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ABSTRACT
A FRAMEWORK FOR SECURE GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT
Sahar Mohamed Ghanem
Old Dominion University, 2004
Director; Dr. Hussein Abdel-Wahab

The need for secure group communication is increasingly evident in a wide variety o f
governmental, commercial, and Internet communities. Secure group key management is
concerned with the methods o f issuing and distributing group keys, and the management
o f those keys over a period o f time. To provide perfect secrecy, a central group key
manager (GKM) has to perform group rekeying for every join or leave request. Fast
rekeying is crucial to an application’s performance that has large group size, experiences
frequent joins and leaves, or where the GKM is hosted by a group member. Examples o f
such

applications

are

interactive

military

simulation,

secure

video

and

audio

broadcasting, and secure peer-to-peer networks. Traditionally, the rekeying is performed
periodically for the batch o f requests accumulated during an inter-rekey period. The use
o f a logical key hierarchy (LKH) by a GKM has been introduced to provide scalable
rekeying. If the GKM maintains a LKH o f degree d and height h, such that the group size
n < d \ and the batch size is R requests, a rekeying requires the GKM to regenerate
O(Rxh)

keys and to perform 0 ( d x R x h)

keys encryptions for the new keys

distribution. The LKH approach provided a GKM rekeying cost that scales to the
logarithm o f the group size, however, the number o f encryptions increases with increased
LKH degree, LKH height, or the batch size. In this dissertation, we introduce a
framework for scalable and efficient secure group key management that outperforms the
original LKH approach. The framework has six components as follows. First, we present
a software model for providing secure group key management that is independent o f the
application, the security mechanism, and the communication protocol. Second, we focus
on a LKH-based GKM and introduce a secure key distribution technique, in which a
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rekeying requires the GKM to regenerate 0 { R x h ) keys. Instead o f encryption, we
propose a novel XOR-based key distribution technique, namely XORBP, which performs
an XOR operation between keys, and uses random byte patterns (BPs) to distribute the
key material in the rekey message to guard against insider attacks. Our experiments show
that the XORBP LKH approach substantially reduces a rekeying computation effort by
more than 90%. Third, we propose two novel LKH batch rekeying protocols. The first
protocol maintains a balanced LKH (B^-LKH) while the other maintains an unbalanced
LKH (S-LKH). If a group experiences frequent leaves, keys are deleted form the LKH
and maintaining a balanced LKH becomes crucial to the rekeying’s process performance.
In our experiments, the use o f a B'^-LKH by a GKM, compared to a S-LKH, is shown to
substantially reduce the number o f LKH nodes (i.e., storage), and the number of
regenerated keys per a rekeying by more than 50%. Moreover, the B^-LKH performance
is shown to be bounded with increased group dynamics. Fourth, we introduce a
generalized rekey policy that can be used to provide periodic rekeying as well as other
versatile rekeying conditions. Fifth, to support distributed group key management, we
identify four distributed group-rekeying protocols between a set o f peer rekey agents.
Finally, we discuss a group member and a GKM’s recovery after a short failure time.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Many emerging technologies, such as web technology and low cost high performance
desktops have provided both the inspiration and the motivation o f a wide range of
applications, for which securing data transmission is an important requirement. Although
secure point-to-point communications have been predominant so far, the need for secure
group communication is increasingly evident in a wide variety o f government,
commercial, and Internet communities. Secure group communication is becoming the
basis for a growing number o f applications such as war gaming, law enforcement,
disaster relief, stock quotes distribution, news feeds, software updates, live multi-party
conferencing, shared work space, distributed interactive simulation, Internet video
transmission, and on-line video games. Some o f these applications engage in one-tomany communication while others involve many-to-many communication. Different
group applications and different application contexts will need different security services.
In secure group communication, just as in point-to-point communication, the privacy,
integrity, availability, and authenticity o f a group service must be protected. However, a
group security concerns are considerably more involved than those regarding point-topoint communication. In secure group communication, dealing with common issues o f
message authentication and confidentiality becomes much more complex. In addition,
other concerns arise, such as access control, and dynamic group membership [4], [31].
Secure group communication is usually categorized by the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) as secure multicast communication. The IP multicast model [18] uses the
notion o f a group o f members associated with a given group address. A sender simply
sends a message to this group address and the network replicates the message and
forwards the copies to group members located throughout the network.

The journal m odel for this dissertation is the lEEE/A CM Transactions on Networking.
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Secure group communication has three major core areas: secure group policy, secure
group data transfer, and secure group key management [29]. A secure group policy
provides the definition, implementation and maintenance o f policies governing the
various mechanisms o f group security, such as key dissemination, access control,
updating (rekeying) o f the group shared keys, and the actions taken -when certain keys are
compromised. Secure group data transfer is concerned with providing secure group traffic
techniques such as the methods used to ascertain the authenticity o f a piece o f data and
the methods used to establish data confidentiality. Secure group key management is
concerned with the methods o f issuing and distributing group keys and the management
o f those keys over period o f time, e.g. updating (rekeying) the existing group key(s)
under certain conditions following the prescribed policies.
In this dissertation, we present our view and efforts in developing software
framework for providing secure group key management that is efficient, scalable,
reliable, and independent o f the application, the security mechanism, and the
communication protocol.

1.1

Overview
Before the widespread use o f the computer, information security was provided by

physical and administrative means. With the introduction o f the computer, the need for
automated tools for protecting files and information stored on the computer became
evident. The generic name for such tools is computer security. The introduction of
distributed systems and the use o f networks and communications facilitate carrying data
between computers. Network security measures are needed to protect data during their
transmission. There are no clear boundaries between these three forms o f security.
By viewing the function o f the computer system as providing information, there is a
flow o f information from a source to a destination, and the attacks could be classified as
passive attacks, or active attacks. Passive attacks are usually called eavesdropping,
monitoring, or interception, and its goal is to obtain information that is being transmitted.
The attacks could be the release o f message content, or traffic analysis. They are very
difficult to detect. Thus, network security emphasis is on preventing them rather than
detecting their occurrence. Active attacks involve modification o f the data stream or the
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creation o f a false one. There are four active attack categories. Masquerade
(impersonating) in which one entity pretends to be a different entity; Replay in which
passive capture o f a data units is followed by subsequent retransmission to produce an
unauthorized effect; Modification o f the message (alteration, delay, or reorder); Denial o f
service that prevents the normal use o f a service. It is difficult to absolutely prevent active
attacks. The goal o f a network security system is to detect them and possibly recover
from any resulting disruption or delays.
The following are the defined network security services:
•

Authentication that assures the recipient that the message is from the source that it
claims to be.

•

Access control to limit and control the access o f information to authorized users.

•

Confidentiality (privacy) is the protection o f transmitted data from passive attacks, so
it is accessible only for authorized users.

•

Integrity that assures the recipient that any modification o f a transmitted message is
done only by authorized users.

•

Non-repudiation is to prevent neither the sender nor the receiver from denying a
transmitted message.

•

Anonymity when the identity o f the sender o f a message is secret.

•

Service availability is the detection and recovery from attacks that result in the loss or
reduction in availability o f elements o f a distributed system.
Many emerging technologies, such as low-cost high performance desktop, video and

audio processing equipment, and high-speed transmission and switching will enable real
time information exchange among group o f participants. A new generation o f distributed
group applications will take advantage o f these technologies and provide many networkbased services. Many o f these applications will require security provisions for session
management and information transmission. War gaming, stock quotes distribution, news
feeds, distributed interactive simulation, live multi-party conferencing, and on-line video
games are just some of these group applications that require multiparty exchange o f data,
voice, and video among a large number o f simulated and real participants. Group
communication has many varying characteristics such as group

size, member

characteristics (i.e., computing power and available bandwidth), membership dynamics.
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4

expected group lifetime, number o f senders, and volume and type o f traffic. A group
security

service

should address the

different requirements

o f different

group

characteristics in addition to being scalable, reliable, and independent o f security
objective, technology, and communication protocol [10],
Cryptography techniques can be used to provide authentication, confidentiality,
sender non-repudiation, and message integrity. The use o f cryptography necessitates the
distribution o f shared group key(s). The nature o f group communication presents a
challenge when trying to provide secure group key management. Secure group key
management addresses issues such as how to generate a group key, how to securely
distribute the group key, how to revoke membership o f leaving members, i.e., preventing
leaving members from access to future group communication (perfect forw ard secrecy),
how to prevent joining members from access to past group communication (perfect
backward secrecy), and how to periodically refresh the group key [65].
Extending point-to-point protocols for distributing a group key is not scalable. For
example, setting up a group o f symmetric keys with the assistance o f a centralized group
key manager (GKM), where the GKM is used for authenticating and distributing the
group key to group members. Such protocol will involve encrypting the relevant message
n times, for a group o f n members, which is not scalable. The primary design goal o f a
secure group key management is to be scalable and make efficient use o f processing,
bandwidth, and storage requirements for a GKM and a group member.
Secure group key management is a relatively recent field o f research that is related to
two classical problems namely secure broadcast and contributory group key agreement.
In secure broadcast a sender wishes to broadcast a secret (group key) by a single
transmission (that is received simultaneously by many receivers) to some subset o f his
receivers. Proposed solutions that are based on the mathematical Chinese Remainder
Theorem [15] or polynomial interpolation [7] are either o f theoretical interest where their
security is not studied, or not efficient for large group sizes. Contributory group key
agreement is usually based on a generalization o f Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement
protocol to a group [37], [61]. DH allows two individuals to agree on a shared key, even
though they can only exchange messages in public. Group DH protocols are contributory
key agreement protocols that generally require sending several messages and the group
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key is generated and distributed after several rounds. These protocols are suitable for
small size peer groups, but not suitable for one-to-many type o f applications, or
applications with heterogeneous environments where group members’ computation
power and bandwidth varies. Since the rekeying delay is very large, group DH protocols
are not suitable for highly dynamic or large groups.
Secure group communication is usually categorized by the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) as secure IP multicast communication. Hardjono et al [29] propose a
reference framework and problem areas for secure IP multicast protocol suites and define
the functional building blocks for such protocol suites. Three problem areas are defined,
namely, multicast data handling, keying material management, and multicast security
policies. Multicast data handling covers problems concerning the security-related
treatments o f multicast data by the sender and the receiver that includes multicast data
encryption, group authentication, source authentication, and data integrity. Management
o f the keying material (i.e., cryptographic key belonging to a group) is concerned with
the secure distribution and refreshment o f keying material along with their associated
state and parameters. Multicast security policies cover aspects o f policy in context of
multicast security that include policy creation, high-level policy translation, and policy
representation. Secure IP multicast provides security throughout the network layer and
routing protocols, and might require trust in intermediate routers.
lolus [49] is the first system to address the group key management scalability
problem by noticing that the security association must be dynamic in case o f group
communication, changing as group membership varies. lolus’s approach to provide
scalability introduces the notion o f a secure distribution tree that is composed o f a
number o f smaller secure multicast subgroups arranged in a hierarchy to create a single
virtual secure group. Scalability is achieved by having each subgroup relatively
independent. Each subgroup has its own subgroup keying and there is no global group
key. Several other proposals adopt a distributed group key management to solve the
group key management scalability problem, e.g. [21], [64].
Wong et al. [67] present a different approach to improve the scalability of group key
distribution. Instead o f a hierarchy o f group security agents, they employ a hierarchy of
keys namely Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH). It is assumed that there exists a trusted and
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secure GKM responsible for group access control and key management using a LKH.
The LKH keys are distributed to group members while attempting to localize (as much as
possible) the effects o f a rekeying event. The LKH approach gained a lot o f interest, and
several other techniques have been built on top o f it to improve the rekeying
computation, communication, or storage requirements [20],

1.2

Motivation and Objective
Secure group communication is becoming the basis o f a wide variety o f applications

in many government, commercial, and Internet communities. Secure group key
management is concerned with securely issuing and distributing a shared group key to
group members. In order to ensure perfect secrecy, the shared group key needs to be
changed and redistributed (rekeyed) as group members join or leave the group. Rekeying
when a member joins (leaves) the group, used to provide perfect backward (forward)
secrecy, prevents the member from accessing previous (future) group communication.
Usually, there exists a dedicated group manager (GKM) responsible for such group key
{GK) management issues. In terms o f scalability, group rekeying presents a challenging
problem when trying to revoke a membership such that a leaving group member would
not have future access to the group communication.
A very fast rekeying is crucial to the performance o f an application that has large
group size, experiences frequent joins and leaves, or the GKM is hosted by a group
member because o f the required computational effort. For example, a distributed
interactive military simulation that requires the exchange o f communication between
groups o f tens of thousands of participants. A second example, is a content-based publish
subscribe system such as stock quotes distribution, and secure broadcasting o f audio and
video, where a central server experiences frequent join and leave requests. A third
example is a secure group o f few hundred participants, where the GKM is hosted by a
group member such as in peer-to-peer networks, mobile ad-hoc networks, or grid
computing environments.
The simplest protocol is for the GKM to maintain the GK and a shared key with every
group member. Rekeying for a new member joining the group requires the GKM to
change the GK, encrypt it with its previous version and send it to old group members, and
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encrypt it with the new member shared key and send it to him. Rekeying to revoke a
membership (i.e., leaving member) requires the GKM to change the GK, encrypt it
individually with each shared key and send it to the corresponding member. When
revoking a membership, the GKM can no longer use the previous GK that is known to the
leaving (evicted) member. This protocol requires two encryptions to provide perfect
backward secrecy, but requires n encryptions to provide perfect forward secrecy for a
group o f n members. This protocol is not scalable since it scales linearly with the group
size.
The logical key hierarchy (LKH) [67] provides a scalable approach and requires the
GKM to maintain a hierarchy (tree) o f keys o f degree d. The root o f the hierarchy is GK,
the leaf nodes are the members shared keys, and the other keys (known as keyencrypting-keys KEKs) are used to provide scalable rekeying. Every group member holds
the keys that fall on the path from his shared key leaf node to the root. If a new member
joins the group, his shared key is inserted in the hierarchy and all the keys he will be
holding are changed and redistributed. If a group member leaves the group, his shared
key is deleted from the hierarchy and all the keys he was holding are changed and
redistributed.
For example, the LKH o f degree <7=3, shown in Fig. 1, is maintained by a GKM for
a group o f 9 members (a keys is indexed by the members’ numbers whose holding it).
Rekeying after inserting K^ (member joins) requires the GKM to change

to be

K^_g and the group key Kj_g to be K^_g, and to perform the following 4 encryptions' for
the new keys distribution: {Kg_g}Kg_^, {Kj_g}Kg, {K,_p}Ki_g, and {Ki_g}Kg. While
rekeying after removing Kg (member leaves) requires the GKM to change Kj_g to be
K,_g and the group key K^_g to be K ^_^, and to perform the following 5 encryptions for
the new

keys

distribution:

{Kg_^}Kj,

{K,_g}Kg,

{Ki_g}Kj_ ,
3

and

{Kj_g}K _g. In general, for a group o f n members and a balanced LKH o f degree d,
7

rekeying after a member joins would require GKM to perform on the average 2 x log^ n
encryptions and rekeying after a member leaves would require GKM to perform on the

The notation {M }K implies that the m essage M is encrypte<i with the key K.
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average d x log^ n encryptions. A group member stores log^ n keys and has to perform
at most log^ n decryptions for a rekeying.

-7-9
-1-3

K,

Fig. 1. A Logical Key Hierarchy o f degree J = 3 for a group o f 9 members.

Traditionally, group rekeying is performed periodically for the accumulated join and
leave requests (i.e., batch o f updates) during an inter-rekey period. If the GKM maintains
a LKH o f degree d and height h, such that n < d ^ , and the batch size is R requests, a
rekeying requires the GKM to regenerate 0 { R y . h ) keys and to perform 0 { d x R x h )
keys encryptions for the new keys distribution. The encryption-based LKH approach
provided a rekeying cost that scales to the logarithm o f the group size, however, the
number o f encryptions performed by a GKM increases with increased LKH degree, LKH
height, or the batch size, and can be more than the simple approach’s number of
encryptions (i.e, n encryptions).
Many researchers introduced new techniques for group rekeying on top o f LKH
attempting to reduce compuation, communication, or storage cost for a GKM or a group
members. While Chang et al. [13] achieve reduction in a GKM storage, their approaches
allow members to collaborate or collude and break the system easily. The use o f one-way
function to reduce communication cost is suggested by Balenson et al. [2], which might
increase the computation effort and the rekeying delay. The use o f pseudo-random
function to reduce communication-storage parameters is suggested by Canetti et al. [11],
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which constraints key generation to applying pseudo random function which makes it
hard to choose the session key form chosen weak keys.
The objective of our work is to provide a framework for secure group key
management that outperforms the original LKH approach in terms o f a rekeying
computation effort for all application scenarios. The framework has to be secure,
scalable, efficient, reliable, and independent o f the application, the security mechanism,
and the communication protocol.
The main component o f the framework is the key distribution technique. The main
drawback o f the LKH approach is that rekeying requires the use o f encryption/decryption
that will delay the process. Many real-time applications require very fast rekeying so that
it is not disraptive to their performance. In addition, the LKH approach has two different
procedures for rekeying in case o f a member joining or leaving the group. Having two
un-symmetric rekeying protocols makes it more complex for batch processing, where a
rekeying is performed after a sequence o f requests o f members joining and/or leaving the
group (i.e., batch o f updates). As previously noted, the other approaches built on top o f
LKH either increase the computation effort or are more vulnerable than the original LKH
approach. Our objective is to introduce a key distribution technique, on top o f LKH, that
requires much less computation effort and symmetric in both rekeying cases. In addition,
the new technique should be as secure as the original LKH and does not introduce any
significant increase in the communication or the storage requirements.
While the use of LKH is becoming standard practice as a group key management
technique, and many researchers assume a balanced LKH (i.e., all leaf nodes are at the
same level) for their cost estimates. To the best o f our knowledge, no LKH maintenance
algorithms have been proposed for any LKH degree that keeps it balanced all the time.
Our objective is to provide LKH insertion and deletion algorithms and the associated
rekeying protocol(s) that maintain the LKH o f any degree balanced at all times.
Since the group rekeying latency is large, it is not practical to apply such process after
each member joins or leaves the group. Instead, a batch rekeying process should be
applied for a sequence o f members joining and/or leaving the group. The rekeying
process could be triggered periodically or when a certain condition is satisfied such as the
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batch size exceeding a certain limit. Our objective is to extend the developed balanced
LKH algorithms and protocols for individual updates to a batch o f updates.
A central key manager becomes a central point o f both congestion and failure. For a
scalable reliable framework, our design has to provide both central and distributed secure
group key management mechanisms. In addition, it is essential to incorporate a recovery
mechanism for a key manager and a group member after short times o f failure. The
mobile computing paradigm is an example where frequent short disconnection times may
occur, due to handoffs.

1.3

Contributions
First, we presented a new generic software model for providing secure group

communication. The model identifies five main components

along with main

functionality and interactions. The identified components are authentication manager,
group key manager, rekey manager and the corresponding rekey client, group rekey
channel, and cryptographic utility manager [25]. Then, we extended Java'^'^ Security with
an application-programming interface (API) that can be used to provide group key
manager, rekey manager, and rekey client functionality as suggested by our model. Our
secure group key management framework is independent o f the application, the security
mechanism, and the communication protocol. The group key management framework
requires addressing the following issue; group key distribution, rekey protocol, batch
rekeying, distributed group key management, and group key manager recovery. We
briefly present our approach to resolve the aforementioned issues highlighting our
contributions.

A Key Distribution Technique
We focused on the rekey manager/rekey client protocol that uses a Logical Key
Hierarchy (LKH) in order to provide scalable group key distribution. Similar to the
original LKH, we assume the rekey manager (re)-generates any key independent o f all
other keys including its old version. Then, the rekey manager sends a rekey message to
all group members. The rekey message is received by the rekey client component, and
contains a rekey packet for every new key. The rekey client chooses which rekey packets
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to process and update his set o f keys according to other guiding message information
(e.g., the location o f the new keys).
The original LKH approach encrypts a new key with either other key or its previous
version. Instead, we proposed a novel XOR-based key distribution technique namely
XORBP. The proposed approach uses an XOR operation between keys to reduce the
computation effort, and uses random byte patterns (BP) to distribute the key material in a
fixed size rekey packet to protect against insider attacks [24]. Compared to the encryption
approach, our technique provides symmetric rekey protocols in both cases o f group
member joining and leaving. In addition, our experiments have shown that XORBP can
achieve more than 90% reduction in the rekey message construction time, compared to
the encryption-based key distribution technique, for the same LKH degree. For example,
consider a news broadcast GKM that supports a group o f size n = 60,000, where up to
100 listeners could join in a sec, a listener stays tuned for few minutes, and a one block
encryption consumes 1 msec. Using the original encryption-based LKH, where d = 4 ,h =
8, and R = 1000, the rekey manager’s rekey message construction time requires 32 sec.
Using the suggested XORBP LKH approach, a rekey message construction time is
reduced to 3.2 sec.
On the other hand, XORBP increases LKH storage, member storage, and the rekey
communication cost (message size). Due to the un-symmetry o f the encryption protocol,
increasing the LKH degree with such protocol reduces the join rekey computation cost
while increases the leave rekey computation cost. Using the symmetric XORBP key
distribution technique and increasing LKH degree would not have the same constraint.
The symmetry o f XORBP protocol allows the use o f a larger degree LKH, which reduces
LKH storage, member storage, and rekey communication cost compared to a smaller
degree LKH.

LKH Maintenance and Rekey Protocols
The research literature lacks practical LKH maintenance algorithms as well as
algorithms for keeping it balanced. Keeping a LKH balanced is crucial to the
performance o f group rekeying especially for highly dynamic groups. We proposed two
novel protocols for establishing and maintaining a LKH (by a rekey manager) with any
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degree as key nodes are inserted and deleted while group members join and leave the
group. In addition, we detailed the rekey message format and construction in different
LKH insertion and deletion scenarios as well as the different rekey client updates to
maintain a group member set o f keys. One protocol adopts a balanced LKH while the
other adopts an unbalanced LKH that is developed for comparison.
Our protocols are based on the rekey manager assigning a unique member
identification (individual ID) that will be used as a group member sort and search value.
Individual identifications are sent in the rekey message to guide its processing, so they
better be randomly generated (not from any names, IP address, or any other true
individual identification) to prevent the possibility o f traffic analysis. In our protocols, the
LKH plays a dual role as a key tree and an easily searchable data structure (using an
individual ID) for the member individual material (name, IP address, k e y ,... etc).
Our first protocol maintains a LKH as a search tree (S-LKH) using the individual IDs.
We adapt the search tree algorithms to accommodate the constraint that group individual
materials are entries in the leaf nodes, while the internal nodes contain key-encryptingkey s (KEKs). Our second protocol maintains a LKH as a balanced

search tree (B^-

LKH) that has the same structure as S-LKH but guarantees that the LKH is balanced after
every node insertion or deletion. B"^ search trees have an extra constraint that all allocated
nodes have to be at least half full to reduce the required tree allocated memory (storage).
On the other hand, B’^-LKH maintenance introduces complexity and extra overhead in the
rekey process.
We have performed empirical experiments to compare the rekey performance o f SLKH versus B^-LKH for different group sizes and LKH degrees. For individual rekeying
(i.e., rekey after every join or leave request) the use o f B^-LKH results in an increase in
the average number o f rekey packets and the average number o f encrypted keys
compared to S-LKH. On the other hand, a B^-LKH has smaller height, and introduces a
decrease in the maximum number of encrypted keys. The maximum number o f encrypted
keys identifies the minimum period that has to be elapsed between two rekeyings.
Furthermore, a B"^-LKH requires much less allocated nodes (i.e., storage) compared to SLKH. The reduction o f the number of allocated nodes using B'^-LKH reaches 50% o f the
number o f nodes for the same degree S-LBCH for a highly dynamic group. A complete
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h -\

LKH o f degree d and height h contains {d'' - \ ) l { d - \ ) nodes ( ' ^ d ' ), and can fit a
1=0

group o f size n < d ^ . A leaf node contains d individual keys, while an internal node
contains d key-encrypting-keys. For the aforementioned example, a GKM for 60,000
group members and a LKH o f degree

= 4, the B^-LKH number o f allocated nodes is

estimated to be 42,000, (form our experiment, when d = A, the B'''-LKH number o f
allocated nodes = 0.7 x n ). On the other hand, if a S-LKH is used, the LKH number o f
allocated nodes could increase to more than 84,000 for a highly dynamic group.

Batch Rekeying
As previously mentioned, individual rekeying is not practical. For example, if the
inter-arrival time o f group members at the start o f a session is very small, a new group
key might be issued (by the rekey manager) before the previous key version has reached
(or has been used by) the group members. A simple solution is periodic rekeying that
suggests rekeying after a fixed period o f time that is large enough to avoid the above
problem. Periodic rekeying will require a rekeying for a batch o f updates (i.e,
accumulated join and leave requests during this period). Periodic rekeying doesn’t take
into account the batch size or the request delay. We have extended our protocols to
support batch processing.
First, we introduced a generalized rekey policy based on three main parameters that
determine the triggering condition for the rekeying process. The three parameters are
batch size, maximum request delay (i.e., time between receiving the request and the start
of rekeying), and the minimum inter-rekey period (i.e., minimum period that has to be
elapsed between two consecutive rekeyings). The application has the flexibility o f using
all or some o f the rekey policy parameters as a deciding factor for triggering the rekey
process. The application type determines what blend of parameters is taken into
consideration. We detailed the designed rekey policy definition and presented a software
object design for secure group key management.
Next, we extended S-LKH and B"^-LKH rekey protocols for a batch o f updates. For
individual rekeying we concluded that the use o f B'^-LKH introduces major LKH storage
savings and slightly increases the rekey cost. Our experiments for batch o f updates show
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that using B^-LKH with large batch size and/or high dynamic groups substantially
reduces the rekey cost by more than 50% when compared to S-LKH. For example,
assuming a balanced LKH (B'*'-LKH) the number o f regenerated keys in the above
example is estimated to be 8,000 keys, while if an unbalanced S-LKH is used, the number
o f regenerated keys can increase to more than 16,000 keys (and therefore doubles the
LKH estimated rekeying times). In addition, our experiments demonstrate that B"^-LKH
performance is stable (bounded) for highly dynamic groups while S-LKH performance
deteriorates as the group dynamics increase. Such S-LKH instability is due to the fact that
the minimum number o f children o f a node is one while B^-LKH nodes need to be at
least half full.

Distributed Group Key Management
To extend the scalability and the reliability o f our model, we introduced four
cooperating protocols o f distributed group key management between peer rekey agents.
In a group o f peer rekey agents, every agent manages a subset o f the group members and
participates equally in generating and distributing the group key (known to all group
members). We show that the protocol with the minimal overhead is that one rekey agent
at a time generates and distributes the group key to all members. We provide the design
details o f the LKH maintained at every agent for the different cooperation scenarios.
If any rekey agent is required to update all group members o f a new group key, a
naive approach is that every agent maintains (replicates) the group LKH. Instead, we
proposed the creation o f agents’ LKH (A-LKH) that reduces the replicated LKH size, and
the number o f maintained keys at a group member. Moreover, we discussed two different
approaches for maintaining A-LKH namely dynamic A-LKH and static A-LKH. The first
approach, dynamic A-LKH, allows a flexible agent join and leave but has a drawback of
(sometimes) updating (some) group members when a rekey agent joins or leaves the
agents’ group. While, in the second approach, static A-LKH, the maximum number o f
rekey agents has to be known before starting the session and updating A-LKH is
transparent to all group members.
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Group Key Manager Recovery
Finally, we suggested a recovery protocol o f a group key manager (agent) after a
short time o f failure. Although the group key manager state (e.g., LKH) could be
recovered by collecting the state stored at all group members (and rekey agents), we
introduced the use o f a log file to facilitate such recovery in ease o f member failures or
inconsistency. The logging system avoids writing any key or revealing any random
number generator information. The log file is used to recover the last rekey policy, the
rekey scheduler state, and the shape o f LKH (without keys). The group members
participate in the recovery phase by sending at least one encrypted recovery message to
their rekey manager. The recovery message sent by a group member contains his set of
maintained keys. Noticing that many LKH keys are stored by more than one group
member (e.g., the group key is maintained by all group members), we introduced a key
selection technique for group members to reduce the number o f sent keys in a reeovery
message while allowing the group key manager to retrieve all LKH keys. The proposed
logging and recovery mechanism is secure and easy to implement. The recovery o f a
group member after short time o f failure can be treated as the member leaving the group
then joining later. If no rekeying is initiated between the leave and join requests, the
group member state is refreshed (i.e., sending him the same set o f keys he was holding).
In this case, refreshing a group member optimizes the rekey process by reducing the
number o f changed keys. Such refreshing requires the group member to provide his
individual ID and key.

In summary our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) A generic software model for secure group key management that identifies the main
eomponents and their functionalities and interaetion. Extending Java'^“ security with
an API that can be used to provide the group key manager, the rekey manager, and
the rekey client functionality suggested in our model.
2) A simple key distribution technique XORBP that can be used with the Logical Key
Hierarchy (LKH) approach for group key management. Our experiments show that,
compared to the original encryption technique for key distribution, XORBP has
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symmetric rekey procedures for join and leave, and can achieve more than 90%
reduetion in the rekey message construction time [24],
3) Two LKH protocols for group individual rekeying (i.e., after each join or leave
request) that details the LKH insertion and deletion algorithms, and the rekey
message format and construction performed by a group rekey manager. In addition,
the protocols detail the rekey elient updates performed by the eomponent that reeeives
the rekey message at a group member. Our first protocol adopts an unbalanced LKH
(S-LKH) while the other adopts a balanced LKH (B"^-LKH). Our experiments show
that B^-LKH reduces the required LKH storage while slightly increases the individual
rekeying cost compared to S-LKH. The reduction o f the number o f allocated nodes
using B^-LICH reaches 50% o f the same degree S-LKH for a highly dynamic group
[25].
4) For batch processing (sequence o f join and/or leave requests): first, we formalized a
definition o f a flexible rekey policy that has three main parameters: batch size,
maximum request delay, and minimum inter-rekey period. Then, we provided a
simplified view o f the software objects used to provide secure group key
management. Next, we extended the above two protocols (S-LKH and B^-LKH) to
support batch rekeying. Our experiments for batch o f updates show that using a
balanced LKH (B'^-LKH) with large batch size and/or high dynamie group
substantially reduces the rekey computation and communication cost by more than
50% when compared to an unbalanced LKH (S-LKH). In addition, our experiments
show that B'^-LKH performance is stable (bounded) for highly dynamic groups while
S-LKH performance deteriorates as the group dynamics increases.
5) We introduced four cooperating protocols o f distributed group key management
between a group o f peer rekey agents, and detailed the maintained LKH and the
group rekey overhead for each model. We introduced the use o f agents’ LKH (ALKH) to reduce the size o f the replicated LKH maintained at each agent over a naive
approach (used in two o f the above protocols). In addition, we proposed two
techniques for A-LKH maintenance, one allows a transparent agent join or leave to
group members and the other is not transparent (group members might be
affeeted/notified).
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6) Finally, we proposed a logging and recovery mechanism for the group key manager
and the rekey manager. The proposed technique is secure and easy to implement.
Group members participate in the recovery o f their group key manager by sending
one recovery message (in most cases). A key selection technique is proposed for a
group member to reduce the size and overhead o f the recovery message. In addition,
we discussed the recovery o f a group member after a short time o f failure.

1.4

Outline
The rest o f this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II presents related work

to secure group communication and secure group key management. Chapter III
introduces the software model for secure group key management and presents the new
key distribution technique XORBP. In addition, the experimental results for comparing
XORBP key distribution technique with the encryption-based technique are presented. In
Chapter IV, we detail the designed rekey protocols. The first protocol adopts an
unbalanced LKH (S-LKH) while the second protocol adopts a balanced LKH (B^-LKH).
We present the rekey message format, the LKH data structure, the LKH maintenance
algorithms along with the rekey message construction for both protocols, and the rekey
client update procedures for B^-LKH protocol. Moreover, the experimental results for
comparing the two protocols for individual rekeying are presented. In chapter V, we
introduce a rekey policy definition and implementation, and highlight the extension of
B^-LKH rekey protocol for batch processing. Furthermore, the experimental results for
comparing S-LKH and B^-LKH protocols for batch rekeying are presented. Chapter VI
presents the extended model for distributed group key management. In addition, we
discuss the recovery o f a group member after a short time of failure as well as the
proposed recovery protocol for the group key manager. Finally, chapter VII concludes
this dissertation summarizing our contributions and presenting ideas for future
extensions.
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CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
In chapter I, we identified the main requirements and issues for providing secure
group key management. In a general model, there is a group manager responsible for
generating and distributing a group key to all group members. The group manager is also
responsible for changing and redistributing (i.e., rekeying) the group key when it deems
necessary. The group key has to be changed to prevent new (old) group members from
accessing previous (future) group communication. Secure group key management has to
be scalable and reliable. A major scalability problem occurs when a rekeying is
performed to revoke a group membership. A naive solution allows the group manager to
perform n encryptions to distribute a new group key to a group o f n members.
In this chapter, we present relevant related work to the secure group key management
problem. First, we present two (classical) problems similar to group key distribution.
Section 2.1 presents the secure broadcasting problem, while section 2.2 presents the
contributory group key agreement problem. As previously noted, secure group
communication is categorized by IETF as secure multicast. Section 2.3 summarizes the
lEFT group key management standard. In addition, we summarize the recent research
work for secure group key management. The approaches for solving the scalability
problem, identified above, can be categorized as physical distributed management
(section 2.4) and the logical key hierarchy approach (section 2.5). Moreover, section 2.6
summarizes several related topics to secure group communication such as multicast
IPsec, group policy, group access control, group data-origin authentication, and rekey
transport protocols. Finally, section 2.7 summarizes this chapter.

2.1

Secure Broadcasting
Secure broadcast is motivated by the main property o f a broadcast channel, that is a

single transmission from a source station can be received simultaneously by many
destination stations. Secure broadcast is defined as the sender wishing to broadcast a
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secret to some subset o f his receivers. Meanwhile, the sender does not perform a separate
encryption either o f the secret or o f a single key with which to protect the secret, for each
o f the intended recipients.
Secure lock [15] proposes the locking concept and a secure lock implementation
based on the Chinese remainder Theorem. The proposed scheme is efficient only when
the number o f users in a group is small, since the time to compute the lock and the length
o f the lock (hence the transmission) is proportional to the number o f users.
Berkowis [7] provided a generalized model for a predefined scheme for secure
broadcasting that uses polynomial interpolation for secret sharing. The general model
assumes each receiver has a unique pseudo-share (secret) with the sender. The sender
broadcast a set o f shares, while each subscribed receiver adds his pseudo-share, as a
possible share, to the received shares. If that pseudo-share is an actual share he recovers
the secret, and if it is not he doesn’t recover the secret. Some examination o f the security
o f his scheme is still necessary. Gong [26] tries to add authentication, integrity check, and
freshness assurance to the message o f a modified version o f the polynomial method.
Fait and Naor [22] introduce theoretical measures for the qualitative and quantitative
assessment o f the encryption schemes designed for broadcast transmissions. The work
considers a scenario where there is a center and a set of users. The center provides the
users with pre-arranged keys when they join the system. At some point the center wishes
to broadcast a message to a dynamically changing privileged subset o f the users. The
obvious solution is to give every user its own key and transmit an individually encrypted
message to every member o f the privileged class. This requires a very lengthy
transmission. The other simple solution is to provide every possible subset o f users with a
key. This requires every user to store a huge number o f keys. The authors provide
solutions, which are efficient in the two measures, transmission length, and storage at the
user’s end. In addition, the schemes should be computationally efficient. The security
parameter was defined to be the length o f the key. Another defined parameter is the
number o f users that have to collude so as to break the scheme. For a given parameter k, a
k-resilient scheme should be resilient to any subset of k users that collude and any disjoint
subset o f any size o f privileged users.
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2.2

Contributory Group Key Agreement
There are two types o f group key agreement, centralized or contributory. In

centralized techniques, the entire key generation is performed by a single entity (which
actually translates into key distribution, not key agreement). On the other hand, in a
contributory key agreement, each group member makes an independent contribution to
the group key. The contributory key agreement model is usually based on a
generalization o f Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement protocol to a group [37], [61]. DH
is a public-key system that allows two individuals to agree on a shared key, even though
they can only exchange messages in public. Group DH generally require sending several
messages, exchanges, and the key is generated and distributed after several rounds. These
protocols are suitable for small size peer groups. While they are not suitable for one-tomany (one sender and many receivers) type o f applications, applications with a
heterogeneous environment where member computation power and bandwidth varies. In
addition, since the rekey latency (delay) is very large, they are not suitable for highly
dynamic and/or large groups where frequent re-keying is necessary.

2.3

Standardized (IETF) Group Key Management
The Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) [35], [36] is an application level

protocol, independent o f the underlying communication protocol. The creation and
distribution o f the group key require assignment o f roles. The two primary roles are those
o f key distributor and member. The protocol identifies what functions the individual
hosts perform in the protocol. The controller initiates the creation of the key, forms the
key distribution messages, and collects acknowledgement o f key receipt from the
receiver. The member waits for a distribution message, decrypt, validate, and
acknowledges the receipt o f the new key.
Baugher et al. [ ] present a group key management architecture for multicast security
6

that is based upon the group controller model with a single group owner as the root-oftrust. The group owner designates a group controller for member registration and rekey.
The framework and the architecture allow for a modular and flexible design o f group key
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management protocols for variety different settings that are specialized to application
needs.
Hardjono et al [29] propose a reference framevv^ork and problem areas for secure IP
multicast protocol suites and define a breakdown to functional building blocks for such
protocol suites. They define three problem areas; multicast data handling, management o f
the keying material, and multicast security policies. Group key management building
blocks following the reference framework are described in [28], [33].

2.4

Distributed Group Key Management
Ensemble [57] is a group communication system built at Cornell University, and is a

descendant from an earlier system named Hours, that is descendant from the Isis system.
The system allows processes to create process groups in which scalable reliable FIFOordered multicast and point-to-point communication are supported. A process group
coherently binds together many processes into one entity. Processes may dynamically
join and leave a group. Ensemble is a user-level library linked to an application, and is
divided into many layers each implementing a simple protocol. Stacking together these
layers, the user may customize the system to suite its needs. All members in a group must
have the same stack to communicate. Ensemble group communication has inherently
limited scalability, and scales to 100 members. Rodeh et al. [57] describe the security
protocols and infrastructure o f Ensemble. A completely distributed and fault-tolerant
algorithm for the management o f Ensemble group keys (arranged as LKH) is described in
[56].
lolus [49] is a scalable, general-purpose framework that can be used for either secure
multicasting or multicast key management. lolus discards the idea o f large flat secure
multicast group and replaces it with the notion o f a secure distribution tree that is
composed o f multiple smaller secure multicast subgroups arranged in a hierarchy.
Together these subgroups form a single virtual secure multicast group. The glue that
holds the subgroups together consists o f the Group Security Agents (GSAs) that manage
each subgroup. The GSAs cooperate to invisibly deliver all multicast data securely to
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each o f the subgroups, thereby creating a single secure multicast image for the senders
and receivers.
Versakey [64] is a middleware framework for secure multicasting. The framework
presents three closely related schemes for key distribution and management, ranging from
tightly centralized to completely distributed. The framework also provides a set o f
efficient transitions from one scheme to another. All approaches organize the space o f
keys that will eventually be assigned to group members in a unique way, without actually
generating the keys before they are needed.
DISEC [21] proposes a distributed key management scheme for many-to-many secure
group communication. The framework uses one-way function trees for key distribution
and management. DISEC proposes a localized ID assignment scheme thereby eliminating
the need for a centralized group controller. Each member generates its own key thereby
contributing a secret towards the computation o f the root key. In addition, DISEC doesn’t
have a single point o f control, attack, or failure.

2.5

Logical Key Hierarchy
Wong et al. [67] present a novel solution to the scalability problem o f group key

management. They introduce key graphs and its special type, a key tree, to specify secure
groups. It is assumed that a tmsted and secure key server is responsible for group access
control and key management, and the key server uses key graphs for group key
management. A key graph is a directed acyclic graph with two types o f nodes, w-nodes
representing members and A:-nodes representing keys. A member is given key k if and
only if there is a directed path from w-node u to k-node k in the graph. In addition, they
present three rekeying strategies, user oriented, key oriented, and group oriented
join/leave protocols based on these strategies. The strategies are scalable to large groups
with frequent joins and leaves. In particular, the average server processing time per
join/leave increases linearly with the logarithm o f group size. The key tree is widely used
and known as a logical key hierarchy (LKH).
Representing a binary LKH as a one-way function trees (OFTs) is introduced in [2].
In comparison with LKH, OFT algorithm reduces half the number o f bits broadcast by
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the manager per add or evict operation. The OFT has the option o f member contributions
to the entropy o f the common communication key. On the other hand, OFT raises some
interesting questions about the security o f function iterates, and that o f bottom-up one
way function trees.
Key management using a Boolean function minimization technique, introduced in
[13], is similar to the LKH scheme in the sense that it uses smart distribution o f keys to
achieve good scaling. However, instead o f using a fixed hierarchy o f keys, they
dynamically generate the most suitable key hierarchy by composing different keys. The
paper focuses explicitly on the problem o f cumulative member removal and proposes a
scheme that can be used to find the minimum number o f messages required to distribute
the new keys to the remaining group members. An advantage o f their scheme is that the
controller has to maintain only

0

(lo g n ) keys as opposed to
2

(w), where n is the number

0

o f members in the group. Due to the minimal number o f auxiliary keys that this key
management maintains, it may be susceptible to collusion attacks. In a collusion attack, a
set of members previously removed from the group collude and by combining their sets
o f keys may be able to obtain the current valid set o f keys, thereby being able to continue
unauthorized receipt o f group communication.
Loptsiech

et al.

[46]

describes

a key management mechanism

for group

communication sessions that is based on the “Subset-Difference” algorithm. The SubsetDifference algorithm is especially suitable for stateless receivers. Its main advantage over
LKH is that it requires to transmit only 2 x r keys instead o f

2

x r x log n keys in order
2

to revoke r users from a set o f n users, regardless o f the coalition size, while maintaining
a single decryption at the user’s end. In return, it requires every receiver to store
log ( x n ) keys instead o f logj nkeys. The receiver needs to employ 1 decryption for
2

2

every rekeying event plus log n applications o f a pseudo-random generator. Chen and
2

Dondeti [14] study the advantage and applicability o f statefull and stateless rekeying
algorithms to different applications. An analytically comparison is presented o f the
storage eost and the rekeying cost o f LKH and the Subset-Difference revocation
algorithm in immediate and batch rekeying scenarios.
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Canetti et al. [11] present a rekeying protocol for wide range o f efficiency
requirement with respect to several parameters. An upper bound is deduced in the
tradeoff between storage and communication parameters In addition, lower bounds are
presented on the tradeoff between communication and user storage. Moreover, the
proposed scheme is shown to be almost optimal with respect to these lower bounds. The
security o f their scheme can be reduced to the strength or the security o f the pseudo
random function used in the computation. Repeated applications o f a pseudo-random
function, to the input will make it difficult (for the group controller) to guarantee that the
root key is not from a weak key space.
Another improved LKH algorithm, LKH+2, is proposed in [55], where a group
manager can use keys already in the tree to drive new keys. LKH+2 achieves K x log^ n
message size for leave operations, where K is the size o f a key.
Selck et al. [58] present a modification to the LKH scheme where the new approach
proposes an organization o f the LKH trees with the respect to the members’ compromise
probabilities instead o f keeping a balanced tree, in a spirit similar to data compression
techniques such as Huffman and Shannon-Fano coding.

2.6

Additional Secure Group Communication Issues
In this section we present the following additional secure group communication

issues: multicast IPsec, group policy, group data-origin authentication, rekey transport
protocols, and secure multicast services.
2.6.1

Group/Multicast IP Security (IPsec)

IPsec [41] is designed to provide interoperable, cryptographically based security
services for IPv4 and IPv . These services are provided at the IP layer, offering
6

protection for IP and/or upper layer protocols (e.g. TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc). These
objectives are met through the use o f two traffic security protocols, the Authentication
Header (AH) [42] and the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [43], and through the
use o f cryptographic key management procedures and protocols. These mechanisms are
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designed to be algorithm-independent with a specified standard set o f default algorithms
to facilitate interoperability in the global Internet.
IPsec security services can be provided between a pair o f communicating hosts,
between a pair o f communicating security gateways, or between a security gateway and a
host. The protection offered is based on requirements defined by a Security Policy
Database (SPD) established and maintained by a user or system administrator. Packets
are selected for one o f three processing modes based on IP and transport layer header
information matched against entries in the SPD. Each packet is either afforded IPsec
security services, discarded, or allowed to bypass IPsec.
Afforded IPsec packets (use o f AH and/or ESP) make use o f Security Associations
(SAs). SA is a simplex connection that affords security services to the traffic carried by
it. The Security Association Database (SAD) contains parameters that are associated with
each active SA to specify the security services to be provided, protocols to be employed,
and algorithms to be used. The Internet Security Association and Key Management
Protocol (ISAKMP) [47] defines the procedures and packet formats to establish,
negotiate, modify and delete security associations (SAs). Theses formats provide a
consistent framework for transferring key and authentication data which is independent
o f the key generation technique, encrjqition algorithm and authentication mechanism. The
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [32] is an ISAKMP to negotiate, and provide authenticated
key material for security associations in a protected manner.
Extending IPsec to support secure (multicast) groups is not standardized, however,
there are several drafts try to extend IPsec to such support. Canetti et al. [9] propose an
architecture for secure IP multicast that mimics the IPsec architecture, and re-uses exiting
IPsec mechanisms wherever possible.
The IPsec ESP provides a set o f security services that include data origin
authentication, which enables an IPsec receiver to validate that a received packet
originated from a peer-sender in a pair-wise SA. However, for secure IP multicast groups,
ESP

supports

only

“group

authentication”

and

does

not

support

data-origin

authentication. Multicast ESP (MESP) [5] is an extension o f the ESP transform for
multicast data-origin authentication. Canetti et al. [12] propose another MESP transform
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in addition to an Application MESP (AM ES?) that is designed to work in the
application/transport layer.
Similar to ISAKMP, the Group Secure Associate Key Management Protocol
(GSAKMP) [34] defines the message passing requirements to provide mechanisms to
disseminate group policy, perform access control decisions during group establishment,
generate group keys, recover from the compromise o f group members, delegate group
security functions, and destroy the group. In GSAKMP group responsibilities are
decomposed into authorized roles. Roles are defined for Group Owner, Group Controller,
SubGroup Controller, and Member.
2.6.2

Group Policy

Security policy is a statement o f the rules enforced by security mechanisms. Policies
can be described by whom they cover and by what they cover. Group security policy can
be static or it can be dynamic and tailored to the requirements o f the group.
Hardjono et al. [30] define group security policy expressed in the form o f policy
token or policy certificate. It describes the elements that make-up an instance o f group
policy and explains the intended functions o f each element.
The Antigone framework [48] provides an interface for the definition and
implementation o f a wide range o f secure group policies. Policies are implemented by the
composition and configuration o f a defined set o f mechanisms that provide the basic
services needed for secure groups. Antigone provides mechanisms for providing the
following functions; authentication, member join, session key and group member
distribution, application messaging, failure detection, and member leave.
The Dynamic Cryptographic Context Management (DCCM) [19] provides a policybased security for large (

1 0 0 , 0 0 0

members), dynamically changing groups o f

participants. In DCCM, groups at all levels have policies. These policies are represented,
negotiated, managed, and an unambiguous set o f mechanisms and configuration (called a
cryptographic context) is created to make particular interactions possible subject to these
policies.
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2.6.3

Multicast Group Access Control

Multicast communication provides one-to-many and many-to-many communication
[18]. There are a number o f available multicast routing protocols that provide the
efficient transport mechanisms o f multicast by routing packets with one group destination
address to multiple recipients. A host uses the Internet Group Membership Protocol
(IGMP) to notify the routing system that it should deliver packets for a particular
multicast group to this host. Gong and Shacham [27] discuss threats, requirements for
security, and some trade-offs between scalability and security. They outlined the
fundamental security issues in building a trusted multicast facility such as protecting
traffic, controlling participation, and restricting access o f unauthorized users.
IGMP operates in a different portion o f the network from the multicast routing
protocol. IGMP operates between hosts and edge routers. Moffaert and Paridaens [50]
discuss security aspects in IGMPv3. Coan et al. [16] propose an application-level secure
multicast technique that addresses some o f the limitations o f end-to-end secure multicast.
The technique has a defense against denial-of-service attacks by using a secure extension
to IGMP. Ballardie [3] describes how a Core Based Tree (CBT) multicast protocol can
provide for secure joining o f a CBT group tree.
Gothic [39] is an architecture for providing group (receiver) access control. Gothic is
composed o f two systems; the group policy management system and the group member
authorization system.
2.6.4

Group Data-Origin (Source) Authentication

The problem o f stream authentication is solved for the case o f one sender and one
receiver. The sender and receiver agree on a secret key, which is used in conjunction with
a message authenticating code (MAC) to ensure the authenticity o f each packet. In case
o f multiple receivers, however, the problem becomes much harder to solve, because a
symmetric approach would allow anyone holding a key (that is, any receiver) to forge
packets. Alternatively, the sender can use digital signatures to sign every packet with its
private key. This solution provides adequate authentication, but digital signature are
prohibitively inefficient.
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Wong and Lam [

] present a chaining technique for signing/verifying multiple

6 8

packets using a single signing/verification operation. Gennaro and Rohatgi [23] present
two solutions to the problem o f authenticating digital streams. The first one is for the case
o f a finite stream, which is entirely know to the sender. The second case is for a
potentially infinite stream, which is not known in advance to the sender.
TESLA [53] is a secure sender authentication mechanism for multicast data streams.
It provides authentication o f individual data packets, regardless o f the packet loss rate. In
addition, TESLA features low overhead for both the sender and the receiver, and does not
require per-receiver state at the sender. For TESLA to be secure, the sender and the
receiver are required to be loosely time synchronized. Loosely time synchronized means
that the synchronization does not need to be precise, but the receiver musk now an upper
bound on the dispersion (the maximum clock offset). Perrig et al. [54] propose several
substantial modifications and improvements to TESLA.
2.6.5

Reliable Group Rekey Transport Protocols

Group re-keying involves two operations - key encoding and key distribution. The
key-encoding phase involves generating a set o f encrypted keys that have to be
transmitted to the members o f the group. The key distribution phase is concerned with
packing these encrypted keys into packets and delivering the packets to the members o f
the group in a scalable, reliable, and timely manner. Although reliable multicast transport
protocols such as RMP [

6 6

] can be used for reliable delivery o f such packets, the reliable

key delivery problem has some characteristics that can be exploited to design custom
protocols that are more light-weight in nature. Possible tailored solutions to the reliable
group key distribution problem are presented in [60] and [70].
2.6.6

Other Secure Multicast Service

The SecureRing [44] group communication protocols provide reliable ordered
message delivery and group membership services despite faults caused by modifications
to the programs o f a group member following illicit access to, or capture of, a group
member (called Byzantine faults).
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Non-repudiation is a proof o f delivery that the receiver did indeed receive data when
they might deny reception. Using the Nark scheme [ ], each multicast receiver can
8

reliably prove whether any fragment o f the data hasn’t been delivered or w asn’t delivered
in time. Further, each receiver’s data can be subject to an individual watermarked audit
trail. This provides a deterrent against a receiver giving away or re-selling either the keys
or the decrypted data.

2.7

Summary
In this chapter, we presented relevant related work to the secure group key

management problem. We presented two classical problems related to the group key
distribution problem: secure broadcasting and contributory group key agreement. In
addition, we summarized the lE TF’s group key management standard. Furthermore, we
presented the different approaches for distributed group management. Moreover, we
summarized the logical key hierarchy (LKU) approach for scalable group key
distribution, and several variations. Finally, we presented a summary o f other related
topics such as multicast IPsec, group policy, group access control, group data-source
authentication, and rekey transport protocols.
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CHAPTER III
XORBP: A NOVEL GROUP KEY DISTRIBUTION TECHNIQUE
In this chapter, we present the contributed software model for providing (central)
secure group communication. The model identifies the main software components along
with their functionalities and interactions. We focus on the details o f the rekey manager
that generates the shared group key and distributes it to all group members. A rekey
(change o f group key) is necessary when a member joins the group to prevent him from
accessing group communication sent before he joined (such operation is denoted join
rekey). A rekey is also necessary when a member leaves the group to prevent him from
accessing further group communication (such operation is denoted leave rekey). We
highlight the two traditional rekey management techniques namely star and logical key
hierarchy (LKH). The traditional group key management systems used to encrypt a newly
generated key with other key (such as the key’s previous version or a group member key)
before distributing it to group members. We demonstrate the drawbacks o f encryptionbased key distribution techniques (KDT) such as having a non-symmetric join and leave
rekey costs, and being not scalable when used with star or high degree LKH key
management. Moreover, we present our novel XOR-based KDT, namely XORBP. The
proposed approach uses bit XOR operation between keys to reduce the computation
effort, and random byte patterns (denoted BPs) to distribute the key material in a fixed
size rekey packet. We demonstrate that XORBP is symmetric in the join and leave rekey
operations. Furthermore, we empirically study and compare the cost o f the encryptionbased and XORBP KDTs. Our experiments have shown that XORBP can achieve up to
87% reduction in the rekey time compared to an encryption-based KDT.
The rest o f the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 presents a generic
software model for secure group communication. Section 3.2 discusses star and LKH
rekey management techniques, and studies the properties o f the traditional encryptionbased KDT. Section 3.3 introduces XORBP the proposed group key distribution
technique. Section 3.4 demonstrates how XORBP can be used with LKH. Section 3.5
presents scenarios and comparison o f the new key distribution technique versus the
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traditional approaches. Section 3.6 analyses and eompares the cost estimates o f XORBP
versus the encryption-based KDT. Section 3.7 presents the experimental results
confirming the analyzed estimates. Finally, the chapter is concluded in section 3.8.

3.1

Secure Group Key Management Components
Fig. 2 illustrates the designed model o f the software eomponents for secure group key

management. The authentication manager is responsible for ensuring the identity o f the
group members defined according to the group policy. The authentication manager could
receive a request from a group member to join the group, or could be in charge o f inviting
the members to join the group. Afterwards, it applies an authentication protocol (using
long-term keys) to decide whether to accept or reject a member. In addition, it negotiates
the session parameters, such as the protocols and implementation used, and establishes a
session individual key with every new member. Moreover, the authentication manager
could be in charge o f ending a member’s participation in the session, according to a
defined policy, a request from the member himself, or due to detected member
communication failure.
The authentication manager notifies the group key manager (GKM) o f every member
removal, and every new member addition along with that m ember’s individual key. GKM
applies a group rekey policy, as to when to change the group key {GK). Different policies
determine whether rekeying is necessary when a member is added and/or removed, or
whether it is performed periodically. In addition, the rekey policy could determine the
batch size (number o f added and/or removed members), or the rekey period. For example,
a rekey startup policy configures the group key manager to wait a certain amount o f time
before starting the creation o f the group key to avoid a startup implosion scenario. When
a rekey is necessary, GKM asks the rekey manager to generate new GK along with the
rekey message RM to be sent (broadcast) to all group members for such GK update.
In our model, we assume when a new member joins the group he receives an initial
key message that is sent through his private channel. Afterwards, the rekey manager
sends (broadcasts) a RM to all group members (including the new member), through a
group rekey channel that updates GK. When a group member leaves (or is evicted from)
the group, only one RM is sent to the remaining group members. The group rekey
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channel implementation should guarantee message reliability, integrity, freshness, and
source authentication. In addition, it should synchronize GK between all group members.

Cryptographic U tility M anager

Authentication Manager

n ew GK

add/remove a member
add and/or rem ove
members (batch)
Group K ey Manager

R ekey Manager

Group Manager
Group Member

Cryptographic U tility Manager

new GK

R ekey Client

Fig. 2. Secure group key management software components.

Note that the authentication manager, the group key manager, and the rekey manager
could be (all or some) software components running on the same machine, or could be
software components running on different machines and communicating through network
channels and protocols.
The rekey client is the group member component that receives RMs and maintains
GK. Both the rekey manager and the rekey client immediately notify a cryptographic
utility manager with a change o f GK. The cryptographic utility manager is responsible for
providing different group security services to the application. The cryptographic utility
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manager has an Application Program Interface (API) that is used by the application to
provide different security services. The cryptographic utility manager could derive
several group keys (from the shared GK) for different uses, such as group encryption,
message integrity, and authentication. Note that, the cryptographic utility manager is
needed at the group manager if it will act as a group member.

3.2

Traditional Rekey Manager
The tradition approaches for providing central group rekey management either uses a

star key management or a logical key hierarchy (LKH). Both approaches use encryptionbased key distribution technique as explained next.
3.2.1 Star Rekey Manager
A star rekey manager for a group o f n members maintains one group key GK, and n
individual keys one for every group member. Every group member i maintains two keys,
GK and his own individual key K ..
If a new member (n + 1) joins the group, the rekey manager changes (regenerates)
GK to be G K ', and sends a RM that has two encrypted^ keys [{GK }G K,[G K }K „ ^).
The first encryption is the new GK ( G K ') encrypted with the previous group key, and is
decrypted by old group members to retrieve G K '. The second encryption is GK'
encrypted with the new member individual key

, and is decrypted by the new

member to retrieve G K '.
When member n leaves the group, the rekey manager sends a RM that has {n -1 )
encryptions o f the new group key [{Gi^ }K,.,1 < i< (n -1 )]. Bach individual encryption is
decrypted by the associated group member’s key to retrieve the new group key.
Fig. 3 illustrates an example o f the keys maintained by a star rekey manager for 9
members. If a new member joins the group and his individual keyK^ is to be inserted,
GK is regenerated, and a RM that has two encrypted keys [{GK }GK,{GK }Kg{ is

{ M } K denotes the m essage M is encrypted with the key K.
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constructed and distributed to group members. If that member leaves the group, his
individual key

.^ 9

is deleted, a new group key GK

is regenerated, and a RM is

constructed and distributed to group members. In this case, the RM has

8

encrypted keys

{{GK}K,AGK^K,,{GK}K,,{GK}K,,{GK}K,,{GK]K,,{GK}K,,{GK'')K,].
We can conclude this technique does not provide a scalable RM construction cost
since the cost (time and size) when a member leaves the group increases linearly with the
group size.

GK

Fig. 3. The keys maintained by a star rekey manager for 9 members.

3.2.2

Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) Approach for a Rekey Manager

A LKH rekey manager maintains one group key GK, an individual key for every
group member, and a set o f key-encrypting keys (KEKs) used for scalable rekeying. A
LKH o f a specified degree d is constructed such that GK is the root o f the hierarchy, and
every individual key represents a leaf node. Fig. 4 illustrates a LKH o f degree J = 3 and
height A = 2 for 9 members, where the root node represents GK and the leaf nodes
represent the members’ individual keys.
Every group member holds the set o f keys at the nodes that fall in the path that leads
to the root, starting from his individual leaf node key. To guarantee perfect backward
secrecy, if a new member joins the group his individual key is inserted in the hierarchy
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and all the keys on the path from his individual key leaf node to the root are regenerated.
Similarly, to guarantee perfect forward secrecy, if a member leaves the group, his
individual key is deleted from the hierarchy and all the keys he was holding are
regenerated. In both cases, the rekey manager needs to construct a RM that contains such
keys update. The constructed RM will contain a rekey packet for every new (regenerated)
key.
For example, in Fig. 4 if a new member joins the group and his individual keyATjj is
to be inserted, two keys need to be regenerated K-^ and GK. The RM in this case has two
rekey packets for the two new keys, [{K^}K^,{K'^)K^j] and [{GK }G K ,{G K }K'^] . The
first rekey packet has two encryptions o f K ^ , the first encryption is decrypted by old
group members (who maintain K ^) to retreive Kj^, and the second encryption is
decrypted by the new member’s individual key to retrieve K ^ . Similarly, the second
rekey packet has two encryptions o f GK, the first encryption is decrypted by all old group
members to retreive G K ' , and the sencod encryption is for the new member (after he gets
K ^). On the other hand, if that member leaves the group and his individual key K^^ is to
3

be deleted, the same two keys need to be regenerated. The RM in this case has the two
rekey packets [ {Kl } Ki „{ Kl } K^ ^ ] and [{GK"}K^,{GK"}K 2 ,{GK"}K',]. The new keys
K'{ and GK

can no longer be encrypted with their previous versions since the leaving

member already knows them, instead every new key is encrypted individually by each
sibiling node key (after deleting the individual key node o f the leaving member).
We can see that when using LKH and inserting K^

3

the RM has 4 encrypted keys

compared to only 2 in the star rekey manager. On the other hand, when deleting K^
RM has 5 encrypted keys compared to

8

in the star rekey manager.
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GK

■2.2

GK

Fig. 4. A LKH o f degree

3.2.3

KEK

-2..3

-3.2

- 3.3

individual key

= 3 and height A = 3 for a group of 9 members.

Encryption for Key Distribution

The traditional technique for distributing the group key in the above two rekey
managers (star and LKH) is the use o f encryption. The star rekey manager, for a group of
n members, performs

2

key encryptions when a new member joins the group and

performs {n - 1) key encryptions when a member leaves the group to construct a RM that
updates GK. The leave rekey cost, using star rekey manager, increases linearly with the
group size n increase.
A rekey manager that maintains a LKH o f degree d and height A, for a group o f n
members, performs (at most)

( 2

x h) key encryptions when a new member joins the

group and performs (at most) (J x A- ) key encryptions when a member leaves the
1

group. If the LKH is a complete tree for n members then the height h = log^ n . The
rekey cost is logarithmic in the group size n in both the join and leave cases, which is a
scalable solution. Although the use o f LKH provides a scalable group rekey solution, the
cost o f join and leave rekeyings are not symmetric. In addition, increasing the degree o f
the hierarchy d that decreases its height h and leads to a decrease o f the join rekey cost
while increases the leave rekey cost. For example, for a group o f size n = 512 members, a
LKH o f degree

= 2 is of height h =9 (assuming it is constructed as a complete tree),

while a LKH o f degree J =

8

is o f height A = 3. In the first case, d = 2 , the join rekey cost
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is 18 encrypted keys and the leave rekey cost is 17 encrypted keys. On the other hand,
when <7=8 the join rekey cost is

6

encrypted keys (1/3 the first case) and the leave rekey

cost is 23 encrypted keys (4/3 the first case, and 4 times the join case). Wong et al.
proved that the optimal LKH degree is 4 when enciyption is used [67].

3.3

XORBP: A Novel Group Key Distribution Technique
Brute force techniques used to guess a key have to search on the average half the key

space. Unless plain text is provided, the analyst must be able to recognize plain text as
plain text. If the message is just plain text in English, then the result pops out
immediately (although the task o f recognizing English would have to be automated). If
the message is some more general type o f data, such as a “numerical” data, the problem
becomes even more difficult to automate.
From the above observation, we can notice that all techniques that encrypt the new
GK by any other key (previous GK, individual key, or KEK) do uimecessary work, and
the same security can be achieved with much less computation effort. The new proposed
computation method will use bit XOR operation between two keys instead o f encrypting
one with the other. The XOR operation is sufficient to protect the key material from
outsider attacks (members outside the group) but doesn’t protect individual key material
from insider attacks (members inside the group). Hence, to protect from insider attacks,
we suggest distributing the key material in random byte patterns (BPs) in a fixed size
rekey packet.
3.3.1 Why XOR
Assume C - A ® B , where A and B are keys o f size k bits^. The XOR operation has
the following properties:
•

Easy computation.

•

The output C is always the same size as the two inputs (k bits). This property is not
valid in addition and subtraction operations (e.g. in TABLE I: 11 + 11 = 110).

' The sym bol © denotes a logical X OR operation w hile <fe denotes logical A N D operation.
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Reversible easy computation, i.e. knowing A and C, we can uniquely and easily
calculate B. Unique reversible computation is not valid in AND and OR operations
(e.g. in TABLE II; 10 & 11 = 10 & 10 = 10).
All output values are uniformly distributed in the output space. The output matrix size
is ( * X ^ = ^*), every output value in the range [ :( * 2

2

2

0

2

1

)] appears

2

* times (see

TABLE III). This property is not valid in all other simple operations (AND, OR,
addition, or subtraction).
Every output value can be generated w ith2^ combinations. That is, knowing C only
2^ guesses are needed to know A and/or B. This property is not valid in all other
simple operations.

TABLE I.
A + B, WHERE A AND B ARE 2 BITS LONG
+

00

01

10

00

00

01

10

01

01

10

11

100

10

10

11

100

101

11

11

100

101

110

11
•

11

TABLE II.
A & B, WHERE A AND B ARE 2 BITS LONG
&

00

01

10

11

00

00

00

00

00

01

00

01

00

01

10

00

00

10

10

11

00

01

10

11
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TABLE III.
A © B, WHERE A AND B ARE 2 BITS LONG

©

00

01

10

11

00

00

01

10

11

01

01

00

11

10

10

10

11

00

01

11

11

10

01

00

The last two properties o f XOR operation makes (A ® B) as secure as (A}B , to all
members who don’t know both A and B. Performing XOR operation between the keys
solves the problem o f protecting the key material from outsider attacks. But this operation
doesn’t protect the key material from insider attacks. For example, if we have a group o f
two members X and Y, each one has his own individual key that is known only by him
and by the rekey manager. Let the individual key o f X is Kj ^ , and the individual key o f Y
is K y . Assume the rekey manager needs to send them the group key GK. Previous
methods used to broadcast a rekey packet that contains [{GK}jKj^,{GK}Ky], the group
key encrypted with every member individual key. Every member reads his own part in
the packet, and decrypts it to retrieve the group key. Members outside the group can’t
leam any key material, and members inside the group can’t learn each other keys.
Alternatively, the new method suggests sending a rekey packet that contains
[GK ® Kj ^, GK
also can retrieve

K y ] . We can see that Y who knows KyC&n retrieve GK easily, but
, since he can read {GK © K ^ ) and thus {GK © K ^ ) © GK = K ^ .

Hence, adding a security barrier to insider attacks is essential. The suggested method to
protect from insider attacks is to distribute the key material in random byte pattern BP in
the broadcast rekey packet. Every BP is known only by the rekey manager and by the
individuals similar to K ^ and Ky . Every BP specifies a unique byte numbers in a fixed
size rekey packet.
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For example if all keys are o f size 3 bytes, and the rekey packet size is 260 bytes.
Assuming

= {200,120,79} and

= {110,205,55}, the suggested technique for

distributing GK to the two members, is to distribute the 3 bytes o f (GK © K^,) in BP^
packet bytes numbered 200, 120, and 79 respectively, and distribue the 3 bytes of
(GK © Py) in BPy packet bytes numbered 110, 205, and 55 respectively.
3.3.2

Protection from Insider Attacks

If the key length is k bits, the key space that is searched by attackers has 2* different
key values. Let K - \ k / S ] be the size o f the key in bytes. For a group o f n members, the
rekey manager that uses encryption (encrypt GK with every member individual key) to
broadcast GK will send a rekey packet o f size ( n x K ) bytes. The rekey manager that uses
XOR and BP for distributing GK for n members should broadcast a rekey packet o f size
( n x K + E ) bytes, i.e. the rekey packet contains E extra bytes.
The worst-case insider attack is that (n - 1) colluding members trying to guess the BP
(and therefore the key) o f the remaining member. A group o f ( n ~ \ ) members can
exclude ( ( n - l ) x K ) bytes from the packet that contain their own versions o f the key.
The remaining are (K + E) bytes, and they are trying to select K ordered bytes. In this
case E is estimated so that they have a search space larger than or equal to the search
space o f the protected key. We can see that there is an E extra bytes increase in the
message size, and this increase is the price paid for reducing the computation form n
encryptions to simple XOR operations. The inequality

> 2^ is used to estimate the

extra bytes size"*.
Note that if we distribute the key material GK in the byte patterns BPs instead o f the
XORed keys (GK ® K ^ ) and (GK ® K y ) the rekey packet will contain a repeated byte
patterns o f GK and that will make it easier (less permutation) for attackers to make a
guess. If GK is distributed in “bit patterns” instead o f bjde patterns that will solve the
repeated byte patterns problem but will increase the size of the data needed to keep the

P^ = — ^ — ; c ! = c x ( c - l ) x . . . x l
“
(b-a)\
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patterns. For example: I f we have a key o f size K bytes, and a rekey packet o f size S
bytes. To decode a “byte” location in the rekey packet s bits are needed such that
s = I"log s'] . To decode a “bit” location in that rekey packet (s + 3) bits are needed. The
2

data size for a key and byte pattern BP is =

+

bytes. Using a bit pattern

(there is no need for the key), the data size = K x ( s + 3) bytes. The data size required
using byte pattern BP is less than the data size required using bit pattern for all positive
values o f .S’ (Ai x

( 5

+ 3) > (jST +

x s- / s]) for all s' > (-1 6 / 7) ). On the other hand, using

bit patterns might decrease the required extra bytes E and therefore the message size. If
bit patterns are to be used, the rekey message extra bytes E can be estimated by solving
the inequality
3.3.3

> ^.
2

Extra Bytes Adjustment

The insider attack by one member in which he can exclude his own BP {K bytes), and
make a guess for any other BP has a search space size equals to
attack by m members has a search space of size
attack by {n - 1) members, the search space size is

phe insider

in the worst-case insider
, in which E is estimated to

make the search space size greater than or equal to the search space o f the protected key
to have the same security achieved by encryption.
The extra bytes E depends only on the key size K, and does not depend on the group
size n. We can further reduce E if the insider attacks are rare, or the cost o f protecting the
key from insider attacks (represented in £ ) is greater than the benefits gained from that
protection. For example, if the keying material is changing frequently, we can assume
that the lifetime o f the key is shorter than the time required for making a correct guess
using a reasonable cost machine. We can estimate a reasonable search space size Q from
the lifetime o f the key and calculate the extra bytes E such thatP^^'^^^ > Q, where Q is
the reduced search space size.
In addition, using XOR operation instead o f encryption helps in protecting the
individual key material from the “known plain text attack'. Known plain text attack, is an
attack in which plain text and its corresponding cipher text are known by the attacker. It
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has been proven that in some cases this information can reduce the search space for the
key. Using encryption methods, an insider can build a database from the rekey messages
RMs that contains pairs o f {GK, GK encrypted by other individual key(s)). This database
can help him in guessing the other individual key(s). The database can grow quickly if
the group has frequent joins and leaves and therefore frequent RMs are sent. This type o f
attack does not exist when using XORBP. Using the above observation, if the known
plain text attack reduces the search space size from 2^ to Q. Then extra bytes E is chosen
such that

3.4

> Q , where Q is the reduced search space size.

Logical Key Hierarchy and XORBP
The following is a summary o f the terminology used. The group key is GK. All key

sizes are K bytes. The LKH degree is d. The group size (number o f members) is n. The
LKH height h for n members \s h - [log^ ri\, assuming it is constructed as a complete
tree.
The key data maintained by a rekey manager is a LKH o f degree d and height h.
Using XORBP, each non-root node key (KEK or individual key) is accompanied by a
byte pattern BP. Each member is assigned a leaf node in the LKH, which contains his
individual data (key, BP, ...etc). In addition, every member knows his leaf node position
in the LKH, and holds all the entries o f the LKH in the path from his leaf node up to the
root.
It is assumed there is only one join or one leave at a time in which GK and all LKH
entries (keys and BPs) that are held by that member need to be regenerated (batch
rekeying for a set join and/or leave requests is discussed in chapter V). The rekey
manager broadcasts a rekey message RM for every join or leave rekey. The RM contains
a message-identifier, a rekey packet for every new key, and an encoded BP for every new
BP. The message-identifier is the leaf node position o f the member who caused the rekey
either because he joined or left the group.
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3.4.1

XORBP Rekey Packet Construction

The rekey message RM contains a rekey packet for every newly generated key, GK or
KEK. A rekey packet contains the new key distribution information and is targeted to a
corresponding set o f members that should hold that key. No other member in the group or
outside the group should be able to easily retrieve any key information from the rekey
packet.
A XORBP rekey packet size is S = d x K + E bytes; where d is LKH degree, K is the
key size in bytes, and E is the estimated extra bytes (section 3.3.3). A XORBP rekey
packet constructed for a new key

at LKH node u contains multiple versions o f

XORed with the keys at the LKH sibling nodes o f u. If u is the key node path starting
from the root, then uv is a path to a sibiling node o f u. If the number o f sibilings for node
u is e {e is less than or equal to LKH degree d) there exists e sibling nodes determined by
the path uv, 1 < v < e , where each node contains
u will be denoted ( K ^,,

All sibling nodes o f a node

)

The rekey packet is constructed for the new
in the rekey packet contains (X„ ©

such that for every v, the

bytes

). The remaing empty bytes in the rekey packets

contains dummy (randomly generated) bytes.
3.4.2

Encoded Byte Pattern

When generating a new key, its corresponding BP needs to be regenerated too.
Similar to the key, the newly generated BP needs to be sent in the rekey message RM to
the group members who should hold it. As previously described, a new key will be
distributed in a rekey packet o f size S bytes such that S = d x K + E , where d is LKH
degree, K is the key size in bytes, and E is extra bytes. Each sibling node o f the
distributed key node should have a unique byte pattern BP that specifies unique K bytes
in the rekey packet o f S bytes.
Guaranteeing unique BPs can be implemented by maintaining an array R o f Booleans
o f size S with every key, every entry in R corresponds to a byte in the rekey packet.
Initially all array entries are set to true, a true value means the byte is free (i.e. not
assigned to any sibling key node) while a fa lse value means the byte is already assigned
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and can’t be assigned to any other sibling. When regenerating a BP, the old K bytes (old
BP byte numbers) have to be freed (i.e. marked true in R) and then new free K bytes are
selected (and marked fa lse in R). The generation o f a random BP will require the
generation o f K random numbers in the range [0;5'-l]. Since the maximum number of
node siblings is d, this would guarantee at least (K + E) free bytes for a new BP o f K
bytes. If any o f the randomly generated byte numbers is not free (locked up in R), the
nearest free byte is chosen instead.
Similar to a key, a new BP can’t be sent plain in a RM, instead it is encoded so that it
can be retrieved only by the targeted members (members who maintains its
corresponding key). The encoding o f a newly generated BP is performed using its
corresponding newly generated key. The new BP is first represented as a string o f bits
then XORed with the corresponding generated key. The bit representation o f BP might be
of shorter or longer length than the key. If it is shorter than the key, it is XORed with the
first same-length bits o f the key. If it is longer than the key, the key bits are repeated fully
or partially (one or more times) until the exact length is reached.
For example, if the key size X is 3 bytes (24 bits), and the rekey packet size S is 260
bytes. Since S equals 260, 9 bits are enough to represent a byte number in the range
[0:259]. A BP can be represented by a string o f length 3 x 9 = 27 bits that
approximated

to

3 r d -b y te

4

2 n d —byte

bytes

when

sentin

RM.

For

I20(9bits)

79(9bits)

200(9bits)

= 001111000001001111011001000 , the encoded BP is calculated as
120

79

200

001111000001001111011001000©
^

key

120)that can be represented as

___________A___________ __________ A__________ ___________A

follows:

a

\s t-b y te

K = 110110111000010010100100, and BP = (200, 79,
string o f bits

a

is

3

\s t-3 b its

lio ij^ l^ o o c a ^ l^ jfr^
3 r d -b y te

2 n d -b y te

_

ggg

1st—byte

101 001110110001101001101100
A th-byte

3 rd -b y te

2 n d -b y te

\s t- b y te

byte is repeated to reach the exact BP bit string size.
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3.4.3

Simple Case: LKH of Height A = 1

A LKH o f height h = \ can fit a group o f maximum size n such that n < d . The RM
distributed by the rekey manager contains one rekey packet for a newly generated GK per
every join or leave. The key data maintained by the rekey manager is shown in Fig. 5.

GK

Fig. 5. A LKH o f degree d and height h = \ .

The rekey procedure for a join or a leave o f a member X whose individual key is

:

1. Determine, the leaf node position for member X individual data to be inserted/deleted.
The member position will be used as a message-identifier.
2. If (X is joining) then {Select freeRH^ and send it to member X through his private
channel along with his leaf node position; Insert the individual leaf node { K ^ , B P ^ )
into LKH.} else (Delete the individual leaf node

) from LBCH.}.

3. Generate new GK.
4. Construct a rekey packet for the new GK u s i n g ( a s

described in section

3.4.1).
5. Send a rekey message RM that contains the constructed rekey packet to all group
members.
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3.4.4

Another Simple Case: LKH of Height A = 2

A LKH o f height h = 2 can fit a group o f maximum size n, such that d < n < d ^ .
Using a LKH o f height 2, group members can be virtually viewed as arranged in d
partitions (at most), and every partition contains d members (at most). A LKH o f height 2
maintained by a rekey manager is shown in Fig.
that partition hold the same partition key

6

. For any partition p , all members at

and the same partition BP

that are used

in constructing a new GK rekey packet. Moreover, each member X holds his individual
key

and his individual BP

that are used in constructing a new partition key

Kp rekey packet. For every join or leave rekeying, the rekey message RM distributed by
the rekey manager contains two rekey packets one for a newX^ and the other is for a new
GK. In addition, RM contains one encoded new BP BP^.

GK

Fig. . A LKH o f degree d and height h = 2.
6
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The rekey procedure for a join or a leave o f a member X whose individual key

1. Determine the position, and therefore the partition p , where member X individual leaf
node will be inserted/deleted. The member position will be used as a messageidentifier.
2. If (X is joining) then {Select free5P^^ and send it to member X through his private
channel along with his leaf node position; Insert the individual leaf node

^ , BP^ ^ )

into LKH.} else (Delete the individual leaf node (Kp^, BP^^) from LKH.}.
3. Generate new partition p node entries

and BP^.

4. Constmct a rekey packet for the new

using the individual leaf nodes

{Kp*,BP^^). (as descibed in section 3.4.1)
5. Encode the new BP^ with the new

(as described in section 3.4.2).

. Generate new GK.

6

7. Construct a rekey packet for the new GK using partition nodes ( X ,, BP, )
8

. Send a rekey message RM that contains the two rekey packets (from step 4 and 7) and
the encoded BP (from step 5) to all group members.

Is changing the partition BP^ necessary? Yes it is necessary, and we will show this
by example, assuming everybody knows the rekey procedure. If member X joins the
group in partition A then he will hold K^ and BP^. Assume X left the group for a while
and joined it again in different partition B. Assume K ^ is changed to K'^ when X left but
BP^ is the same, and X (who knows the procedure) is able to memorize BP^. A member
X can retrieve the new K \ when he joins partition B because he knows GK (member o f
the group), and he can read {GK ©

) at the same BP^. I f X left the group again and

no other member joined or left partition A, X can retrieve the new GK and aecess further
information by knowing BP^ and K'^ (note that he was a member o f partition B, and K^
is changed once he left but K \ is the same).
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3.4.5

General Rekey Procedure by the Rekey Manager

Assume the inserted/deleted leaf node immediate parent position is
illustrated in Fig. 7, where
level h),
(h-l)),

decodes a child node position o f the root node (child at

decodes a child node position o f the node determined by

(child at level

/j decodes a child node position o f the node determined by/j (child at level )
2

and is the immediate parent o f the leaf node that contains the member data (individual
key and individual BP) among at most (d-l) other individual members data nodes.

GK

A
level h
level (h-1)

level 2
level 1

Fig. 7. The path to a leaf node in a LKH o f height h.

The rekey procedure for a join or a leave o f a member X:
1. Determine the leaf node position o f member X individual data to be inserted/deleted,
and therefore determine all the LKH nodes entries that need to be regenerated from
the root node to the leaf node immediate parent. Assuming the position is
and
(K ,,

the

LKH

I ,BP, I

entries

are

GK,

(Ky^

),

I ). The position is used as the RM message-identifier.
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2. If (X is joining) then {Select free individual BP

, and send it to member X

along with his position through his private channel. Insert the member individual leaf
node ( K , , , ,B R ,

,,)

at the first level o f LKH.} else {Delete the member
,, ,B P ,,

individual leaf node ( X , ,

,

f r om the first level o f LKH.}

3. For every LKH entry at level i - 2 t o h {
a. Generate new key K,^,^ ^ , and select new BP BP,^,^ , .
b. Construct a rekey packet for the new

^ , using

B P , j t ) nodes at

level (f-1) (as described in 3.4.1).
c. Encode the new BP,^,^ ^ , with the new

, (as described in 3.4.2).}

4. Generate new GK.
5. Construct a rekey packet for the new GK to all members using level h keys and BPs
{K„BR).
6. Send a RM to all members that contains the message-identifier, all constructed rekey
packets, and all encoded BPs.
Note that, the rekey procedure is almost symmetric for both join and leave cases.
Note also that all if all LKH new entries are generated at once (step 3.a and step 4),
constructing the rekey packet and encoding BP for each new entry can be performed in
parallel (step 3.b-c and step 5).
3.4.6

How Group Members Retrieve the New Keys and the New Byte Patterns

Not all rekey packets and all encoded BPs should be read and processed by all group
members. Since every members knows his position and the RM includes the
identification

position o f the member who joined/left). Every member can

select the rekey packets and the encoded BPs to process. The RM contains h rekey
packets and {h-l) encoded BPs.
For every i, where 1 < r < /z, the i* rekey packet and the i* encoded BP contain a new
key and a new BP for a node at the (z +1)'* level. This data should be retrieved by at
most

members who have their position matches

The /z'*rekey packet

contains the new GK, and should be retrieved by all n (at most d *) members
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3.5

Scenarios and Comparison
In this section, we compare the group rekeying performance when the traditional key

management approaches (star and encryption-based LKH) are used, and when the
proposed approach (XORBP LKH) is used. Two examples are used to demonstrate such
approaches, a group o f members joining a subscription News broadcast server, and a
group o f peer-to-peer machines communicating securely.
We assume the group rekeying is performed periodically by a GKM that will leam
the join and leave requests right before a rekeying process is initialized. The GKM will
perform some time-consuming operations, e.g., random number generation and
encryptions, before a rekeying, if any, and delay the rest o f the operations, e.g.,
encryptions, until the exact requests are known. The following are the. three approaches
under consideration.

Approach 1; The traditional star key management approach. The GKM changes
the group key and encrypts it individually for every group member. This approach
requires the GKM to regenerate one key and to perform 0(n) keys encryptions to provide
perfect forward secrecy for a group o f n members, i.e., the rekeying cost scales linearly
with the group size. A group member performs 1 decryption to retrieve the group key. In
this approach, the GKM can regenerate a new group key and encrypt it with the every
group member individual keys right after a rekeying is committed and before leaming the
next requests.
Approach 2: Encryption-based LKH. The use o f a LKH by a GKM provides a
scalable group rekeying that scales to the logarithm o f the group size. If the LKH degree
is d, and its height is h ( n < d ^ ) , the GKM is required to regenerate 0(h) keys and to
perform O ( d x k ) keys encryptions to provide perfect forward secrecy after single leave
request. However, for a batch of R requests, the GKM is required to regenerate O ( R x h )
keys and to perform O ( R x d x k ) keys encryptions. A group member is required to
perform at most h decryptions to retrieve the new group key (more than the required cost
by the star approach).
Approach 3: XORBP LKH: The new key distribution technique, XORBP, is used
with the LKH approach to provide a more scalable and efficient group rekeying that

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

51

doesn’t require any encryption/decryption to be performed by the GKM or by any group
member. Similar to the encryption-based LKH approach, for a batch o f R requests, the
GKM is required to regenerate 0 { R x h ) keys, in addition, the GKM random number
generation overhead is increased. Since no encryption is used, this approach reduces a
rekeying time to 10% o f the encryption-based LKH rekeying value, for the same LKH.
Most o f this time is spent in random number generation. The three approaches offer the
same security capabilities.
3.5.1

A News Broadcast Server Example

Consider a News broadcast server that encrypts its broadcast using a group key that is
handed to every newly joined member. Assume that the total number o f connected group
members at any point o f time is 30,000 and the used encryption algorithm requires 1
msec for a single encryption/decryption. In addition, assume the server changes the group
key periodically every 30 sec, and the average number o f leave requests is 100 and the
join requests are 50 in the 30 sec inter-rekey period. Consequently, a newly joined
member might have to wait at most 30 sec before being able to decrypt the broadcast, and
a leaving member might be able to decrypt the broadcast for maximum o f 30 sec after he
leaves.
Star key management: The GKM is required to perform 30,000 key encryptions
which consume 30 sec. A group member only has to perform 1 decryption to extract the
group key that consumes 1 msec. The GKM can start encrypting a new group key with
every group member key before a rekeying. When he leams o f the requests, he will throw
away the encryptions performed for the leaving members (100 encryptions) and has to
perform encryptions for the newly joined members (50 encryptions). The GKM needs the
whole inter-rekey period to perform the encryptions. The traditional star key management
has a problem in the following cases: the need to support a larger group size, the use o f a
more time consuming encryption standard, and the 30 sec maximum request delay is not
acceptable.
Encryption-based LKH: If the LKH degree d = 4, height h = 10 due to nodes
insertion and deletion, and the number o f LKH new keys (rekey sub-tree size) for the 150
requests is 100 keys. The total number o f key encryptions at the server = 100 x4x10 = 4
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sec (compared to 30 sec in the star approach). A group member has to perform at most 10
decryptions that is 10 msec (every 30 sec). A group member decryption cost is increased
compared to the star approach.
The GKM can perform all random number generation before leaming the exact
requests. However, most o f the encryptions (if not all) has to be performed after leaming
the exact join and leave requests. This can be a drawback of LKH if we need to reduce
the time after leaming the requests and the start o f the rekeying. However, if the rekeying
is performed frequently, the total time spent by the GKM performing encryptions is a
better cost measure.
The rekey cost for LKH with encryption based KDT increases in the following cases:
1) The LKH degree is increased.
2) The number o f requests is increased. For example, 1000 new keys need to be
distributed (instead o f 100), in this case, the cost o f LKH is worse than the star
approach and requires 40 sec o f GKM encryption time.
3) The LKH height is increased due to nodes insertion and deletion (i.e., maintaining a
balanced LKH greatly affect the number o f new keys/encryptions).
XORBP LKH: The rekeyig time is reduced to 10% o f the above values that is 400
msec for the GKM and 1 msec for a group member (every 30 sec). The number o f new
keys for a single request is 0{h). The total number o f new keys for the 150 request is
100 X10 = 1000 keys. The rekeying time doesn’t increase with the LECH degree increase
and slightly increases with larger number o f requests or an unbalanced LECH since no
encryption is performed (i.e., more XOR operations are performed). A group member can
have the minimum cost achieved using the star key management.
Similarly, the GECM can perform random number generation before leaming the
requests. Compared to the star approach, the GECM can achieve better performance after
leaming the requests, since in the star approach the GECM has to perform encryptions for
the newly joined members.
3.5.2

A Secure Peer-to-Peer Network Example

Consider a secure peer-to-peer network for a group o f 1000 members (machines), and
1 ipsec encryption/decryption standard. If one machine (member) is hosting the GKM
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and there are 50 member join/leave requests every 30 sec. A new group key will be
issued every 30 sec. The following are the rekeying time costs for the considered
approaches.
Star key management: the server encryption time = 1 sec; a group member
decryption time = 1 msec (every 30 sec).
Encryption-based

LKH:

the

server

encryption

time

=

50(requests) x A{d) x A{h) = 800 msec; a group member decryption time = 4 msec.
X ORBP LK H : the server time cost = 80 msec; a group member time cost is less than
1 msec.
We can observe that the increase in the number o f requests in the encryption-based
LKH approach could lead to a worse performance than the star approach. The group
member hosting the GKM prefers the minimum overhead approach that doesn’t affect
(disrupt) the application.
Similarly, performing pre-operations could reduce the time between knowing the
requests and the actual rekeying in the star approach over the encryption-based LKH
approach. The encryption-based LKH approach is better than the star approach if the total
server (light-weight) time spent performing encryptions are compared. The XORBP LKH
approach outperforms the other two approaches in both cases.

3.6

Cost Analysis and Estimates
The parameters to the cost equations are the key size K and its corresponding search

space size Q (used in estimating the extra bytes E), and the LKH degree d.
3.6.1 How to Select the Key Size
It is usually assumed that group members are sharing a symmetric encryption key.
Using symmetric cryptography usually achieves faster encryption/decryption than
asymmetric cryptography. The key size is dependent on the used encryption algorithm.
The two widely used symmetric key encryption algorithms are “Data Enciyption
Standard” (DBS) that uses 56 bits key and “International Data Encryption Algorithm”
(IDEA) that uses 128 bits key [40]. While an IDEA key is encoded in 16 bytes
(128/8 = 16), a DBS key is encoded in 8 bytes (7 bits in every byte contain part o f the
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key ( 7 x 8 = 56) and the 8* bit in every byte is used for parity ebeck). Another widely
used version of DBS is ealled triple DBS (or DBS-BDB) that uses 3 DBS keys [40].
Assuming the maximum key search space size g = 2^, the estimated extra bytes E
for the above three algorithms are as follows:
•

For DBS, the extra bytes E can be estimated from

> 2^®(7.2e'^); where E = \ 2 1

bytes satisfies the ineqality (Pg^^ « 8.9e'^) .
•

For IDBA, the extra bytes E can be estimated from

> 2*^*(3.4e^®); where E =

264 bytes satisfies the inequality (7]f° « 9.2e^^).
•

For triple DBS, the extra bytes E can be estimated from P^^*^ ^ 2’'’*(3.7e^”) , where
P =116 bytes satisfies the inequality {P^l^ « 3.9e^'’) .

3.6.2

How to Select the Degree of the Hierarchy

If it is desired to keep the rekey packet size S less than 1500 bytes to fit in one UDP
packet (Bthemet network)^ in which case, a rekey packet can be sent without
fragmentation. The degree d can be calculated using the equation S =^d~>^K + E , where
K is determined form the used encryption algorithm and E is the estiamted extra bytes.
Increasing d will decrease h, and therefore will decrease the computation cost at the
rekey manager and at every group member if XORBP is used as a KDT. On the other
hand, increasing d increases the LKH node size as well as the rekey packet size S.
Moreover, selecting d such that the byte pattern BP is represented in an exact size of
bytes will omit adding extra bits (section 3.4.2). The LKH degree d can take into
consideration the disk block size if the LKH will be stored on disk. In such case, it is
better to keep each node in one disk block for easier access.
3.6.3

Cost Estimation

The following are the cost estimates o f LKH key management approach used with
XORBP KDT. Assuming the rekey packet size S = d x K + E , where d is the LKH
degree, K is the key size in bytes, and E is the estimated extra bytes. Let s = [logj iS] that
is 5 bits are needed to identify a byte location in a rekey packet. If the group size is n, and
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LKH height is h {h = [log^ n \ for a balanced LKH);the maximimun group size for the
same height LKH M a x _ n = d^ (assuming the LKH is complete).The analytical

cost

estimates is as follows:
•

Byte pattern size: BPS = j'i' x K / S ] bytes.

•

LKH root node {GK) size = K bytes.

•

LKH non-root node size (NS) that contains a key and BP N S - K + BPS bytes.

•

A LKH (of degree d and height h) storage size can be estimated by adding the nodes’
sizes at all levels. The required LKH storage (LKHS) for a group o f size n smaller
Max_n

than

can

be

estimated

as

TT^rrc,
”
^
li
^
dx(Max n - l ) x N S . , ^
LKH S = ----------- x ( K + > d x N S ) - ------------{K + -------------=---------------) bytes
M ax_n
M ax_n
{d ~^)

•

A group member holds the LKH root node entry {GK), and (at most) h non-root nodes
entries.

The

required

group

member

storage

(MS)

can

be

estimated

as

M S = K + h x N S hylQS.
•

The rekey message RM contains (at most) h rekey packets and {h-l) encoded byte
patterns

BPs.

The

maximum

RM

size

(RMS)

can

be

estimated

as

RM S = h x S + { h - V ) x BPS bytes.
• Maximum number o f newly generated keys = h per a rekey.
• Maximum number o f newly generated BPs is (/z-1). Therfore, the maximim number
o f randomly generated byte locations^ can be estimated as = { h - \ ) x K per a rekey.
•

If e. is the number o f sibilings at the i* level o f a newly generated key node at level {i
+ 1). The rekey packet for that key contains { e ^ x K ) bytes o f key material (XORed
keys), while the remaing bytes are filled with randomly generated bytes. The total
h

number o f the randomly generated bjdes can be estiamted as = ( ^ 5 - e, x X ) per a
j= i

rekey.
• As previously explained in section 3.4.6, for every rekey message RM, there are (at
most) d members who will process all h rekey packets, d^ members who will process
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(A-1) rekey packets,

members who will process (A-2) rekey packets,

d ’' (all

members) who will process one packet (for GK). The average number o f rekey
packets

processed

by

a

group

member

can

be

estimated

as

=

h~\

,
(M ax n - d )
,
^
per a rekey.
1+ — -------= 1 + ^
M ax_ n
M a x _ n x ( d -V)
In a rekey message RM, there exists an encoded BP that corresponds to every rekey
paeket except for GK. Similar to the rekey packet, the encoded BP is processed by the
same group members that process the corresponding rekey packet. From the above
estimate, the average number o f encoded BPs processed by a group member =
(Max _ n - d )
Max_nx(d -I)

per a rekey.

For a LKH with encryption-based KDT, the byte pattern size (BPS) is equal to 0 in
LKH storage (LKHS) and member storage (MS) estimates as given above. Let Enc_K be
the size o f an encrypted key in bytes. In such case, the rekey message RM has two
different

sizes;

join

RMS

(jR M S = 2 x h x E n c _ K )

bytes,

and

leave

RMS

( IRMS = ( d x h - l ) x E n c _ K ) bytes. Moreover, when an encryption-based KDT is used
the only randomly generated numbers are the new keys.
Comparing the cost o f XORBP versus encryption-based KDTs when used with the
same degree (d) LKH and for the same group size n: from the above analytical cost
estimates, XORBP introduces an increase in LKH node size and therfore an increase in
the LKH storage (LKHS) and member storage (MS). In addition, the rekey message size
(RMS) is subject to increase depending on the encrypted key size. On the other hand, the
use o f XOR operations between keys, instead o f encryption, promises a substantial
decrease in the rekey message construction time as well as the rekey processing time by a
group member.
For example, for a group o f size n = 4096 that uses DBS encryption, key size K = S
bytes, encrypted key size E ncJE - 16 bytes, and the (larger) estimated extra bytes E =

^ A byte location is a number in the range [0:5-1], where S is the rekey packet size.
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127 bytes. Fig. 8, Fig. 9, and Fig. 10 illustrate the analytical cost estimates for XORBP
(“x” prefix) versus encryption (“e” prefix). The LKH degree is increased by 4 starting
from 4 to 32. Note that; the same figures are obtained by trying different group sizes. Fig.
8. illustrates LKH storage (LKHS) and Fig. 9 illustrates member storage (MS) for both
KDTs. As expected, the use o f XORBP increases the storage requirement for the rekey
manager and the rekey client. We can observe that LICHS and MS are slightly decreasing
with the degree increase, and xLKHS and xMS are almost double cLKHS and eMS,
respectively, for the same LKH degree.Fig. 10 illustrates the rekey message size (RMS)
for the two encryption cases o f join (eJRMS) and leave (elRMS) and for XORBP
(xRMS). We can observe that when using encryption, the join RMS (ejRMS) is slighlty
decreasing with LKH degree increase, while the leave RMS (elRMS) is linearly
increasing with LKH degree increase. Similary, increasing LKH degree linearly increases
elRM construction time (number o f encryptions). Such leave rekey cost linear increase
with LKH degree makes it unfeasible to use larger degree LKH with encryption-based
KDT. On the other hand, when XORBP is used, xRMS (and therfore the construction
time) is symmetric for the join and leave cases. As shown in Fig. 10, xRMS is larger than
elRMS for all LKH degrees, but smaller/comparable to elRMS for larger LKH degrees
(xRMS has a nonliner relation with LKH degree).
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Fig. 8. Comparison o f estimated LKH storage (LKHS) when used with encryption-hased
versus XORBP KDT s.
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Fig. 9. Comparison o f estimated LKH member storage (MS) when used with encryptionbased versus XORBP KDTs.
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Fig. 10. Comparison o f estimated LKH rekey message size (RMS) when used with
encryption-based versus XORBP KDTs.

3.7

Experimental Results
We have implemented an initial prototype for the secure group key management

components (section 3.1) extending Java'^“ security [62]. The implementation provides
both star and LKH rekey managers. In addition, both encryption-based and XORBP
KDTs are available with the use o f LKH rekey manager. Moreover, two LKH
maintenance algorithms and rekey protocols are available. One protocol adopts an
unbalanced LKH while the other adopts a balanced LKH. Chapter IV provides the details
o f such algorithms and protocols.
We performed experiments to illustrate and compare the rekey message RM
construction time in different cases. All experiments ran on the same machine: Sun Ultra250 with processor speed o f 400 MHz, main memory o f 2 GB, and operating system
Solaris 2.8. In the following experiments: a LKH rekey manager uses the unbalanced
LKH algorithms. The group size is increased from 32 to 2048 in multiple o f 2 (unless
otherwise stated). For each group size, 100 LKHs are constructed by a sequence of
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member additions. For every constructed LKH, 10 readings o f RM construction time are
measured for 5 join rekeyings and 5 leave rekeyings (one join followed by one leave 5
times). Next, the LKH join/leave RM construction time, for that group size, is considered
as the average o f the 500 readings.
The following experiments study and compare RM construction time as follows: 1)
star versus LKH approach for group key management; 2) effect o f increasing LKH
degree when used with encryption-based or XORBP KDT; 3) effect o f increasing the
encryption time (i.e. more complex encryption standard) on the saving o f RM
construction time when XORBP KDT is used over the encryption-based K DT; 4) effect
o f using secure random number generation on XORBP KDT; and 5) comparing the
estimated and measured rekey costs.
3.7.1

Star Versus LKH Key Management Approaches

The first experiment compares RM construction time for star rekey manager versus
LKH rekey manager. Both managers are using encryption-based KDT with DBS
encryption. LKH degree is 4, and the group size increases from 32 to 256 in multiple o f
2. Fig. 11 illustrates RM construction time for both managers in both the join and leave
rekey cases. For star rekey manager sJoin and sLeave are the RM construction time in the
join and leave rekeyings respectively. For LKH rekey manager eJoin(4) and eLeave(4)
are the RM construction time in the join and leave rekeyings respectively, where .4
identifies LKH degree. We can observe that sLeave increases linearly with the group size
increase and therefore star rekey manager does not provide scalable rekeying. The
experiment confirms that using star rekey manager is not practical even for small group
sizes.
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Fig. 11. Comparison o f RM construction time in for star versus LKH key management
approaches.

3.7.2

Increasing LKH Degree

The second experiment shows the effect o f increasing LKH degree on a LKH rekey
manager that uses encryption-based versus XORBP KDTs. The encryption algorithm is
DBS with extra bytes E = 121 bytes. The experiments are performed for LKH o f degree 4
and 16. Fig. 12 illustrates the results when encryption-based KDT is used. We can
observe that increasing LKH degree decreases the join rekey cost (eJoin(16) is 47% of
eJoin (4)) while increasing the leave rekey cost (eLeave(16) is 135% o f eLevae(4)). Such
result confirms our analysis that the use o f higher degree LKH (more than 4) with
encryption-based KDT is not practical. Fig. 13 illustrates the results when XORBP KDT
is used. We can observe that increasing LKH degree decreases both the join and leave
rekey costs (xJoin(16)/xLevae(16) is 66% o f xJoin(4)/xLeave(4)). Such result confirms
our analysis that increasing LKH degree with XORBP KDT decreases both join and
leave rekey costs.
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Fig. 12. Effect o f LKH degree increase {d = A versus J = 16) on RM construction time
when encryption-based KDT is used.
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3.7.3

Increasing Key Size

The third experiment shows the RM construction time saving for the same degree
LKH when XORBP KDT is used versus encrjqrtion-based KDT for different encryption
standards. LKH degree is 4, and the group size increases form 32 to 4096 in multiple of
2. Fig. 14 illustrates the results when DBS encryption algorithm is used (extra bytes E =
127). We can observe that the use o f XORBP KDT decreases both the join and leave
rekey costs when compared to encryption-based KDT (xJoin is 23% o f eJoin, and xLeave
is 12% o f eLeave). Fig. 15 illustrates the results when triple DBS enciyption algorithm is
used (extra bytes £ ’=116). Triple DBS key size is 3 times DBS key size and performing a
triple DBS encryption is more time consuming than DBS. Similarly, the use o f XORBP
reduces the rekey cost (xJoin is 40% o f eJoin, and xLeave is 20 o f % eLeave). Note that
Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 demonstrate XORBP KDT symmetric rekey cost for both join and
leave rekey cases, and the un-symmetry o f the encryption-based KDT. Comparing RM
construction time saving when DBS is used versus tripe DBS, we can observe that the
time saving o f XORBP is increased when used with smaller key size encryption protocol.
When DBS is used xJoin is 23% o f eJoin while when triple DBS is used xJoin is 40% o f
eJoin (i.e. when DBS is used join RM construction time saving achieves 77%, while if
triple DBS is used the saving is reduced to 60%). Similarly, when DBS is used leave RM
construction time saving achieves 87%, while if triple DBS is used the saving is reduced
to 80%. Such saving is because larger key size introduces more random number
generation for larger byte patterns and rekey packets’ filling bytes. Random number
generation is an expensive operation in terms o f computation time but not as much as
encryption.
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Fig. 14. Comparison o f RM constmction time when used with DES encryption-based
versus XORBP KDTs.
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Fig. 15. Comparison o f RM construction time when used with triple DES encryptionbased versus XORBP KDTs.
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3.7.4

Secure Random Number Generation

The use of XORBP introduces extra random number generation (section 3.6.3). The
key generation in the above experiments is performed using javax.crypto.KeyGenerator
class, while other random numbers and bytes are generated using java.util.Random class
[62]. In addition, the above experiments perform un-optimized random byte generation,
i.e. when a rekey packet is instantiated it is filled with newly generated random bytes
then some of those bytes are overwritten with XORed keys (those bytes shouldn’t be
generated in the first place). Moreover, when encoding a BP, an unnecessary extra
random byte is usually generated to augment the rest o f the unused byte o f the encoded
BP.
Secure random number generation is more expensive than the usual (un-secure)
random

number

generation.

java.security.SecureRandom

This

experiment

is

performed

using

class that uses “SAHIPRNG” algorithm instead o f

java.util.Random class [62]. The same experiment as in section 3.7.3 for DES is repeated
with the new

random

generation class while key generation uses the

same

javax.crypto.KeyGenerator class. The same code that performs un-optimized random
byte generation is used. From our experiments, it is estimated that SecureRandom
generation consumes 2.5 times the time o f the same Random generation.
The experiment shows RM construction time saving for the same degree LKH when
XORBP KDT is used versus an encryption-based KDT. LKH degree is 4, and the group
size increases form 32 to 4096 in multiple o f 2. Fig. 16 illustrates the results when DES
encryption algorithm is used (extra bytes E = 116). Similarly, the use SecureRandom with
XORBP KDT decreases both the join and leave rekey costs versus encryption-based
KDT (xJoin is 56% o f eJoin, and xLeave is 31% o f eLeave). Comparing the saving with
the results shown in Fig. 14, the join RM construction time saving is reduced from 77%
using Random to 44% using SecureRandom. The leave RM construction time saving is
reduced from 87% using Random to 69% using SecureRandom.
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Fig. 16. Comparison o f RM construction time when used with DES encryption-based
KDT versus XORBP KDT that uses secure random number generation.

3.7.5

Estimated and Measured Costs

This experiment compares the estimated and measured LKH height for different LKH
degrees and group size n = 4096. The LKH degree is increased from 4 to 32 by step 4
(i.e., 4, 6, 12, ..., 32), and the rekey manager uses XORBP KDT. For every LKH degree,
n members are added and the LKH height and the number o f allocated nodes are
recorded. As previously mentioned, the experiments in this chapter adopt unbalanced
LKH maintenance algorithms. The average o f 500 readings is plotted.
Fig. 17 shows that the measured LKH height is usually larger than the estimated
height for smaller LBLH degrees, and almost the same for larger LKH degrees. Fig. 18 and
Fig. 19 illustrate the difference between the required member storage (MS) and rekey
message size (RMS) respectively using the measured and estimated LKH heights. Similar
to the height, usually the measured MS and RMS have slight increase from the estimated
values. Fig. 20 illustrates the difference between the required LKH storage (LKHS) o f the
measured and estimated values. Unlike MS and RMS, there is in the average 60%
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increase in the measured LKHS over the estimated LKHS. Such increase is due to the use
of unbalanced LKH maintenance algorithms. Such increase is expected to get higher with
either a group size or group dynamics increases. Group dynamics determines the join and
leave patterns.
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Fig. 17. Comparison o f measured and estimated LKH height for a group o f size n - 4096.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

68

-0 — measured

— estimated

180
160
140

120
100
^

80

0

5

10

20

15

25

30

35

deg ree

Fig. 18. Comparison o f measured and estimated member storage (MS) for a group o f size
n = 4096.
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Fig. 19. Comparison o f measured and estimated rekey message size (RMS) for a group o f
size.n = 4096.
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Fig. 20. Comparison o f measured and estimated LKH storage (LKHS) for a group o f size
n = 4096.

3.8

Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced a software model for secure group key management,

where the main components along with their functionalities and interactions were
identified. Concentrating on secure group key management, we highlighted two
traditional rekey manager approaches for group rekeying, namely star and logical key
hierarchy (LKH). The star key management approach is a simple approach that doesn’t
provide scalable leave rekeying since the leave rekey cost increases linearly with the
group size. The LKH approach provided a scalable join and leave rekeying. Using the
LKH approach, both join and leave rekeyings scales linearly with the logarithm o f the
group size. On the other hand, the LKH approach has un-symmetric rekeying procedures
for join and leave cases and doesn’t scale well with LKH degree increase. The original
LKH key distribution technique (KDT) for a newly generated key in a rekey message is
to encrypt a new key either with another key or with its previous version (encryptionbased KDT).
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We introduced XORBP, a new KDT that can be used with the LKH approach.
XORBP performs a simple XOR operation between keys instead o f encryption and
distributes the key material in random byte patterns (BPs) in a fixed size rekey packet for
every new key. The rekey message contains a rekey packet for every new key that is
targeted to a set o f group members that should hold that key. The use o f XORBP
provided symmetric rekey procedures for join and leave rekeyings. In addition, it
substantially reduces the rekey time. On the other hand, the use o f XORBP increases the
required LKH storage, member storage, and the rekey message size. In addition, XORBP
introduces extra random number generation when compared with encryption-based KDT.
We derived analytical cost estimates o f XORBP KDT, and performed empirical
experiments to compare its performance versus encryption-based KDT. Our experiments
show that, increasing LKH degree when used with encryption-based KDT increases the
un-symmetry o f join and leave rekey costs, which makes the use o f an LKH degree
greater than 4 not practical. Using XORBP as KDT and increasing LKH degree allows
the decrease of join and leave rekey costs. Using XORBP KDT versus encryption-based
KDT, with the same degree LKH, can achieve 90% savings in the rekey message
construction time. Using XORBP KDT with higher degree LKH (compared to lower
degree LKH) provides
communication.

Finally,

extra savings in all cost metrics:
our experiments,

using unbalanced

storage, time,
LKH

and

maintenance

algorithms, show that there exists a slight increase in the measured LKH height, member
storage, and rekey message size over the estimated values. On the other hand, the
experiments show that the measured LKH storage for small group size has a 60%
increase over the estimated value. Such undesirable increase motivates us to develop
balanced LKH maintenance algorithms and protocols as explained in chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV
LOGICAL KEY HIERARCHY REKEY PROTOCOLS
As previously mentioned in chapter III, for secure group key management, there
exists a (central) rekey manager that maintains a logical key hierarchy (LKH) for scalable
rekeying (change o f group key, GK, due to either new group member addition or group
member removal). The rekey manager sends a rekey message (RM) to all group members
for every group rekeying. The rekey message contains a rekey packet for every new LKH
key. The rekey client is the group member component that maintains a set o f LKH keys
(including GK), and receives and process RMs for such keys update.
In this chapter, we propose two techniques for a rekey manager to maintain a LKH,
and the associated rekey protocols. One technique adopts an unbalanced LKH (denoted
S-LKH) while the other adopts a balanced LKH (denoted B'^-LKH). We detail the LKH
node structure, and the RM format and construction for all scenarios o f LKH node
insertion and deletion. In addition, we present the rekey client processing for different
RM types. We performed empirical experiments to compare the rekey performance o f SLBH protocol versus B'^-LKH protocol for different group sizes and LKH degrees. The
B'^-LKH protocol causes a small increase in the average number o f rekey packets, and the
average number o f encrypted keys in a RM when compared to the S-LKH protocol.
However, in chapter V we show that introducing hatch rekeying (rekeying for several
members addition and/or removal) results in a reduction in the B^-LKH case. On the
other hand, the use o f B'^-LKH decreases LKH height and the maximum number o f
encrypted keys in a RM when compared to S-LKH. The expected maximum rekey time is
used in adjusting the minimum inter-rekey period that has to be elapsed between two
consecutive rekeyings. Moreover, the use o f B'^-LKH reduces the number o f allocated
nodes for a LKH (up to 50% reduction) when compared to S-LKH.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 presents motivation and overview of
the new techniques and protocols. Section 4.2 presents S-LKH node structure, RM
format, and S-LKH maintenance algorithms along with RM construction. Section 4.3
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presents B^-LKH maintenance algorithms along with RM construction, and algorithms
analysis. Section 4.4 details B'^-LKH rekey client processing when receiving a RM to
update the maintained set o f keys. Section 4.5 presents performance evaluation
experiments and results. Finally, section 4.6 concludes the chapter.

4.1

Motivation and Overview
A LKH is maintained by a rekey manager to provide scalable rekeying. A balanced

LKH is a key tree where all leaf nodes are at the same distance (level) from the root.
Keeping a LKH balanced is very important to the performance o f group rekeying
especially for highly dynamic groups (many joins and leaves). Several researchers
assume a balanced LKH when estimating and analyzing the cost o f group rekeying [11],
[67]. Keeping a LKH balanced is a crucial issue. However, the literature lacks practical
LKH maintenance algorithms as well as algorithms for keeping a LKH o f any degree
balanced all the time [51] [52]. As concluded in chapter III, when an unbalanced LKH is
used, there is always an increase in the measured LKH height over the estimated value.
The increase in LKH height leads to a small increase in member storage, and rekey
message size over the estimated values. Nevertheless, there is a substantial increase in the
allocated LKH storage over the estimated value (the increase achieves 60% as shown in
section 3.7.5).
The proposed LKH maintenance algorithms require the rekey manager to assign a
unique identification for every group member, namely individual ID. For example, an
individual ID could be a randomly generated number. Individual IDs are used in
constructing the LKH and are sent in a RM to guide its processing (by a rekey client).
Using LKH keys or true member identification (such as name or IP address) as IDs
makes the rekey protocol vulnerable to traffic analysis. Since individual IDs are part o f a
RM, true IDs can be used to reveal the LKH structure and group members information.
Our proposed LKH maintenance techniques provide a dual LKH purpose, as a key
tree and as an easily searchable data structure for individual material (ID, key, ...etc).
The first proposed technique maintains a LKH as a search tree [63], denoted S-LKH,
using individual IDs as searched values. A search tree is not balanced and is used to
provide sort and search algorithms for a set o f searched values. In a search tree, any value
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is located only once at any tree node (internal or leaf). We adapt the traditional search
tree algorithms to accommodate the constraint that a group member individual material
(ID, key, ...etc) is always an entry in a leaf node. The S-LKH internal nodes contain keyencrypting-keys (KEKs). We detail S-LKiH node structure and maintenance algorithms
that show how a S-LKH grows (shrinks) when an individual entry is inserted (deleted)
into a leaf node. In addition, the algorithms show how a RM is constructed for different
insertion and deletion scenarios. The S-LKH maintenance algorithms are applicable for
any LKH o f degree d > 2 .
The second proposed technique maintains LKH as a balanced

search tree [63],

denoted B^-LKH, that has the same structure as S-LKH but guarantees that a LKH is
balanced after every node insertion or deletion. B"^ search trees have an extra constraint
that all allocated nodes have to be at least half full to reduce the required LKH storage
(allocated memory space). B^-LKH maintenance introduces complexity and extra
overhead in RM construction and in the rekey client processing. We detail B"^-LKH
maintenance algorithms along with RM construction for different insertion and deletion
cases. In addition, we detail the rekey client RM processing (for key updates) for
different RM types.

4.2

S-LKH: A LKH as a Search Tree
In a binary search tree, each node N contains a single search value v and points to two

sub-trees (children). The left sub-tree (child) contains all the search values in the tree
rooted at N that are less than or equal to v, and the right sub-tree (child) contains all the
search values in the tree rooted at N that are greater than v. A multi-way search tree o f
degree J is a general tree in which each node has d or fewer children (sub-trees) and
contains one fewer search values than it has children. That is, if a node has four children,
it contains three search values. The search tree is constructed such that the search values
are sorted in an ascending order in each node. In addition, the searched values are sorted
across all nodes.
A rekey manager that maintains LKH as a S-LKH is required to provide a unique
individual identification, ID, for every new member. S-LKH is constructed as a search
tree for those individual IDs. An individual ID can be a newly generated random number.
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Using LKH keys as sort/search values will reduce an insider attack search space. For
example, colluding group members can specify a smaller search space for LKH keys by
revealing their keys and positions to each other. Individual IDs are sent in a RM to guide
the rekey client processing. Using true member identification such as name or IP address
as an individual ID makes the protocol vulnerable to traffic analysis. Generating IDs as
random numbers prevents both the insider attack and the traffic analysis problems.
Similar to a search tree, a S-LKH internal node has at least one child, while a S-LKH
leaf node has no children. The proposed S-LKH maintenance algorithms adapt the
traditional search tree algorithms to the constraint that an individual material (ID, key,
...etc) is always an entry in a leaf node. Consequently all searched IDs are entries in leaf
nodes while the internal nodes contain replicas o f certain IDs that are used as an index to
guide the search for leaf entries’ IDs.
4.2.1

S-LKH Node Structure

In a S-LKH o f degree d, the node size e is the number of entries in a node such that
l < e < ( 7 . The leaf node structures is

where the pair

( K. , IDj) is an individual entry that contains an indiviudal key K. and an indiviudal ID
/D,.among other individual information such as name, IP address,..etc (not shown). The
individual IDs are the sorted/searched values used in constructing S-LKH and are unique
through

all

leaf

nodes.

The

internal

node

structure

is

[(K ,, Pj) ,/D j, { K j , P2 ),...,/D^_i, (K^ , P J ] , where the pair (K.,P.) is a child node entry in
which K- is a KEK and Pi is a pointer to the (internal or leaf) child node. The internal
nodes’ IDs are replicas o f certain leaf IDs and are choosen to guide the search.
A leaf node entry insertion requires a pair (K,.,/D,.) o f the individul key and ID in
addition to other individual material (not illustrated). While, an internal node entry
insertion requires an ID, except for the first insertion, and a child node. An internal node
entry is created to contain the pair (K,.,P^.), where K,. is a newly generated KEK and
is a pointer to the child node. Internal node IDs are inserted between childem entries as
shown in the internal node structure above. A S-LKH is constructed such that for every
internal node, the first entry P, points to a child node whose every IDi entry IDi < ID^,
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the last entry

points to a child node whose every ID. entry ID^_^ < ID ., and every

other Pj points to a child node whose every ID. entry IDj_^ < ID. < I D . . In addition, all
entries o f a leaf node are sorted in ascending order by their IDs. Fig. 21 illustrates a SLKH structure maintained by a rekey manager. The rekey manager maintains two
entities: the group key GK and root the pointer to the S-LKH root node.

GK

root

(K ,, PO , ID ,

( K j, L ), ID j,..., IDe.,, (K=,Pe)

Fig. 21. A S-LKH structure.

A S-LKH provides dual purpose as a key tree and as an easily searched data structure
for individual material. A S-LKH has two views, the key view that shows the
corresponding key tree (LKH), and the search view that shows the search tree for
individual IDs. For example. Fig. 22(a) is a S-LKH o f degree d = 2 and height /z = 3 for a
group o f size n = 5; Fig. 22(b) is the S-LKH key view, and Fig. 22(c) is the S-LKH
search view.
When S-LKH is used with XORBP key distribution technique (KDT) (chapter III),
every key entry in an internal node or in a leaf node is associated with a byte pattern
(BP). The BP will be allocated (generated) when the entry is first inserted. In the
remainder o f this chapter, we assume the use o f encryption-based KDT, and explain the
changes, if any, when XORBP is used.
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(K,, Pi), 900, (Kz, P2)

(K,.,,P,.,), 400, (K,.2 , P1.2)
(K 2,,.,,1120),(K 2„,.2, 1 2 0 5 ))

(K,.,.,. 120), (K,.,1,2, 205)

(a) The S-LKH nodes.
GK

-2.1.2

(b) The S-LKH key view.

900

400

120

205

900

1120

1205

(c) The S-LKH search view.

Fig. 22. A S-LKH o f degree d = 2 and height A = 3 for a group o f size n - 5 .
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4.2.2

S-LKH Rekey Message Format

Fig. 23 depicts the rekey message RM format used by a S-LKH rekey manager. Fig.
23(a) illustrates the initial key message sent to a group member before receiving any RMs
and is used to initialize his state (ID, position, LKH height, and LKH degree). Where ID
is the member unique identifleation assigned by the rekey manager, and position is an
encoded LKH position o f the individual leaf entry. The individual BP is sent only if
XORBP is used as a KDT. Fig. 23(b) illustrates the RM format, which is sent to all group
members for every rekeying, where SEQ is a sequential number that indicates RM
number starting from I for the first message, type is the message type that could be ADD
if the rekey is due to new member addition or REMOVE if the rekey is due to group
member removal (other types will be introduced later when the algorithms are presented),
position is the encoded LKH position o f inserted/deleted leaf node entry, level specifies
the distance between the root node and the effected leaf node, ID is the inserted/deleted
leaf entry ID, and a RekeyPacket is constructed for every new key.
If an encryption-base KDT is used, the RekeyPacket, shown in Fig. 23(c), contains
several encryptions o f a new key (encKey). Each encKey is targeted to a different set o f
group members. On the other hand, if a XORBP KDT is used, the RekeyPacket, shown in
Fig. 23(d), contains a fixed length o f bytes (size is S'bytes as estimated in section 3.3.3)
and an encoded BP encodedBP for the assoeiated BP as explained in section 3.4.2. Note
that, GK is not associated with a BP and a rekey packet for GK doesn’t contain an
encoded BP.
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ID

Position

LKH height

LKH degree

Individual BP

(a) Individual (initial) key message.

SEQ

Position

Type

L evel

ID

R ekeyPacket),R ekeyPacket 2 , ...

(b) Rekey Message (RM).

encK eyi, encK ey 2 , ...

(c) Encryption rekey packet.

encodedBP

S bytes

(d) XORBP rekey packet.

Fig. 23. The format o f messages used by a S-LKH rekey manager.

4.2.3

Rekey Packet Construction

For an internal node entry { K ^ , P ^ ) m an internal node N, there are two types o f
constructed rekey packets for a newly generated K \ . The first type is addRekey packet
that is constructed after an insertion o f an entry to the intemaFleaf node A, where node A
is the child o f N pointed to by

(node A for GK is root node). The second type is
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rm vR ekey packet that is constructed after the deletion o f an entry from node A. The rekey

packets are constructed by calling the methods addRekey(A) and rmvRekey{A) provided
by every internal node N (and by GK). Note that the inserted/deleted entry could be
directly in node A or indirectly in the path o f one o f its children.
If an encryption-based KDT is used, the addRekey packet contains two encryptions o f
K \ {{K \ )K ^ , [K \ }Kg ] where Kg is the new entry key in node A. The rmvRekey packet
contains e enctryptions o f K ^

where e is the number o f entries in node A

Note that for the first time a newly created key is distributed, a rmvRekey has to be
constructed since no previous version o f the key exists. In addition, if an operation
performs both insertion and deletion to node A, a rmvRekey packet has to be constructed
for K \ (the key previous version can not be used since some entries are deleted).
If XORBP KDT is used, an internal node entry (X ^,5 P ^ ,P ^ ) contains a BP that has
to be regenerated along with the key K ^ . Both addRekey and rmbRekey packets
construction is symmetric and uses node A entries as described in section 3.4.1. Every
XORBP rekey packets, except for GK, contains an encodedBP for BP^ using K^ as
descibed in section 3.4.2.
4.2.4

S-LKH Algorithm for New Group Member Addition

Fig. 24 is the S-LKH new member addition algorithm, AddMember, where the new
group member has a unique identification memberlD and an individual key memberKey.
The algorithm details how the S-LKH o f degree d rooted at node root is growing while
adding the new member entry as well as how the individual key message initMsg and the
RM rekeyMsg are constructed for the different addition cases (RM type). There are three
possible RM {rekeyMsg) types ADD, SPLIT, and INCREASE as will be explained next.
Initially, the S-LKH rooted at root node is searched by memberlD for the appropriate
position in a leaf node N for the new member entry. The lookup method searches the SLKH rooted at root node guided by memberlD and returns the appropriate position for
the individual entry to be inserted, in addition, it returns all visited nodes in nodeStack,
(where the first pushed node is root and the last pushed node is the leaf node that should
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contain the new individual entry). Then, the new entry is inserted where there are three
cases. The first case occurs if the leaf node N has space for the new entry (number o f
entries less than d), a simple insert is performed and rekeyMsg type is set to ADD^. Note
that, if XORBP KDT is used the individualBP filed in initMsg message is assigned after
the leaf node insertion is performed (Fig. 23 (a)).
The other two cases occur if the leaf node N is full (has d entries). I f N is full, a new
leaf node newNode is allocated and N entries (including the new one) are split equally
between the two nodes (N and newNode). If the number of entries (c/ + 1) doesn’t split
equally between the two nodes (odd number), we keep one more entry in N than
newNode. The newNode is to be the right neighbor o f N. The splitlnsert method returns
an ID that is the maximum ID value in node N after the split. An internal node entry
(KEK and pointer) that points to newNode should be inserted in the parent o f N (to the
right o f N entry). There are two cases for that insertion according to whether the parent
node is flill or not.
The second addition case occurs when the parent o f N has space for a new entry, the
newNode entry is inserted and rekeyMsg type is set to SPLIT. The third addition case
occurs if the parent o f N is full, a new internal node newParent is allocated to be the
parent for the two children N and newNode. The pointer at the parent node that was
pointing to N should be replaced to point to newParent instead and rekeyMsg type is set
to INCREASE. The last case leads to an inerease o f S-LKH height only if the distance
between root and N (denoted level in the algorithm) equals to Qi-l). Note that, the
underlined code highlights the assignment o f the constructed rekey packets to rekeyMsg
fields. Also note that, rmvRekey packets are constructed for the newly created KEKs and
for KEKs that experience deletion in the associated node.
The number o f rekey packets in rekeyMsg is {level+l), (level+2), and (level+3) in the
cases o f ADD, SPLIT, and INCREASE, respectively. The first two packets in the cases
of SPLIT & INCREASE are rmvRekey packets while all other packets are addRekey
packets. Please see appendix A for examples o f the different new group member addition
cases.

^ denotes an assignment to multiple fields in a m essage.
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Method AddMember(memberID, memberKey)
Globals: root, h, d, GK;
Returns: initMsg, rekeyMsg;
if (h equals 0) then { root = AllocateNew LeafNodeQ; h = 1; }
(position, nodeStack) = root.lookup (memberlD);
level = nodeStack.sizeO -1 ; N = nodeStack.pop();
initMsg <- (memberlD, position, h, d);
rekeyMsg G- (position, memberlD, level);
if (N.size() < d) then { N.insert (memberKey, memberlD); rekeyMsg.type = A D D ;}
else { newNode = AllocateNew LeafNode();
ID = N.splitInsert(memberKey, memberlD, newNode);
parent = nodeStack.pop();
if ((level > 0) and (parent. size() < d))
then { parent.insert(ID, newNode); decrement level;
rekeyMsg.type = SPLIT;
rekeyMsg<- (parent.rmvRekev(NL parent.rmvRekev(newNode)) ;}
else
{ newParent = AllocateNew InternalNode();
newParent.insert(null, N); newParent.insert(ID, newNode);
rekeyMsg.type = INCREASE;
rek ev M sg ^ (newParent.rmvRekey(N), newParent.rmvRekey(newNode));
if (level equals (h-1)) then increment h;
if (level equals 0) then root = newParent;
else parent.replace(N, newParent); }
}
for (i = 0 to (level-1))
{ prevN = N; N = nodeStack.popO;
rekeyMsg <-N.addRekey(prevN); }
rekeyMsg ^ GK.addRekev(root);
return initMsg, rekeyMsg;

Fig. 24. The S-LKH new group member addition and RM construction algorithm.
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4.2.5

S-LKH Algorithm for Group Member Removal

Fig. 25 is the S-LKH group member removal algorithm, RemoveMember, that details
how the S-LKH rooted at node root is shrinking after the removal o f a group member
entry as well as how the RM {rekeyMsg) is constructed for the different removal cases
(RM type). There are two possible RM rekeyMsg types REMOVE, and DECREASE. The
removed member is identified by his unique memberlD.
Initially, the S-LKH rooted at node root is searched by memberlD to determine the
position of the leaf entry at node N to be deleted. The first removal case occurs when the
leaf node N, after the deletion, contains one or more entries, the rekeyMsg type is set to
REMOVE. The second case occurs when node N, after the deletion, has no more entries.
In this case, node N entry (KEK and pointer) has to be deleted from its parent node. If the
parent after the deletion has no more entries, its entry has to be deleted from its parent,
and so on. The deletion could propagate to upper nodes and stops when it reaches the first
non-empty node. The rekeyMsg type is this case is set to DECREASE and could lead to
the decrease o f LKH height h if it the deleted leaf node is the only node that has distance
equals to {h-\) from the root. The height h might be decreased by more than one if more
nodes are deleted. The number o f rekey packets in rekeyMsg is {level + 1 ) . Please see
appendix A for examples o f the different group member removal cases.
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Method RemoveMember(memberlD)
Globals: root, h, d, GK;
Returns: rekeyMsg;
(position, nodeStack) = root.lookup (memberlD);
rekeyMsg
(position, memberlD);
level = nodeStack.sizeO -1 ;
N = nodeStack.popO; N.delete(memberlD);
if (N.sizeO > 0) then rekeyMsg.type = REMOVE;
else { while (N.size() equlas 0)
if (level equals 0) then { decrement level; free root; h = 0; breakWhile; }
else { decrement level; prevN = N; N = nodeStack.popO;
N.delete(prevN); }
h = root.getHeight();
rekeyMsg.type = DECREASE;
}
rekeyMsg.level = level;
for (i = 0 to (level-1))
{ prevN = N; N = nodeStack.popO;
rekeyMsg <~N .rmvRekevtprevNl: }
if (root does-not-equal null) then rekeyMsg
return rekeyMsg;

GK.rmvRekev(root);

Fig. 25. The S-LKEl group member removal and RM construction algorithm.

4.3

B^-LKH: A LKH as a

Search Tree

A B^-LKH rekey manager maintains a balanced LKH adapting

search tree

insertion and deletion algorithms [63], [38]. A B^-LKH is a S-LKH that has the same
node structure shown in Fig. 21. A B^ search tree o f degree d is subject to two
constraints, the first is all its leaf nodes are on the same level (i.e. balanced), and the
second is all allocated nodes except the root are at least half full. The root node size is at
least 2, while all other nodes’ sizes are at least \ d l 2 \ that will be denoted Min_d.
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Maintaing a B -LKH introduces complexity and extra overhead in RM construction as
well as in the rekey client processing. B^-LKH algorithms are suitable for any LKH o f
degree d greater than or equal to 4. When d equals 2 or 3 M in jd is 1 (and so is S-LKH)
and using B"^-LKH algorithms introduces exta overhead versus S-LKH.
4.3.1

B^-LKH Rekey Message Format

The initial key message and many fields in RM are similar to the messages explained
in section 4.2.2 for S-LKH protococl. Fig. 26 illustrates the changes to the messages
format used by a B’^-LKH rekey manager. Fig. 26(a) is RM format that contains several
IDs, and several boolean (bit) values isRght, where isRght is a Boolean value that
indicates either “is right” or “is left” that is used with some message types as will be
explained later when introducing the B^-LKH RemoveMember algorithm. Fig. 26(b) is a
XORBP rekey packet that contains several xoredBPs. A xoredBP is eonstructed with two
same (bit) length BPs XORed, and is used with some message types as will be expaliend
later when introucing the B"^-LKH RemoveMember algorithm.

Type

SEQ
ID i,ID 2,

Position

L evel

isRght], isRghtz, ...

...

RekeyPacket], RekeyPacket 2 , ...

(a) Rekey Message (RM).

encodedBP

S B ytes
xoredBP], xoredBP 2 , . ..

(b) XORBP rekey packet.

Fig. 26. The format o f messages used by a B^-LKH rekey manager.
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4.3.2

B -LKH Rekey Packet Construction

B"^-LKH algorithms use the same rekey packet constmction introduced in section
4.2.3 for S-LKH protocol. In addition, there are two remove related operations to uphold
the second

search tree constraint that all nodes are at least half full. The first operation

is shift, in which one entry is shifted from a node to one of its neighboring nodes. The
second operation is merge, in which all entries in an underflow node (its size becomes
less than Min_d) are merged (moved) to one o f its neighboring nodes and the empty node
is deleted.
A new rekey packet constmction is needed for the merge operation and is called
mrgRekey{A, isRight), where isRight is a boolean value if “trwe” that means A is the right
neighbor o f the deleted node and if “false" that means A is the left neighbor o f the
deleted node. Similar to addRekey and rmvRekey packet constmction methods, mrgRekey
is provided by the internal node N that contains the entry

for its child node A.

The encrj^tion-based rekey packet for the new K ^ contains M in_d encrypted key
{ { K \ ] K ^ , { K \ ] K ^ , l < i < Min _d'\

where K. is a merged entry key, and isRight

determines which keys are merged. If isRight equals to true, the first M in_d entries are
merged from the left neigbor node, and if equals to fa lse the last M in_d entries are
merged from the right neighbor node.
The XORBP rekey packets are constmcted the same way for all packet types
{addRekey, rmvRekey and mrgRekey). I f XORBP is used as a KDT technique the
shifted/merged entries’ BP is subject to change due to the possible occupation o f the
assigned bytes. When an entry is shifted/merged a new BP is allocated. The new bit
represented BP has to be sent in the rekey packet XORed with its bit represented previous
value as a xoredBP illustrated in section 4.3.1. The rekey packet contains one xoredBP if
there is a shifted entry to node A, and contains {M injd - 1) xoredBPs if there are {Min_d 1) merged entries to node A.
4.3.3

B^-LKH Algorithm for New Group Member Addition

Adding a new group member leads to the insertion o f a new entry in a leaf node, and
might lead to insertions in one or more internal nodes. First we will present the different
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insert operations in a leaf node and in an internal node, followed by the m ember’s
addition and RM construction algorithm (AddMember).
For a leaf node there exists two possible insert operations namely insert and
splitlnsert. Fig. 27 is an example that illustrates a leaf node N in a LKH o f degree <7 = 4
(Min_d = 2) after the two insert operations. Every leaf entry represents a member
individual key and his unique ID. Fig. 27(a) shows the original leaf node N that has 3
entries. Fig. 27(b) shows the leaf node N after insert (K d, 390) is performed (N contains
maximum number o f entries 4). Fig. 27(c) shows the leaf node N after splitlnsert (Kg,
280) is performed. A new empty leaf node newNode is allocated and passed to this
method call, and an ID is returned that will be inserted in an internal node in the upper
level. Note that the entries are sorted by their IDs, and the last ID in N is returned after
moving half o f its entries to newNode. The two leaf nodes contain at least

entries.

( K a , 340), (K b , 410 ), ( K c , 470)

(a) Original leaf node N.

(K a, 340), (K d, 3 9 0 ) , (K b, 410), (K c, 470)

(b) Leaf node N after insert (K d,

N
(K e , 28 0 ), (K a, 340), (K ^, 390)

I 390

i

390)

newNode
(K b , 410), (K c, 470)

(c) Leaf nodes N and newNode, and the returned ID after splitlnsert (K e, 280).
Fig. 27. An example o f different leaf node insertions in a B^-LKH o f degree <7= 4.
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For an internal node, there are three possible insert operations namely firstln se rt,
insert, and splitlinsert. Fig. 28 is an example that illustrates the three insert operations in
an internal node N in a LKH o f degree d = A. The internal node insert operations are
passed a child node (A, B, C, D, or E) and a pointer to these nodes is created in the entry.
In addition, a newly created KEK is generated for every child node. The firstlnsert
operation, when the node is empty, is passed two child nodes. Fig. 28(a) shows the
internal node N after firstInsert{A, 390, B) is performed. Fig. 28 (b) shows the intemal
node N after the insert{500, C) is performed, then insert(200, D) is performed, that makes
the node full (has 4 entries). Fig. 28(c) shows the intemal node N after splitInsert(AlO, E)
is performed, where a new intemal node newNode is passed to this method call and an ID
is retumed.

I ( K a , P a) , 3 9 0 , ( K b , P b )

j

(a) Intemal node N after firstlnsert (A, 390, B).

( K a , Pa), 2 0 0 , (K d , P d ), 390, (K b , ? b ) , 5 0 0 , (K c , P c )

(b) Intemal node N after insert (500, C), then insert (200, D).

N
(K a, P a), 200, (K d, P d), 390, (K b , ? b)

i 410

I

new N ode
(K e , P e ), 500, ( K c , ? c )

(c) Intemal nodes N and newNode, and the retumed ID after splitlnsert (410, E).

Fig. 28. An example o f different internal node insertions in a B^-LKH o f degree d = A.
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Fig. 29 is the B^-LKH member addition and RM construction algorithm, AddMember,
that details how the B^-LKH rooted at node root is growing while adding new members
entries as well as how the individual key message initMsg and RM rekeyMsg are
eonstructed for different addition cases (RM type). There are three possible RM
{rekeyMsg) types ADD, SPLIT, and INCREASE as will be explained next. The added
member has a unique ID memberlD and an individual key memberKey.
Initially, the B^-LKH rooted at node root is searched by memberlD for the
appropriate position in a leaf node N for the new member entry. The first addition case
occurs when the leaf node N has space for the new entry, a simple insertion is performed,
and rekeyMsg type is set to ADD. The other two addition cases occur if the leaf node is
full. If the leaf node is full a new leaf node newNode is allocated and the entries o f N are
split between the two nodes (N and newNode). An intemal entry (KEK and pointer) has
to be inserted for newNode at the parent o f N and to its right. If the parent o f N is not full
a simple intemal node insertion is performed. While if the parent node is full a new
intemal node is allocated and the entries o f that parent are split between it and the new
allocated node, and so on the split could propagate to upper levels. Note that, after
splitlnsert method is called the parent o f nodes p revN and prevN ew (denoted prvNprnt
and prvNwPrnt, respectively) could be either N or newNode, and are assigned by that
method call.
The second addition case occur when the split propagates until it reaches an internal
node that has space for the new entry and the rekeyMsg type is set to SPLIT. The third
addition case occurs when the split propagates to the root node leading to an increase of
LKH height, and the rekeyMsg type is set to INCREASE. Please see appendix A for
examples o f the different new group member addition cases.
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Method AddMember(memberID, memberKey)
Globals: root, h, d, GK;
Returns: intMsg, rekeyMsg;
if (h equals 0) then { root = AllocateNew LeafNode(); h = 1;}
(position, nodeStack) = root.lookup (memberlD); level = h -1 ; N = nodeStack.popO;
initMsg ^ (memberlD, position, h, d); rekeyMsg <r (position, memberlD);
if (N.sizeO < d) then { N.insert (memberKey, memberlD); rekeyMsg.type = A D D ;}
else { done = false; newNode = AllocateNew LeafNode();
ID = N.splitInsert(memberKey, memberlD, newNode);
while (level > 0)
{ decrement level; prevN = N; N = nodeStack.popO;
if (N.sizeO ^ d)
then { N.insert(ID, newNode); rekeyMsg.type = SPLIT;
rekeyMsg ^ (level, ID, N.rmvRekev(prevN), N.rmvRekev(newNode));
done = true; breakW hile;}
else { prevNew = newNode; newNode = new IntemalNode();
rekeyMsg ^ (ID );
(ID, prevNpmt, prevNewPmt) = N.splitInsert(ID, prevNew, newNode);
rekeyMsg ^ prevNpmt.rmvRekev(prevN);
rekeyMsg
prevNewPmt.rmvRekev(nrevNew); }
}
if (not done )
then { root = AllocateNew IntemalNode(); root.firstInsert(N, ID, newNode);
rekeyMsg.type = INCREASE; increment h;
rekeyMsg ^ (ID, root.rmvRekev(NL root.imvRekevrnewNodeE: }
}
for (i = 0 to (level-1))
{ prevN = N; N = nodeStack.popO;
rekeyMsg
N.addRekev(prevN); }
rekeyMsg ^ GK.addRekey(root);
return initMsg, rekeyMsg;

Fig. 29. The B'^-LKH new group member addition and RM constmction algorithm.
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4.3.4

B^-LKH Algorithm for Group Member Removal

Removing a group member leads to the deletion o f his entry from a leaf node and
possibly the deletion o f one or more intemal node entries. The deletion o f an entry could
be simple that does not lead to the violation o f not being half full or it could need extra
overhead to uphold the

constraint that all nodes are at least half full. Keeping the B^-

LKH balanced and keeping the nodes half full need two possible remove-related
operations shift and merge, both operations apply to two neighboring siblings (o f the
same parent) nodes, N and its right or left neighbor Nghbr. The best neighbor for a node
N (if the two exists) is the one with greater size (i.e. has more entries). I f the two sibling
neighbors have the same size, the right one is chosen. Note that, the first child o f a node
has only a right sibling, while the last child o f a node has only a left sibling and the only
neighbor is the best neighbor. The best neighbor is chosen from the two possible
neighbors (if exists) o f a node N, that have the same anchor, such that it has enough
entries to avoid the more expensive merge operation. The original B^ search tree
algorithms impose no restriction on choosing a neighbor that has the same anchor and we
avoided such choice because o f its potential and complex change to the tree, and hence
increased cost o f the rekey operations [38]. For example if the best neighbor to a node
doesn’t have the same parent, two parent entries for the two nodes need to be rekeyed
(regeneration o f the key).
If the deletion o f an entry at node N causes an underflow, i.e. its size becomes {Min_d
-1), a shift or merge operation is essential to keep it at least half full. The shift operation
moves an entry from Nghbr to N, where N g h b f s size is more than Min_d. The merge
operation moves all entries o f N to Nghbr and deletes node N, where N ghbr’s size is
exactly Min_d.
Fig. 30 and Fig. 31 are examples that depict the possible shift operations from right
and left neighbors, respectively, in a B^-LKH o f degree d = A. The minimum number o f
entries in a node is 2. The examples illustrate the nodes before and after the operation in
the two cases o f the nodes (N and Nghbr) being leaf or intemal nodes. In addition, the
examples illustrate how the ID is adjusted in the anchor node. The shift method call is
provided by the anchor node and retums an ID that will be sent in the RM.
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Anchor

•( Kn: Pn )>IDX) (KNghbr, PNghbr )
Nghbr

N

(Ka,P a)

i

(Ka, IDa)

i (Kb, Pb), IDb, (Kc, Pc), IDc, (Kd, Pd)
(Kb, IDb), (Kc, IDc), (Kd, IDd)

(a) Node N before shift from right neighbor Nghbr.

Anchor
i • • ■( Kn, Pn ), IDb, (KNghbr, PNghbr ) •• •
N
(K a, P a) ,I D x, ( K b, P b)

(Ka, IDa), (Kb, IDb)

Nghbr
I (K c, Pc), IDc, (K d, P d)

(Kc,ID c),(K d,ID d)

(b) Node N after shift from right neighbor Nghbr (IDb is returned).

Fig. 30. An example o f B^-LKH internal/leaf node x i ^ i shift operation.
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Anchor
i ... ( KNghbtj PNghbr ); IDx> (K n , P n) • ■■
Nghbr

N

I (K b, P b), ID b , (K c , P c), ID c, (K d, P d)

I (K a, P a)

(K b , ID b), (K q, ID c), (K d, ID d)

(K a, ID a)

(a) Node N before shift from left neighbor Nghbr.

Anchor
i ... ( KNghbr, PNghbr), ID c, (K n , P n) ■■•
Nglibr
(K b , P b), ID b , (K c , P c)
(K b, ID b), (K c, ID c)

\

N

(K d , P d ), ID x , (K a, P a)
(K d , ID d ), (K a, ID a)

(b) Node N after shift from left neighbor Nghbr (IDc is returned).

Fig. 31. An example ofB^-LKH internal/leaf node left .s’/zi/i operation.

Fig. 32, and Fig. 33 are examples that depict the possible merge operations from right
and left neighbors respectively in a B”^-LKH o f degree

= 4. The minimum number o f

entries in a node is 2. The examples illustrate the nodes before and after the operation in
the two cases o f the nodes (N and Nghbr) being leaf or intemal nodes. In addition, the
examples illustrate how the anchor node is adjusted. The merge method call is provided
by the anchor node and retums the deleted ID that will be sent in the RM.
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A nchor
Anchor
I

(KNghbn PNghbr)-••

I

i • •-(K-N, P n )> ID x >(KNghbr> PNghbr)- • •
Nghbr
(K a, P a)

I

(K a, ID a)

Nghbr

\

(K b, P b), ID b , (K c, P c)

( K a , P a ) , ID x , (K b , P b), ID b , (K c , P c)

(K b, ID b), (K c , ID c)

( K a , ID a ) , (K b , ID b), (K c , ID c)

(b) Node N before merge with right
neighbor Nghbr.

(a) Node N after merge with right
neighbor Nghbr (IDx is returned).

Fig. 32. An example o f B^-LKH intemal/leaf node right merge operation.

Anchor

Anchor

I ---(Kfvjghbr,PNghbr)---

i ... (KNghbr, PNghbr), ID x ,(K n , P n ) - - Nghbr

N

(K b, P b), ID b, (Kc, P c)

I

(K b, ID b), (K c, ID c)

(K a, P a)

(K b, P b), ID b, (K c, P c), ID x , (K a , ? a )

(K a, ID a)

(K b, ID b), (K c, ID c), ( K a , ID a )

(b) Node N before merge with left
neighbor Nghbr.

Nghbr

(a) Node N after merge with right left
Nghbr (IDx is returned).

Fig. 33. An example o f B'^-LKH intemal/leaf node left merge operation.
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Fig. 34. illustrates the B’^-LKH group member removal and RM construction
algorithm, RemoveMember, that details how a B^-LKH is shrinking wile removing a
group member entry. The removed member is identified by his unique ID memberlD.
Initially, the B^-LKH rooted at node root is searched by memberlD for the position o f the
deleted entry in the leaf node N. While searching for the entry the lookup method looks
for the best neighbor o f each node and pushes it in nodeStack as well as a flag is pushed
in isRghtStack that determines if it is the right or the left neighbor. The deletion o f an
entry form a leaf node could introduce further deletions in upper level nodes that could
propagate up to root or stops at lower level. The deletion o f a member entry has four
different cases, i.e. four different RM types, and those are REMOVE, MERGE, SHIFT,
and DECREASE.
After the entry is deleted from leaf node N, node N is checked to see if it is at least
half full or not. If node N contains at least M in_d entries rekeyMsg type is set to
REMOVE. I f node N underflows the best neighbor Ngbgr (that is popped from the stack)
is checked to see if we could shift an entry from it (has more than M in_d entries) or a
merge is essential (has exactly M in_d entries). If shift is possible, an entry is shifted form
Nghbr to N, the deletion propagation stops, and rekeyMsg type is set to SHIFT. I f Nghbr
has exactly M in_d entries then the entries o f node N are merged (moved) to Nghbr node.
In this case, the intemal node entry at the parent node {anchor) that was pointing to node
N has to be deleted. If the anchor (parent) didn’t underflow after that deletion the merge
stops and rekeyMsg type is set to MERGE. If the anchor underflows its neighbor is
checked for shift or merge operation, and so the deletion could propagate to upper level
nodes. If the deletion propagates to root node and merged its only two children nodes,
B'^-LKH height is reduced by 1 and rekeyMsg type is set to DECREASE. Please see
appendix A for examples o f the different group member removal cases.
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Method RemoveMember(memberlD)
Globals: root, h, d, Min_d, GK;
Returns: rekeyMsg;
(position, nodeStack, isRghtStack) = lookup (memberlD);
rekeyMsg G (position, memberlD); level = h -1 ; N = nodeStack.popO;
N. delete(memberlD);
if ((N.sizeO > Min_d) or ((N equals root) and (N.size() > 0)))
then rekeyMsg.type = REMOVE;
else
{ done = false;
while (level > 0)
{ decrement level; anchor = nodeStack.popO; isRght = isRghtStack.popO;
Nghbr = anchor.getNghbr(N, isRght);
if (Nghbr.sizeO > Min__d)
then
{ ID = anchor.shift(N, Nghbr); rekeyMsg.type = SHIFT;
rek ey M sg ^ (level, ID, isRght, anchor.rmvRekev(N), anchor.rmvRekev(Nghbr));
done = true; breakWhile; }
else
{ ID = anchor.merge(N, Nghbr); N = anchor;
rekeyMsg<-(ID, isRght, anchor.mrgRekev(Nghbr. isRght));
if ((N.sizeO > Min_d) or ((N equals root) and (N.size() > 1)))
then { rekeyMsg.type = MERGE; rekeyM sgG (level); done = true;
breakW hile;}
}
}
if (not done )
then { if (N equals root) then free root; else root = N.childAt(O);
rekeyMsg.type = DECREASE; decrement h; }
}
for (i = 0 to (level-1))
{ prevN = N; N = nodeStack.popO;
rekeyMsg G N.rmvRekev(prevN): }
if (rekeyMsg.typeO does-not-equal DECREASE)
then rekeyMsg <r GK.rmvRekevfroot);
return rekeyMsg;

Fig. 34. The B^-LKH group member removal and RM construction algorithm.
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4.3.5

Algorithms Analysis

Analyzing AddMember and RemoveMember algorithms for a B^-LKH o f height h,
TABLE IV illustrates R M ’s (shown in Fig. 26) different field sizes for all group member
addition and removal cases (RM type), where RM level equals L. TABLE V illustrates
the different rekey packet sizes when encryption-based or XORBP KDT is used, where
Enc_K is the encrypted key size in bytes, and S is the XORBP rekey packet size. As
previously mentioned, for a B^-LKH o f degree d, M in_d is the minimum number o f non
root node entries that is equal to Li/ / 2 j .

TABLE IV
RM FIELD SIZE FOR B^-LKH OF HEIGHT h, AND RM ’S LEVEL L
RM type

“ID”

“isRght”

Number o f

Number o f

Num ber o f

length

length

addR ekey

rm vRekey

m rgRekey

packets (nA)

packets (nR)

packets (nM)

ADD

1

0

h

0

0

SPLIT

k -L

0

L + \

2x(h-L-\)

0

INCREASE

h+\

0

1

2xh

0

REM OVE

1

0

0

h

0

M ERGE

h-L

h -L -\

0

L+\

h -L -\

SHIFT

h-L

h -L -\

0

L+ 3

h -L -2

DECREASE

h

h-\

0

0

h-1
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TABLE V
REKEY PACKET SIZE FOR ENCRYPTION-BASED AND XORBP KDTS
Encryption-based

X O R BP

addR ekey packet size

2 X Ena _ K

S

rm vRekey packet size

exEnc _ K

S

w h e r e M i n _ d < e < d ( e i s the
number o f children for that key
entry node)
mrgRekey packet size

Min _ d X E n c _ K

S

Number o f k eys generated

nA + nR + nM

nA + nR + nM

Number o f encoded B Ps (A B P is

0

nA + nR + n M - 1

0

n M X { M i n _ d - V ) for MERGE

K numbers in the range [0:5 -1])
Number o f x o re d B Ps

and D EC REA SE
nM X { M in _ d - \ ) + I for SHIFT
0 otherwise

4.4

B'^-LKH Rekey Client Processing
The rekey client is the software component at every group member that receives RMs

and updates the client maintained set o f keys. The rekey client initially receives initMsg
that initializes the variables ID, position, h, d, and M in_d (calculated from d). The
position is represented as an array o f size h, where position{Qi\ identifies the child node
number o f LKH root node. In addition, the rekey client maintains a list o f keys key List o f
size {h + 1), where its first element (entry number 0) is his individual key and its last
element (entry number h) is GK. When the client receives initMsg he inserts his
individual key in a newly created keyList. Then the client keeps receiving rekeyMsg to
update his keys.
Updating keyList[\\ from a rekey packet depends on whether the KDT is encryptionbased or XORBP. If an encryption-based KDT is used, selecting the key encKey to be
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decrypted depends on the rekey packet type {addRekey, rmvRekey, or mrgRekey) and
positional). The selected encKey is decrypted either with its previous version, or with
keyList\i-\). On the other hand if XORJBP is used, updating keyList\i\ is symmetric for all
packet types and uses keyListli-l) and its associated BP to get the new version o f the key.
For every updated key, except GK, the associated BP is updated from the encodedBP in
the same rekey packet. The individual BP that is associated to the individual key
{keyList[G\) is sent in the initialization message initMsg.
When the rekey client receives rekeyMsg he compares his position

with

rekeyMsg.position to decide on the starting matching level {match) where he should start
updating his keyList. For example, if the member individual is in the leaf node that has
the inserted/deleted entry match will be 2. If the member individual entry is in a leaf node
that has the same parent o f the directly affected leaf node match will be 3, and so on. If
position has no intersection with rekeyMsg position then match is set to {h + \). The
following code fragment illustrates how to adjust match. Note that, match equals 1 only
at the new individual (i.e., his rekey client software component).

match = -1;
for (i = 0 to (h-1))
if {position)}) equals rekeyM sg.position\\^
then match = i;
else break F o r;
match = h - match',
if {match equals 1) then match = 2;

After deciding on match, the update procedure is triggered by rekeyMsg.type and
executed to update keyList. There are six different update procedures according to
rekeyMsg type. The following is the Simple update procedure called when rekeyMsg.Type
equals ADD or REMOVE. A group member whose match equals 2 and his ID is greater
than the inserted/deleted ID experiences a change in his individual leaf node position.
This individual leaf position is incremented by 1 if a new individual entry is inserted and
is decremented by 1 if an individual entry is deleted. In addition, a group member updates
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his keyList from the corresponding rekey packets according to his match. A group
member whose match equals 2 updates all h keys, while a group member whose match
equals (A + 1) updates only one key {GK). Please see Appendix B for detailed rekey
client update procedures and an example.

if {{match equals 2) and {ID > rekeyMsg.ID\Oyj)
then if {rekeyMsg.type equals ADD)
then in c re m en tposition{h-\\,
else d ecrem en tposition[h-l\,
for (i = {match - 2) to (A - 1))
keyList.update(i + 1, rekeyMsg.packet[i])',

4.5

E xperim ental Results
We have implemented the rekey manager and the rekey client in Java'^“[[62]. Both S-

LKH and B^-LKH protocols are available for use with an encryption-based or XORBP
KDT. In the following experiments, we compare the performance o f an unbalanced LKH
(S-LKH) versus a balanced LKH (B'^-LKH). First, an experiment is performed to study
the frequency o f the different rekey message (RM) types in both add and remove
rekeyings. Second, the simulated group dynamics in the experiments is explained. Third,
an experiment is performed to compare S-LKH and B'^-LKH rekey costs. Fourth, an
experiment is performed to study the effect o f LKH degree and group dynamics on SLKH and B’*^-LKH rekey costs and storage.
4.5.1 Frequency of D ifferent A ddition and Rem oval Cases
This experiment illustrates the frequency o f different RM types in the addition and
the removal rekey cases for both S-LKH and B’^-LKH protocols. The LKH degree d is
increased from 2 to 10. For every LKH degree, the group size n increases from 32 to
2048 in multiples o f 2. For every d and «, 10 LKHs are constructed by a sequence o f n
member additions then n member removals. A new unique random ID is generated for
every new member. The removed member is randomly chosen from the existing
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members. For every constructed LKH, the frequency o f different RM types is recorded.
We have noticed that the frequency o f each RM type depends on LKH degree and
doesn’t depend on the group size.
Fig. 35 and Fig. 36 illustrate the frequency of different RM types for S-LKH protocol
in the addition and removal rekey cases, respectively. We can observe that the frequency
o f the simplest rekey cases (ADD & REMOVE) increases with LKH degree increase, and
are occurring more than 80% o f the time for a LKH degree greater than 8.
Fig. 37 and Fig. 38 illustrate the frequency o f different RM types for B^-LKH
protocol in the addition and removal rekey cases, respectively. Similarly, we can observe
that the simplest rekey cases are occurring more than 80% o f the time for a LKH degree
greater than 8. In addition, the most expensive rekey cases (INCREASE & DECREASE)
are occurring less than 1% o f the time for any LKH degree.
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Fig. 35. Frequency o f add RM type for the S-LKH protocol.
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Fig. 36. Frequency o f remove RM type for the S-LKH protocol.
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Fig. 37. Frequency o f add RM type for the B'^-LKH protocol.
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Fig. 38. Frequency o f remove RM for the B'^-LKH protocol.

4.5.2

G roup Dynamics

To simulate group dynamics, a LKH is constructed by a sequence o f aN member
additions followed by a sequence o f rN member removal. The group size n = a N - r N ,
and the group dynamic ratio gdr is defined to be gdr = rN / a N . If the group is static
(i.e., no member is removed) gdr = 0. For gdr = 0.4, the group size is 60% o f the added
members (i.e., n = 60% aN). To have a group o f size n > 0, gdr value has to be in the
range [0,1 [.
When an encryption-based KDT is used, the rekey message cost is measured as the
total number o f encrypted keys in a RM (in all rekey packets). On the other hand, when
XORBP KDT is used, the rekey message cost is measured as the number o f rekey packets
in a RM.
In the following experiments, we compare the rekey performance o f S-LKH versus
B^-LKH for the same LKH degree, group size, and group dynamic ratio. For every
protocol, and the parameters {d, n, gdr), we construct 100 LKHs. For every constructed
LKH, its height and the number o f allocated nodes (LKH storage) are recorded. Then, 10
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readings for rekey message cost in both add and remove rekey cases (i.e., a remove
member followed by add member 10 times) are recorded. The plotted number o f
allocated nodes is the average o f 100 readings, and the plotted rekey message cost is the
average o f 1000 reading.
4.5.3

S-LK H and B^-LKH Rekey C ost

This experiment compares the behavior o f add and remove rekey costs for S-LKH
versus B^-LKH protocols in terms o f number o f rekey packets and number o f encrypted
keys. The experiment is performed for LKH degree d = A, group size n = 8192, and gdr =
0.4.
Fig. 39 and Fig. 40 illustrate, for both protocols, the frequency o f the different values
obtained for the number o f rekey packets in a RM in add and remove rekeyings,
respectively. We can observe the symmetry between the two figures (i.e., add and rekey
symmetric cost in terms o f the number o f rekey packets in a RM). In addition, we can
observe that using the S-LKH protocol, the number o f rekey packets in a RM spans a
wider range o f values when compared to the B’^-LKH protocol.
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Fig. 39. Frequency o f number o f rekey packets in add rekey message.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

104

rmv S-LKH - - - X " - rmv B-I--LKH
80
70
60
50
3 40
^

30
20
10

0

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

num ber o f rek ey p a c k e ts

Fig. 40. Frequency o f number of rekey packets in remove rekey message.

Fig. 41 and Fig. 42 illustrate, for both protocols, the frequency o f the different values
obtained for the number o f encrypted keys in a RM in add and remove rekeyings,
respectively. We can observe the un-symmetry between the two figures. Similarly, the
rekey cost in terms o f the number o f encrypted keys spans a wider range o f values when
used with the S-LKH protocol compared to B^-LKH. The S-LKjH wider range o f cost
values is due to the un-balanced LKH that implies the existence o f leaf nodes at different
levels from the root node.
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Fig. 41. Frequency o f number o f encrypted keys in add rekey message.
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Fig. 42. Frequency o f number o f encrypted keys in remove rekey message.
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TABLE VI summarizes the different rekey cost metrics for S-LKH versus B'^-LKH
protocols when d —4,n= 8192, and gdr =0.4. TABLE VII summarizes the results when d
= 4, smaller group size n = 512, and gdr = 0.4. TABLE VIII summarizes the results when
LKH is having larger degree d = 8, large group size n = 8192, and gdr = 0.4.
From the previous results, we can conclude that the rekey cost maintains the same
behavior for all group sizes and LKH degrees. The use o f B^-LKH protocol increases the
average number o f rekey packets and the average number o f encrypted keys in a RM
when compared to S-LKH protocol. On the other hand, the use o f B”^-LKH decreases the
average LKH height, the number o f allocated nodes, and the maximum number o f
encrypted keys. The maximum number o f encrypted keys (or the rekey packets) is used
in estimating the minimum time that has to be elapsed between two consecutive
rekeyings.

TABLE VI
S-LKH VERSUS B'^-LKH REKEY COST FOR ( J = 4; n =8192; gdr = 0.4)
S-LKH

B^-LKH

A verage LKH height.

11.09

9

Average LKH number o f allocated nodes.

6485.72

5703.754

A ddM em ber average number o f rekey packets.

8

9.028

A ddM em ber maximum number o f rekey packets.

12

12

R em oveM em ber average number o f rekey packets.

7.542

9.282

R em oveM em ber maximum number o f rekey packets.

11

10

A ddM em ber average number o f encrypted keys.

16,041

18.084

A ddM em ber maximum number o f encrypted keys.

25

27

R em oveM em ber average number o f encrypted keys.

26.81

25.835

R em oveM em ber maximum number o f encrypted keys.

40

32
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TABLE VII.
S-LKH VERSUS B+-LKH REKEY COST FOR (rf= 4; « =512; g d r ^ Q A )
S-LKH

B'^-LKH

A verage LKH height.

lA

6.11

A verage LKH number o f allocated nodes.

404.007

353.559

A ddM em ber average number o f rekey packets.

5.782

6.151

A ddM em ber maximum number o f rekey packets.

9

8

R em oveM em ber average number o f rekey packets.

5.306

6.412

R em oveM em ber maximum number o f rekey packets.

8

8

A ddM em ber average number o f encrypted keys.

11.637

12.343

A ddM em ber maximum number o f encrypted keys.

19

18

R em oveM em ber average number o f encrypted keys.

17.912

17.873

R em oveM em ber maximum number o f encrypted keys.

29

23

TABLE VIII.
S-LKH VERSUS B^-LKH REKEY COST FOR ( J = 8; « =8192; gdr = 0.4)
S-LKH

bllkh

A verage LKH height.

6.16

6

A verage LKH number o f allocated nodes.

3 1 0 8.134

2168.812

A ddM em ber average number o f rekey packets.

5.171

6.001

A ddM em ber maximum number o f rekey packets.

7

7

R em oveM em ber average number o f rekey packets.

5.141

6.338

R em oveM em ber maximum number o f rekey packets.

7

7

A ddM em ber average number o f encrypted keys.

10.352

12.007

A ddM em ber maximum number o f encrypted keys.

19

19

R em oveM em ber average number o f encrypted keys.

32.986

30.488

R em oveM em ber maximum number o f encrypted keys.

45

39
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4.5.4

Effect of G roup Dynam ics an d L K H Degree

If encryption-based KDT is used the optimal LKH degree is 4, and the total number
o f encrypted keys in a RM is the rekey cost metric. When XORBP KDT is used, the
number o f rekey packets in a RM is used as a rekey cost metric. In this experiment, we
study how the group dynamics and LKH degree affect the number o f rekey packets (for
XORBP KDT) in a RM and the number o f allocated nodes in LKH (LKH storage). As we
concluded from the previous experiment (section 4.5.3), add and remove rekey costs are
symmetric in terms o f the number o f rekey packets in a RM.
The group size n = 512, and LKH degree is increased from 4 to 32 in increments o f 4
(i.e. 4, 8, 12, ..., and 32). Fig. 43 illustrates, for S-LKH and B'^-LKH protocols, the
average number o f rekey packets in a RM for static group {gdr = 0). Fig. 44 illustrates the
results when gdr = 0.4. We can observe that the B^-LKH protocol introduces a slight
increase in the average number o f rekey packets in a RM over S-LKH protocol.
Comparing Fig. 43 and Fig. 44, we can conclude that this increase is slightly affected by
the group dynamics. Note that this increase is for individual rekeying (i.e. single add or
remove rekey). In chapter V, we present batch rekeying for a sequence o f add and/or
remove requests. For batch processing, the B"^-LKH protocol rekey cost outperforms the
S-LKH protocol.
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Fig. 43. Average number o f rekey packets in a RM, where gdr = 0, and n = 512.
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Fig. 44. Average number o f rekey packets in a RM, where gdr = 0.4, and n = 512.

S-LKH increases the number of LKH allocated nodes when compared to B^-LKH
(section 4.5.3). If the number o f allocated nodes for S-LKH and B^-LKH are sLKHS and
bLKHS, respectively. The S-LKH pereentile increase in the number o f allocated nodes
can be calculated as inc - (sLKHS - bLK H s)x 1001b L K H S . Fig. 45 illustrates inc for
group size n = 512, and gdr = 0, gdr = 0.2, and gdr - 0.4. We can observe that, the
increase inc has a non-linear relation with the LKH degree. Howerver, inc increases with
the increase o f group dynamics. Fig. 46 illustrates inc when the group size « = 8192, and
group dynamies ratio is 0, and 0.4. Similarly, the S-LKH percentile increase (inc) in
allocated storage over B^-LKH increases with the increase of group dynamics and attains
80% for gdr = 0.4. We have noticed that inc peaks when the group size (n) is near an
exact power o f d. For example when « = 512 me peaks at d = 8 (8'^B = 512), and d = 2 A
(24^2 = 576), and when « = 8192 inc peaks at d =20 (20'^3 = 8000). In this case, the B"*^LKH maintenance algorithms keeps much less number o f nodes than the S-LKH ones.
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Fig. 45. S-LKH average number o f nodes increase over B'^-LKH, where n = 512.
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Fig. 46. S-LKH average number o f nodes increase over B’^-LKH, where n = 8192.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

I ll

4.6

Conclusion
In this chapter, two novel techniques for LKH maintenance and their associated rekey

protocols are presented. The new techniques are based on the rekey manager assigning a
unique individual identification (ID) for each group member. In both techniques, the
LKH plays a dual role as a key tree and as an easily searchable data structure for
individual material (ID, key, IP address, name, ...etc) using individual IDs. The proposed
techniques detail the LKH node structure, the rekey message format, the LKH insertion
and deletion algorithms along with the rekey message constmction for different insertion
and deletion scenarios. Moreover, the rekey client processing to different rekey message
types is presented. The first technique, denoted S-LKH, maintains LKH as unbalanced
search tree using individual IDs as search values. The traditional search tree insertion and
deletion algorithms are adapted to the constraint that individual materials are always
entries in leaf nodes. The second technique, denoted B’^-LKH, maintains LKH as a
balanced search tree that has the same stmcture as S-LKH. In addition, a

search tree

has two additional constraints. The first constraint is, all leaf nodes are always at the
same distance from the root (i.e. balanced). The second constraint is, all non-root node
are always at least half full. These constraints introduce complexity and extra overhead in
the rekey message and the rekey client processing.
We performed empirical experiments to study and compare the behavior o f S-LKH
and B’^-LKH protocols. The first experiment concludes that the frequency o f the simplest
RM tjqies (simple insertion and deletion scenarios) increases with LKH degree increase
for both protocols. The frequency o f the simplest RM types is more than 80% for LKH
degree greater than 8. For B'^-LKH protocol, the frequency o f the most expensive RM
type is less than 1% for any LKH degree. Other experiments illustrate that the use o f B^LKH protocol increases the average number o f rekey packets and the average number o f
encrypted keys (if encryption-based KDT is used) in a RM over S-LKH. On the other
hand, the use o f B^-LKH decreases LKH height, the maximum number o f encrypted keys
in a RM, and the number o f LKH allocated nodes (LKH storage). The S-LKH increase
over B^-LKH in the number o f allocated nodes increases with increased group dynamics
and attains more than 80% for highly dynamic groups (current group size = 60% number
o f added members).
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In chapter IV, the rekey is performed for one group member addition or removal. In
chapter V, batch rekeying for more than one group member addition and/or removal is
introduced. For batch rekeying, B^-LKH protocol rekey cost outperforms S-LKH
protocol.
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CHAPTER V
BATCH PROCESSING OF GROUP REKEYING
In chapter IV, we focused on individual rekeying, i.e. rekeying after each join and
leave request. Individual rekeying is not a practical solution. For example, if the inter
arrival time (time between two join requests) o f group members at the start o f a session is
very small; the inter-rekey time (time between two consecutive rekeyings) will be
consequently very small and a new group key might be issued by the rekey manager
before the previous key version has reached (or has been used by) the group members.
Periodic rekeying has been suggested to alleviate this problem [45], [59], [69]. Periodic
rekeying suggests rekeying after a fixed period o f time that is large enough to avoid the
above problem. Periodic rekeying requires a rekeying for a batch o f requests, i.e., for
accumulated join and leave requests during this period. Researchers suggested that the
expiration o f a rekey period triggers the rekeying process. Such approach does not take
into account the batch size or the join/leave request delay during the rekey period.
This chapter introduces a generalized rekey policy definition based on three main
parameters that determine the triggering condition for the rekeying process. The three
main parameters are batch size, maximum join or leave request delay (time between
receiving the request and the start o f the rekeying process), and the minimum inter-rekey
period (a minimum period o f time that has to be elapsed between two consecutive
rekeyings). The defined rekey policy provides versatile configuration options to the rekey
triggering condition. The rekey policy can be simply used to provide periodic rekeying as
well as other complex rekeying conditions as configured by the application. In addition, a
simplified view o f the software objects that are used to provide secure group key
management is presented. Moreover, the batch rekey message format and construction
are presented. When LKH key management is used, individual rekeying requires
generating and distributing a set o f keys that fall in a LKH path from an inserted/deleted
leaf node to the root. On the other hand, batch rekeying requires generating and
distributing a set o f keys that compose a sub-tree o f the original LKH. The rekey sub-tree

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

114

is composed o f the individual LKH paths o f the inserted and/or deleted leaf nodes to the
root. The batch rekey sub-tree construction for the B^-LKH protocol is detailed.
For individual rekeying, the use o f B^-LKH protocol introduces major LKH storage
(number o f allocated nodes) savings and slightly more rekey processing than the use o f SLKH protocol (see section 4.5.3). In this chapter, it will be demonstrated, through
empirical experiments that using the B'^-LKH protocol for batch rekeying substantially
reduces rekey processing overhead when compared to the S-LKH protocol with large
batch sizes and/or high group dynamics. In addition, our experiments show that B”^-LKH
rekey performance is stable (bounded) for highly dynamic groups while S-LKH rekey
performance deteriorates as the group dynamics increases. Such S-LKH instability is due
to the fact that the minimum number o f node entries is one, while for B^-LKH nodes
have to be at least half full.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 presents the motivation for
introducing the rekey policy parameters. Section 5.2 details the proposed rekey policy
definition. Section 5.3 presents a simplified view o f the secure group key management
software objects. Section 5.4 illustrates the batch rekey message, and the general batch
rekeying process performed by a rekey manager that maintains S-LKH or B^-LKH.
Section 5.5 presents experimental results that compare S-LKH versus B’^-LKH protocols
for batch rekeying. Finally, the chapter is concluded in section 5.6.

5.1

Motivation
Changing the group key is very expensive in terms o f processing time, and bandwidth

consumption. According to the software model introduced in section 3.1, the rekeying
process time has three major time components: 1) RM construction by the rekey
manager; 2) RM transmission from the rekey manager to all group members through a
reliable group rekey channel; 3) RM processing by a rekey client. The rekey cost (time
and bandwidth) at the rekey manager depends mainly on the group size, the key
management protocol, the rekey manager processing power, the network bandwidth and
delay, and the rekey transport protocol. The existence o f a central group key manager
(and a rekey manager) allows heterogeneous members’ environments and the client
processing is minimized. On the other hand, the group key manager is receiving the
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group members’ requests to join and leave the group, and is responsible for rekeying the
group when it deems necessary. Periodic batch processing is introduced as a practical
solution for frequent group rekeying [45], [59], [69]. For batch o f requests, the rekey
manager generates one RM that includes group keys’ updates due to a set o f group
members joining and/or leaving the group. Almeroth and Ammar [1] demonstrate that for
different group applications, the inter-arrival time and member joining duration are
exponential in nature. Simple periodic rekeying does not take into account the possibility
o f no join or leave requests accumulating during a rekey period. Consequently, the
proposed batch rekey policy has three main parameters, minimum inter-rekey period,
batch size, and maximum request delay.
The minimum time between two consecutive rekeyings, denoted inter-rekey period,
has to be greater than the expected (maximum) time needed to rekey the group.
Otherwise, a new group key will be issued before its previous version is ever used. The
need for the group key manager to guarantee minimum time interval between two
consecutive rekeyings makes it essential to process a batch o f requests. Moreover, to
avoid a group startup implosion it is required to delay the initial creation o f the group key
for a suitable time period. The initial creation o f the group (key) is processed as a batch
processing for multiple new members addition.
LKH batch rekeying requires updating a set o f keys that compose a sub-tree o f the
original LKH. The rekey sub-tree is constmcted from all the added/removed leaf node
paths to the root. Li et al. [45] show that, for a group o f size n and LKH o f degree 4
(optimal LKH degree for encryption-based KDT), if an all add requests batch size is
greater than n il or an all remove requests batch size is greater than n!A the use o f LKH
key management is worse than the use o f star key management (chapter III). In both
cases, the number o f encr)q)ted keys in a RM is equal to or greater than the group size n.
That necessitates taking the batch size into consideration when designing a rekey policy.
The maximum request delay is defined to be the maximum time to be elapsed from
the group key manager receiving the request and the start of the rekeying process. The
maximum request delay is a major security concern. This delay determines the maximum
period a group member will wait after he joins the group before being able to receive any
group communication. Moreover, this delay determines the maximum period a group

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

116

member will be able to keep receiving the group communication after he leaves the
group.
We can observe that simple periodic rekeying only guarantees a fixed time interval
between two rekeyings but doesn’t take into consideration the batch size and/or the
maximum request delay. For some applications one o f the above parameters might be of
more interest and easier to estimate while the others are irrelevant or hard to estimate. For
example, a cable network application might require a maximum request delay o f 2 days
that triggers the rekeying process, i.e. members wait at most 2 days to be added/removed
to the network. Another example is a video conferencing application that requires a
minimum inter-rekey period o f 1 minute and a maximum request delay o f 3 minutes.
The rekey policy parameters can be estimated from the group characteristics (the
above time components), and other resource constraints such as the allowed usage of
processing power and/or bandwidth. For example, the rekeying process might be allowed
only 10% o f the machine processing power, and no more than 5 kbps o f bandwidth
usage.
The necessity o f changing the group key because o f a new member joined the group
(perfect backward secrecy/PBS), or a member left the group (perfect forward
secrecy/FFS) depends on the application. For example, for a group o f students meeting in
a virtual classroom there is no need to change the group key when a member joins the
group late (he is allowed to join from the start). On the other hand, for members joining a
video-on-demand provider it is essential to change the group key when a new member
joins or leaves the group. Note that, if the application only requires perfect backward
secrecy, a simple non-LKH protocol can be used. The use o f an LKH protocol is essential
when perfect forward secrecy is required, and that is our concern.

5.2

Rekey Policy Definition
The group key manager is configured by the group rekey policy as to when the group

rekeying should be performed. The rekey policy determines the timing o f both the initial
group key creation and the further rekeying condition. It is assumed that the rekey policy
is static for simpler design and analysis. A dynamic adjustment to the policy parameters
is left for future research.
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The group key manager accumulates the requests in a batch. As previously mentioned
in chapter III, the requests are inserted in the batch as messages are received from the
authentication manager to add, remove, or refresh group members, namely Add(M),
Remove(M), and Refresh(M), respectively, where M is a member identification, e.g., his
name. The member refresh request is introduced to allow an easy recovery o f a group
member after short time o f failure (please see chapter VI for more details). Refreshing a
group member, assumes the group member temporarily lost his set o f keys and requires
sending him the same set o f keys he was holding (as if he newly joined) without
regenerating those keys. The accumulated requests are removed from the batch when a
rekeying is initiated. The S-LKH and B'''-LKH protocols assume the rekey manager
generates a unique ID for every group member that is used as a search value in
constructing LKH. The request identification M is assumed to be different than ID (M
might be used to generate the ID). The member identification M is required to be unique
in the batch, while it can be replicated throughout LKH individual entries (each entry will
have different ID).
The first policy parameter is the rekey condition (RC) that has one o f four possible
values: PBS for perfect backward secrecy, PFS for perfect forward secrecy, PBaFS for
perfect backward and forward services, and NONE when no secrecy is required. Note
that, if RC equals PBS or NONE there is no need to use an LKH protocol, but we allow
their use with an LKH protocol for dynamic policy changes (e.g., used only during part o f
a session). In addition, if there is no change o f keys due to a batch o f requests (e.g., RC is
PFS and the batch contains only add requests), the rekey manager still needs to construct
a rekey message RM that updates the group members o f changes about positions (due to
the new individual entries insertions), newly created keys, and/or removed keys.
The second set of parameters determines the timing o f the first group key creation,
and has two components initASize and initMaxDelay. The third set o f parameters
determines the timing o f the following rekeyings, and has three components
rekeyBatchSize, rekeyMinWait, and rekeyMaxDelay.
The batchSize {initASize or rekeyBatchSize) determines the rekeying condition
according to rekeyMinWait and maxDelay {initMaxDelay or rekeyMaxDelay) values as
will be described in section 5.3, and its minimum value is one. We assume that a value o f
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zero for minWait or maxDelay means this parameter is undetermined (not important to
the application). The maxDelay (if greater than zero) is the maximum delay a request can
be held in the batch before start o f rekeying. The minWait (if greater than is zero) is the
minimum time that has to be elapsed between two consecutive rekeyings. Note that,
maxDelay > minWait.
The batchSize parameter is compared to the current batch size, denoted BS. The batch
size, BS, could simply be the total number o f requests inserted in the batch, or a weighted
sum o f every request type as in equation (1). Where AS, RS, and F S are the number o f
entries in the batch (size) o f Add, Remove, and Refresh requests respectively. And a, r,
and / are the different weights o f the different request types. The weights are policy
parameters, e.g., if RC equals PBS it might be o f interest to give more weight to member
removal requests than any other requests.

BS = a x A S + r x R S + f x F S

(1)

In summary, the following are the rekey policy parameters;
• RC: the rekey condition that has four possible values: PBS, PFS, PBaFS, and NONE.
• a, r, &f . weights used for batch size B S computation.
•

initASize, & initMaxDelay. initial batch size (all add requests) and initial maximum
request delay that are used to specify the time o f the initial group key creation.

• rekeyBatchSize, rekeyMinWait, & rekeyMaxDelay: batch size, minimum inter-rekey
period, and maximum request delay that are used to specify the time o f further
rekeyings.
Where the minimum allowed value for initASize and rekeyBatchSize is one, and
rekeyMaxDelay has to greater than or equal to rekeyMin Wait.

The application has the flexibility o f using all or some o f the policy parameters as a
deciding factor for triggering the rekey process. The type of the application determines
what blend o f parameters is taken into consideration. For example, an application that
requires periodic rekeying every 3 minutes will have the following rekey policy:
•

RC = PBaFS: backwards and forward secrecy are both required.
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•

a = r = / = l : all request types (add, remove and refresh) have the same weight.

•

initASize — rekeyBatchSize - 1: there is at least one request in the batch for the group
key creation or a rekeying to be initiated.

•

initMaxDelay = 5 minutes: wait 5 minutes after the first group member joins before
creating the group key.

•

rekeyMinWait = rekeyMaxDelay = 3 minutes: guarantee minimum inter-rekey period
of 3 minutes, and maximum request delay o f 3 minutes. In this case, if the requests’
inter-arrival time is less than or equal to 3 minutes, a rekey will be periodically
initiated every 3 minutes.

5.3

G roup K ey M anagem ent Softw are Design
Fig. 47 illustrates a simplified view o f the software objects designed to provide secure

group key management and their main interactions. A GroupKeyManager object is
instantiated using instances of the RekeyPolicy (rekeyPolicy) and the RekeyManager
(rekeyManager) as parameters. A RekeyManager object is instantiated with the rekey
manager configuration such as use o f B'^-LKH or S-LKH rekey protocol, LKH degree,
and use o f XORRBP or encryption-based ICDT. A GroupKeyManager instantiates a
Batch {batch). Timer {timer), and Scheduler {scheduler) objects. The different objects’
functionalities are as follows:
•

The RekeyPolicy object provides methods for accessing (and setting) the policy
parameters.

•

The RekeyManager object maintains the group LKH and applies the rekey protocol.
The RekeyManager provides the rekey{batch) method that takes the batch o f requests
as a parameter and constructs the rekey message RM and sends it to all group
members. Moreover, the rekey method sets the rekeyTime to the time when the
rekeying is started, empties the batch, and sets minWaitFlag to false, where
rekeyTime and min WaitFlag are variables maintained by the scheduler.

•

The Batch object provides methods for adding, removing, and accessing request
messages, in addition to methods for configuring the batch size computation and a
method to get the current batch size size{).
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The Timer object provides a timed call to the RekeyM anager'5 method rekey{batch),
where a thread is initialized when timer's method start{TS, PRD) is called to wait for
certain {sleepTime - T S - PRD - currentTimeQ) before calling the rekey method,
where TS is a time stamp o f an action, and PRD is a period that has to be elapsed
before initiating the rekey starting from TS. In addition, timer provides a method for
interrupting and canceling the current waiting thread (stopQ), if such thread is
running. Moreover, timer provides a method that gets the current time-stamp
timeStampQ.
The Scheduler object provides checkRekeyQ method that uses the rekeyPolicy to
decide on the rekey triggering condition

A pplication
Instantiated using
a rekeyP olicy and
a rekeyM anager

RekeyM anager

R ekeyPolicy

ekey(l^t^h)

Batch
firstEntryO

GroupKeyManager
rekeyPolicy,
rekeyManager,
batch, timer,
scheduler

. Timer
\T S, PRD,
slpepTime
start(TS, PRD)
stopO
timeStampO

Scheduler
rekeyTime,
minW aitFlag
checkRekeyO

- > instantiats
. ^ method call

Fig. 47. Simplified view o f the main group key management software objects.
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When a groupKeyManager receives a request message (through a method call), it
inserts the request in the batch after it is stamped with the current time-stamp, followed
by a call to the scheduler’s checkRekeyO method. If the received request is Remove(M)
and the batch contains Add(M) or Refresh(M) request, the old request is deleted and the
new request is not inserted (e.g., when a member is removed a short time after he joined
the group and before a rekey is initiated). If the received request is Add(M) and the batch
contains Remove(M) request, the Remove(M) request is deleted and a Refresh(M) is
inserted (e.g., when a group member recovers after short time o f failure). The member
identification M identifies a unique request in the batch. It is assumed that the group key
manager will not receive a re-add request o f an existing group member, or a remove
request o f a nonexistent member.
The scheduler that uses the rekeyPolicy to trigger a batch rekeying process has three
different states as follows:
•

m in Wait = maxDelay = 0. In this case, the batch rekeying is initialized as soon as the
batch size reaches the batchSize determined by the rekey policy.

•

maxDelay > 0 and m inW ait = 0. In this case, if the arrival rate o f requests
accumulates batchSize requests in the batch before maxDelay expires for the first
batch request (the oldest), then the batch rekeying is initiated immediately.
Otherwise, batch rekeying is initiated as soon as maxDelay expires for the oldest
batch entry.

•

maxDelay > m inW ait > 0. In this case, if there is a slow arrival rate (accumulation) o f
requests in the batch, then maxDelay controls when the rekeying is initiated (batch
size never reaches batchSize). On the other hand, if there is a fast arrival rate o f
requests in the batch, then minWait controls the minimum inter-rekey period by
holding the rekeying process for a while when the batch size quickly reaches
batchSize.
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5.4

Rekey Sub-Tree C onstruction
In LKH group key management protocols, batch rekeying requires updating

(generating and distributing) a set o f LKH keys that compose a LKH sub-tree (denoted
rekey sub-tree). The rekey sub-tree is composed o f all LKH keys that fall on the paths o f
the inserted/deleted leaf nodes to the root. The rekey sub-tree size is the number o f LKH
keys that needs to be updated and therefore it represents the rekey cost.
Assuming the batch rekeying is initiated for a batch o f requests, where the number of
Add requests is AS, the number o f Remove requests is RS, and the number o f Refresh
requests is FS. To reduce the rekey cost, the rekey sub-tree constmction should minimize
the rekey sub-tree size. There are three batch LKH update cases for such minimization as
follows:
•

A S = R S. Every new individual leaf entry replaces a removed individual leaf entry in

the LKH. In this case, every new group member will be assigned the same individual
ID o f a removed group member.
•

A S > R S. The R S removed individual entries are replaced by R S new individual

entries, then the rest o f the new individual entries are inserted into LKH. In this case,
the number o f newly added individual entries to LKH is nA, where nA = A S - R S .
•

A S < R S. The A S new individual entries replace A S removed individual entries, then

the rest o f the removed individual entries are deleted from LKH. In this case, the
number o f deleted individual entries from LKH is nR, where nR = R S - A S .

The LKH rekey sub-tree, denoted rekeyTree, is constructed to contain the keys that
are affected by the replacement, the insertion, or the deletion o f the updated leaf entries.
In addition, rekeyTree contains the keys to be sent to the refreshed members {PR requests
in the batch). An inserted, deleted or refreshed leaf entry LKH position determines the set
o f keys that are inserted in the rekey sub-tree. For example. Fig. 48 illustrates a B'^-LKH
and batch o f 4 add requests, 2 remove requests, and 2 refresh requests. The two remove
requests positions are marked “Rplc” for replacing by 2 add requests, the other 2 add
requests positions are marked “Add”, and the 2 refresh requests positions are marked
“Rfrsh”. The key nodes that are inserted in the rekey sub-tree for such batch o f updates
are grayed. Note that, a new key node

“ K 3 .3 ”

is inserted to the original LKH to
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accommodate the new entries. Please consult appendix C for the detailed B'^-LKH
rekeyTree construction example.

®

t

Rfrsh

Rfrsh

S
Rplc

...

t

Rplc

Add

Add

The gray connected k ey nodes com pose the rekey sub-tree.

Fig. 48. An Example of a B^-LKFI, a batch o f requests, and a rekey sub-tree.

There are four possible values o f the rekey condition RC in a rekey policy that require
LKH key changes as follows:
•

PBS: a new member shouldn’t be able to recover previous group keys (before he
joins).

•

PFS: a removed member shouldn’t be able to recover new group keys (after he
leaves).

•

PBaFS: both above conditions should be satisfied

•

NONE: no secrecy is required but LKH maintenance is necessary.
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The rekeyTree is a LKH sub-tree that contains all LKH keys that need to he updated
(i.e., regenerated and distributed to group member) for a batch o f requests and the rekey
condition RC determined from the rekey policy should always be satisfied. According to
RC value, a rekeyTree key node is either unlabeled or labeled by one o f three labels “A”,
“GA”, and “GR”. If XORBP KDT is used, the rekey packet is constructed the same way
for all labeled keys as described in section 3.4.1. If encryption-based KDT is used, the
key label determines how a rekey packet for distributing that key is constructed. If
encryption-based KDT is used, the rekey packet is constructed for a rekeyTree key node,
according to its label, as follows;
•

No label: no rekey packet is constructed for that key.

•

“A” : construct a rekey packet that contains the key encrypted with every child key
inserted in the rekeyTree.

•

“GA” : regenerate the key then construct a rekey packet that contains the newly
generated key encrypted with its previous version, and with every child key inserted
in the rekeyTree.

•

“GR” : generate the key then construct a rekey packet that contains the newly
generated key encrypted with every child key in the original LKH.

L eaf key nodes inserted in the rekeyTree are always not labeled, (no packets are
constructed for them) but they are used if their immediate parent is labeled “A ” or “GA”
as described above. When inserting a key in rekeyTree that already exists its label could
be upgraded. The possible labels have the following precedence from lower to higher
(“no label” < “A” < “GA” < “GR”). If the inserted key node (that already exists) is
marked with a lower precedence label then it is upgraded, otherwise it is kept unchanged.
5.4.1

Rekey M essage for a B atch of R equests

The format o f the batch rekey message (RM) is illustrated in Fig. 49, where Addsize,
RemoveSize, and RefreshSize is the number o f Add, Remove, and Refresh requests in the
batch, respectively. Other message fields are explained next.
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SEO

Add size

R em ove size

Refresh size

R eplacedPositioni, R eplacedPosition 2 , . ..
R efreshedPositioni, RefreshedPosition 2
A dd/R em oveH eaderi, Add/Rem oveHeader 2 , . ..
R ekeyPacketi, RekeyPacket 2 ,.

Fig. 49. The batch rekey message (RM) format.

The following is the general procedure for constructing the rekey sub-tree {rekeyTree)
and batch RM for batch o f requests (for both S-LKH and B"^-LKH rekey protocols).
1. The rekeyTree root is initialized to contain the group key GK with no label.
2. Find the position o f every replaced entry (added leaf entry in place o f a removed leaf
entry), replace the leaf entry in the original LKH and insert all the LKH keys in the
path o f that position in the rekeyTree. The leaf key node has no label, while the label
of all internal key nodes (including the root that contains GK) depends on the policy
rekey condition, RC as follows.

if (RC equals PBS) then label = “GA” ;
else if (RC equals NONE) then label =“A”;
else label = “GR”;

In addition, an initial key message initMsg is constructed for every new member that
contains his ID, position, LKH height, and LKH degree. Every replaced entry
position is appended to the batch RM in the ReplacedPosition filed shown in Fig. 49.
3. Find the position o f every refreshed entry, refresh the entry in the original LKH
(update the individual entry changed data) and insert all the keys in the path o f that
position in the rekeyTree with the internal key node labeled “A ”. In addition, an
initial key message initMsg is constructed for every refreshed member that contains
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his ID, position, LKH height, and LKH degree. Every refreshed entry position is
appended to batch RM in RefreshedPosition field shown in Fig. 49.
4. If the number o f added entries nA is greater than zero (i.e., nR =0). For every added
individual entry, add the individual leaf entry to the original LKH without any key
generation and rekey packets construction. The S-LKH or B^-LKH AddMember
method is called without new keys generation or rekey packets construction
(underlined code in Fig. 24 and Fig. 29). In batch rekeying, the AddM ember method
retums the initMsg and the header o f the rekeyMsg (all fields except the rekey
packets) that is appended to RM shown in Fig. 49. Insert all keys corresponding to
such leaf entry insertion to the rekeyTree according to the rekey condition RC, and
position, type, and level from the header o f the rekeyMsg. Please consult appendix C
for B^-LKH rekeyTree labeled insertion o f key nodes.
5. If the number o f removed entries nR is greater than zero {nA =0). For every removed
individual entry, remove the individual leaf entry from the original LBCH without any
keys

generation

or

rekey

packets

construction.

The

S-LKH

or

B^-LKH

RemoveMember method is called without keys generation or rekey packets
construction (underlined code in Fig. 25 and Fig. 34). In batch rekeying, the
RemoveMember method retums the header o f the rekeyMsg that is appended to RM
shown in Fig. 49. Insert all keys corresponding to such leaf entry deletion to the
rekeyTree according to the rekey condition RC, and position, type, level, and isRight
array (only in B^-LKH) from the header o f the rekeyMsg Please consult appendix C
for B^-LKH rekeyTree labeled insertion o f key nodes.
6. Send the above constmcted initMsgs to all newly added members, and refreshed
members. Constmct the batch RM (shown in Fig. 49) that will be sent to all group
members. The batch RM contains the positions o f the replaced and refreshed entries,
and the headers o f the added/removed leaf entries. In addition, a rekey packet is
constmcted for every key node in the rekeyTree according to its label. The rekeyTree
is parsed in post-order when constmcting the rekey packets where the children o f a
node are visited before their parent.
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5.5

E xperim ental Results
The following experiments are performed to compare the performance o f S-LKH and

B^-LKH batch rekey costs with change o f group djmamics (section 5.5.1), and change of
LKH degree (section 5.5.2) for the same group size and hatch size. A batch rekey cost is
represented as the number o f rekey packets in that batch rekey message (RM). If XORBP
KDT is used, the number o f rekey packets in a RM is a good rekey cost metric (all
packets constructed the same way). If encryption-based KDT is used, each rekey packet
contains a varying number o f encrypted keys. The minimum number o f encrypted keys in
such rekey packet is 2, and the maximum is the LKH degree d.
The group dynamics is as defined in chapter IV. For a specified LKH degree d, group
size n, and group dynamic ratio gdr, the LKH is constructed by adding a N members then
removing rN members such that n = aN - rN and rN / aN - g d r . In the following
experiments, the hatch size represents the number o f replaced and/or refreshed leaf
entries, while we assume the number o f added and removed entries are zeros. For a
constructed LKH, a hatch rekeying is initialized with the specified batch size where the
replaced and/or refreshed entries positions are randomly chosen. The following figures
plot the average o f 10 readings o f the number o f rekey packets in a RM (very small
variance is noticed).
5.5.1 Effect of G roup Dynamics
This experiment illustrates the effect o f increasing the group dynamics on batch
rekeying performance for both S-LKH and B'^-LKH protocols. The following figures
show three horizontal lines n il, nid and average {nil, nid). Such lines help in analyzing
the rekey cost for encryption-based KDT. The line n il marks the number o f rekey
packets in the best scenario for which the performance o f LKH is the same as the
performance o f a star key management {n encrypted keys) described in chapter III, where
each rekey packet contains exactly 2 encrypted keys. The performance o f an LKH key
management protocol with encryption-based KDT is worse than the star key management
for all points above this line. The line nid marks the number o f rekey packets in the
worst-case scenario (i.e., each rekey packet contains exactly d encrypted keys). The
average line marks the average case scenario. The performance o f an LKH key
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management with encryption-based KDT is better than a star key management for all
points under the nid line.
This experiment illustrates the rekey cost o f B'^-LKH versus S-LKH, where LKH
degree is 4 and group size n = 8192, for different batch sizes and group dynamics. The
batch sizes are 10%n, 20%n, ..., and 100%n. Fig. 50 illustrates the rekey cost for B"^LKH (denoted B+) versus S-LKH (denoted S) when the group is static {gdr = 0). We can
observe that for a degree 4 LKH and static group, the use o f B^-LKH introduces an
increase in the rekey cost when compared to S-LKH rekey cost. In addition, we can
observe that the average rekey performance o f a LKH with encryption-based KDT and
large batch size (more than 30% n) is worse than the use o f star key management. Fig. 51
illustrates the rekey cost for the same LKH degree and same group size when the group
dynamics is increased to gdr = 0.5. We can observe that B’^-LKH exhibits almost the
same rekey performance o f S-LKH for small batch sizes, and outperforms S-LKH when
the batch size increases. Moreover, we can observe that for higher group dynamics, the
average rekey performance o f a degree 4 LKH and encryption-based KDT is better than
star key management for smaller batch sizes (less than 20% «).
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Fig. 50. B"^-LKH versus S-LKH rekey cost for J = 4, « = 8192, and gdr = 0.
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Fig. 51. B'^-LKH versus S-LKH rekey cost fox d = A, n = 8192, andgrfr = 0.5.
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Fig. 52 illustrates the performance o f a degree 4 S-LKH rekey cost with the group
dynamics increase, where gdr = 0, 0.2, 0.4, and 0.5, for different batch sizes and group
size n = 8192. We can observe that S-LKH rekey cost increases with the group dynamics
increase. Fig. 53 illustrates the performance o f a degree 4 B^-LKH rekey cost with the
group dynamics increase for different batch sizes. We can observe that with the group
dynamics increases, there is a smaller increase in B'^-LKH rekey cost compared to SLKH rekey cost increase.
Performing the same experiment for degree 8 S-LKH and B^-LKH. Fig. 54 illustrates
the S-LKH rekey performance for the different group dynamics, and Fig. 55 illustrates
the B^-LKH rekey performance for the different group dynamics. We can observe that,
for larger LKH degrees (more than 4), B^-LKH rekey cost outperforms S-LKH rekey cost
in all cases o f batch sizes and group dynamics. In addition, from Fig. 54, we can observe
that the average rekey cost o f a degree 8 S-LKH with encryption-based KDT outperforms
star key management for only small group dynamics {gdr = 0, 0.2) or small batch sizes
(less than 30% n). On the other hand, from Fig. 55, we can observe that the average rekey
cost o f a degree 8 B"^-LKH with encryption-based KDT outperforms star key
management for all batch sizes (up to 100% n) and all group dynamics. Moreover, we
can observe that increasing the group dynamics for B'^-LKH protocol leads to a bounded
increase in the rekey cost, while for S-LKH protocol the increase in the rekey cost
steadily increases with the group dynamics.
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Fig. 52. Degree 4 S-LKH rekey cost {gdr = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5).
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Fig. 53. Degree 4 B'^-LKH rekey cost {gdr = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5).
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Fig. 55.Degree 8 B'^-LKH rekey cost {gdr = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5).
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5.5.2

Increasing L K H degree

In the previous experiment, we eoneluded that B''^-LKH rekey cost outperforms SLKH rekey cost (for all batch sizes and group dynamics) for LKH degrees greater than 4.
In this experiment, we study the effect o f increasing LKH degree on the rekey cost
represented as the average number o f rekey packets in a RM. The LKH degree is
increased from 4 to 32 in increments o f 4.
First, the experiment is performed for group size n = 1024 and batch size 102 (10%n).
Fig. 56 illustrates the change o f S-LKH rekey cost with change o f LKH degree for
different group dynamics, where gdr = 0, 0.2, 0.4, and 0.5. We can observe that, the
rekey cost is decreasing with LKH degree increase, while increasing with the group
dynamics increase. Similarly, Fig. 57 illustrates the change o f B^-LKH rekey cost with
change o f LKH degree for different group dynamics. We can observe that, the rekey cost
increase due to increased group dynamics is more bounded compared to S-LKH rekey
cost increase (Fig. 56).
Assuming for the same parameters {d, n, gdr, and batch size} the S-LKH rekey cost
is cS and the B’^-LKH rekey cost is cB. The S-LKH rekey cost percentile increase over
B^-LKH rekey cost (denoted rci) is calculated as rci = { c S - c B ) x \ Q Q I c B . Fig. 58
illustrates the rekey cost percentile increase {rci) with change o f LKH degree and
different group dynamics. We can observe that the S-LKH rekey cost is greater than the
B'^-LKH rekey cost for all LKH degrees greater than 4 {rci is greater than zero). The SLKH rekey cost percentile increase {rci) peaks at certain LKH degrees, and usually
increases with LKH degree increase and group dynamics increase {rci attains more than
50% when d = \ 2 and gdr = 0.5).
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Fig. 56. A S-LKH rekey cost for different group dynamics {gdr = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5).
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Fig. 57. A B^-LKH rekey cost for different group dynamics {gdr = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5).
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Fig. 58. A S-LKH rekey cost percentile increase {rci) over B’^-LKH, where n = 1024 and
batch size = 102.

Next, the same experiment is performed with larger group size n = 8192 and the batch
size is 819 (10% n). Fig. 59 illustrates the S-LKH rekey cost percentile increase over B"^LKH rekey cost {rci) with change o f LKH degree for four different group dynamics.
Similarly, we can observe that the use o f S-LKH introduces extra rekey cost over B”^LKH for all LKH degrees greater than 4. This rekey-cost increase {inc) increases with the
group dynamics increase. In addition, we can observe that this increase peaks at certain
LKH degrees depending on the group size and batch size (peaks at different LKH degrees
than what is shown in Fig. 58). The LKH degree that has a peak increase o f S-LKH rekey
cost over B^-LKH rekey cost is the same for all group dynamics (for the same group size
and batch size).
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Fig. 59. A S-LKH rekey cost percentile increase {rci) over B'^-LKH, where « = 8192 and
batch size = 819.

5.6

Conclusion
Researchers have suggested periodic rekeying to alleviate the problem o f having very

small inter-rekey period. A very small time between two consecutive rekeys does not
allow a group key to be established and used by all group members. Periodic rekeying
makes it essential to process a batch o f requests. While periodic rekeying with a period
greater than the rekey time solves the problem, it does not take into consideration the
batch size, or the maximum request delay. In addition, simple periodic rekeying doesn’t
take into account the possibility o f no requests being accumulated during an inter-rekey
period.
In this chapter, a general and flexible rekey policy is presented. The defined rekey
policy takes into account three parameters: minimum inter-rekey period, batch size, and
maximum request delay. The policy has the flexibility o f triggering the batch rekeying
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process using all or a combination o f these parameters. A simplified view o f the software
objects designed to provide secure group key management is presented. In addition, the
batch rekey message (RM) and its construction in both S-LKH and B'^-LKH protocols is
illustrated. Finally, experiments are performed to demonstrate that the B^-LKH protocol
introduces major rekey cost savings (less number o f rekey packets) for a batch o f requests
compared to the S-LKH protocol. The B^-LKH batch rekey savings compared to S-LKH
increase with the increase o f batch size or the group dynamics. In addition, we concluded
that maintaining a balanced LKH (as a B’^-LKH) guarantees a bounded behavior with the
increase o f the group dynamics, while the performance o f an unbalanced LKH (S-LKH)
deteriorates with the increase o f group dynamics.
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CHAPTER VI
DISTRIBUTED GROUP REKEYING AND RECOVERY
In chapter III, we introduced a software model for secure group key management. We
focused on the case o f a central rekey manager that maintains the group key and performs
group rekeying, when it deems necessary, according to a defined rekey policy. It is
assumed that the rekey manager maintains a logical key hierarchy (LKH) for scalable
rekeying. The existence o f one rekey manager makes it a central point for both
congestion and failure. Deploying a distributed set o f rekey agents that equally share the
load o f group rekeying provides a more reliable and scalable solution. In addition, in
applications which exhibit short failure time or disconnection times, e.g., mobile ad-hoc
networks, a recovery mechanism is crucial to refresh the state o f the group key
management process. In this chapter, we discuss two enhancements to our group key
management framework: distributed group rekeying and the recovery o f a group key
manager and a group member.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 presents the distributed group
rekeying protocols. Section 6.2 presents the proposed recovery mechanism for a group
key manager/agent and discusses a group member recovery. Finally, section 6.3
concludes the chapter.

6.1

D istributed G roup Rekeying
In this section, we present four cooperation protocols for distributed group rekeying

between peer rekey agents. It is assumed that each rekey agent is capable o f managing a
subset o f group members, and participating in the group rekeying process. We show that
the rekey protocol with minimal overhead is that one rekey agent at a time generates and
distributes a new group key to all group members. In addition, we detail the logical key
hierarchy (LKH) maintained at a rekey agent for the different cooperation scenarios. If
any rekey agent is required to distribute a group key to all group members, a naive key
management approach is that every rekey agent maintains (replicates) the group LKH.
Instead, we propose the creation o f agents’ LKH (denoted A-LKH) that reduces the
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replicated LKH size (compared to the naive approach), and the number o f maintained
keys at a group member. Moreover, we discuss two different approaches for maintaining
A-LKH namely dynamic A-LKH and static A-LKH. The dynamic A-LKH approach has
a drawback o f (sometimes) updating (some) group members for a rekey agent join or
leave. On the other hand, the static A-LKH approach allows a transparent rekey agent
join or leave for all group members, although the maximum number o f rekey agents has
to be known before starting a session.
The rest o f this section is organized as follows. Section 6.1.1 is an overview o f the
distributed group rekeying approach between a group o f rekey agents. Section 6.1.2
defines four different cooperation protocols between the rekey agents. Section 6.1.3
details the LKH maintained at a rekey gent for the different cooperation scenarios.
Section 6.1.4 discusses the two different approaches for maintaining A-LKH.
6.1.1

Distributed Group Rekeying Overview

A distributed set o f cooperating rekey agents provides a more scalable and reliable
group rekeying than a central rekey manager. If an agent fails during a group session,
other agents can assume its role and update the failed agent’s subgroup members about
group key changes (if allowed). In addition, a new agent can recover the state o f a failed
agent (recovery is discussed in section 6.2).
Consider a set o f peer rekey agents, i.e., all agents have the same authority and
capability o f accessing, generating, and distributing the group key as well as any LKH
key. Since all rekey agents have a full group rekey authority, there is no need to rekey the
group (change GK) when an agent joins or leaves the rekey agents’ group. A leaving
agent is voluntarily relinquishes its responsibility (due to network discormection or
failure), but is still allowed access to further agents’ communication. On the other hand,
an evicted agent is not allowed any access to future agents or group communication. In
this model, evicting a rekey agent is very expensive and would require recreating the
group without that agent.
A rekey agent is responsible o f managing a subset o f the group members. Fig. 60
illustrates a rekey agents’ group that manages a group o f members, where every agent
manages a different subset o f the group members. At any point o f time, there is one agent
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who acts as the leader o f the rekey agents’ group, denoted LA. The LA is a rekey agent
that is responsible for coordinating many group actions, such as the initiation o f the group
rekeying process. In addition, the group rekeying is performed for the LA ’s subgroup
membership changes (i.e., members join and/or leave). An agent that exhibits a change in
its subgroup membership has to nominate itself to be the leader to perform a rekeying. If
there is only one rekey agent (in the rekey agents’ group), it is assumed to be the LA until
other agents join. Being a LA should be circulated fairly among all rekey agents.
Choosing a leader among a group and guaranteeing there is only one leader at a time is
the classical distributed systems mutual exclusion problem [17].

rekey agents

fs

/

'

(A) :I (T)'\»

'

)

□

□ □

□

Fig. 60. Rekey agents and group members.

A rekey agent can join the rekey agents’ group at any time (usually before the start o f
a group session). Initially, a rekey agent broadcasts its desire to join the agents’ group to
an agent-group channel prompting a response from the LA. The LA provides the initial
status and (LKH) information. In addition, the LA informs other rekey agents o f the new
agent joining. A rekey agent is assumed to be active before any member joins its
subgroup.
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When a group member joins, he is assigned one rekey agent to be under its
supervision (each member is supervised by only one rekey agent). There are several
approaches for a client to select one sever among a distributed set o f servers as follows:
•

The client contacts a directory server (could be the authentication manager) who
directs him to his server according to a load balancing or a route optimization
technique.

•

All servers addresses are published and the client chooses the nearest to his location
(in the network sense), at random, or any other selection criteria.

•

The servers are inserted in subnets, and the clients contact their subnet server.

•

A client can send his request to a servers’ channel, all servers receive the request but
only one will respond according to a specified policy decision (for example, the
leader or the nearest to the member’s network location).

In the following cooperation models, if all agents are required to participate in
generating a key (group key or other), a key agreement protocol (KAP) is needed. The
existing technique known as group Deffie-Hellman [61] defines different protocols for
such key agreement. The Deffie-Hellman protocol for two members requires two
messages to be exchanged between the two parties, whereas group Deffie-Hellman
protocols require several rounds and exchanges between all parties.
6.1.2

Rekey Agents Cooperation Protocols

The main function o f a central rekey manager is to generate the group key (GK) then
distribute it to all group members (G). In distributed rekey management between a group
o f m rekey agents, every agent Aj is responsible o f managing a subgroup SGi, such that
= G . The group rekeying is performed for the elected LA ’s subgroup
membership changes. Other agents’ subgroup membership changes are not incorporated
is such rekeying. There are four group rekeying cooperation protocols between a group o f
rekey agents in terms o f key generation and distribution, namely, all generate and all
distribute; all generate and one distributes; one generates and all distributes; one
generates and one distributes. The following are the four possible rekey agents’
cooperation scenarios.
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6.1.2.1

All Generate and All Distribute

All agents participate in generating a new GK through a key agreement protocol
(KAP) and participate in distributing it to the group members. The following is the allgenerate-and-all-distribute rekey protocol. First, the LA sends StartRekey message
(command) to all other agents to start the KAP. Second, the KAP proceeds until all
agents agree on the new GK. The KAP might require several rounds and message
exchanges. Finally, every agent (including the leader) distributes the new GK to its
subgroup members. It is essential that, a rekey agent signs the GK distribution message
so that the group members are able to authenticate its source.

LA ^ Ai: StartRekey
Ai -> Aj: KAP messages
Ai ^ SG;: GK
6.1.2.2

All Generate and One Distributes

All agents participate in generating a new GK then the LA distributes it to all group
members. The following is the all-generate-and-one-distribute rekey protocol^. The first
two steps generate new GK through KAP. Then, the LA distributes it to all group
members. This protocol eliminates the signature overhead performed by each rekey agent
to GK distribution message in the all-generate-and-all-distribute rekey protocol. Only the
LA signs the GK distribution message sent to all group members.

LA -> Ai: StartRekey
Ai -> Aj: KAP messages
LA -> G: GK

' X A Y ; M , denotes X sends Y a m essage M.
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6.1.2.3

One Generates and All Distribute

The LA generates a new GK, and all agents participate in distributing it. The
following is the one-generate-and-all-distribute rekey protocol in two steps. First, the LA
sends a StartRekey message to every agent along with the newly generated GK. Second,
every agent (including the LA) distributes the new GK to its subgroup members. This
protocol eliminates the KAP phase.

LA
Ai
6.1.2.4

Ail StartRekey, GK
SGi! GK
One Generates and One Distributes

The LA generates and distributes a new GK to all agents and to all group members.
This is the minimal overhead rekey protocol that reduces the overhead incurred in both
the KAP phase and the GK distribution message signature required if all agents are
participating in the rekeying process. Note that, the rekey agents are taking turns in being
the LA.

LA
6.1.2.5

Ai & G: GK
Comparison of Distributed Group Rekeying Protocols

We can observe that the first rekey protocol that allows all rekey agents to participate
in generating and distributing the group key in every rekeying requires the maximum
overhead o f both the key agreement protocol phase and the signature o f GK distribution
message performed by every rekey agent. The second rekey protocol that allows all rekey
agents to participate in generating the group key, but the LA distributes it to all group
members eliminates the signature o f GK distribution message for all other agents. The
third rekey protocol that allows the LA to generate a new GK, then every rekey agent
distributes it to a subset o f group members reduces the overhead incurred in the key
agreement protocol phase that requires exchange o f several messages. The fourth rekey
protocol that suggests the LA generates and distributes a new GK to other rekey agents
and all group members provides a minimal overhead rekey protocol for faster rekeying
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process. The fairness in participating in the rekeying process between all rekey agents can
be guaranteed through the leader selection mechanism.
In all cooperation scenarios, it is assumed that all rekey agents are communicating
through an agent secure group channel (A-Chnl). In addition, all rekey agents and all
group members are communicating through a secure rekey channel, G-Chnl, as illustrated
in Fig. 61(a). In all-agents-distribute rekey protocols, every rekey agent instead can have
its own independent subgroup rekey channel, SG-Chnl, as illustrated in Fig. 61(b).

A-Chnl

G-ChnI

□
(a) All members join the same group rekey channel (G-Chnl).

A-Chnl

s
\

S G rC h n l

SGj-Chnl

(b) Each subgroup members join different subgroup rekey channel (SG-Chnl).

Fig. 61. Communication channels between the rekey agents and the group members.
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6.1.3

Distributed Group LKH Maintenance

For a group o f n members managed by m rekey agents, the subgroup managed by a
rekey agent is assumed to be o f size (n/m). A logical key hierarchy (LKH) is used to
provide scalable GK distribution. The rekey agents’ cooperation model determines the
LKH maintained at every agent. We will illustrate the LKH maintained at a rekey agent
and the keys maintained by its subgroup members for the two different GK distribution
cases: 1) all agents participate in distributing a new GK each to its subgroup members; 2)
one agent at a time (the LA) distributes a new GK to all group members and to other
rekey agents.
We will illustrate different LKHs o f degree d = 2, where the group size n = 32,
managed by 4 rekey agents (i.e., m = 4), and a rekey agent subgroup size is 8 members.
6.1.3.1 All Agents Distribute
In all-agents-distribute rekey protocols, every rekey agent participates in distributing
a new GK to its subgroup members. It is sufficient for an agent Aj to maintain a LKH for
its subgroup SGi. There is no need for the rekey agents to share (replicate) any key
information other than GK. In this case, every group member maintains his individual
key and in the average lo g ^(n /m ) keys, where n is the group size, m is the rekey agents’
group size, and d is the LKH degree.
When n = 32 and m = 4, Fig. 62 illustrates the LKH (o f height h = 3) maintained at a
rekey agent for 8 members, where GK is the only replicated key at every rekey agent. A
group member maintains 4 keys including his individual key and GK.

GK

6h
Fig. 62. A subgroup LKH o f degree 2 for 8 members.
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6.1.3.2

One Agent Distributes

In one-agent-at-a-time-distributes rekey protocols, the LA distributes a new GK to all
other agents and to all group members. The naive key management solution is every
rekey agent maintains a fully replicated LKH for all group members. In this case, a group
member maintains his individual key and in the average log^(n) keys, where n is the
group size, and d is the LKH degree.
When n = 32 and m = 4, Fig. 63 illustrates the group LKH (of height h = 5) for 32
members that is replicated at every rekey agent. A group member maintains 6 keys
including his individual key and the group key.
The naive solution requires a full replication o f the group LKH rooted at GK.
Alternatively, we suggest a more replication conservative solution. In the new approach,
a rekey agent Ai maintains its subgroup LKH rooted at a rekey agent individual key AKi.
In addition, all agents replicate an agents’ LKH (denoted A-LKH) rooted at GK. The leaf
nodes o f A-LKH are the agent keys AKs. The A-LKH and the subgroup LKHs are either
having the same degree or having different degrees. Note that, A-LKH keys are
replicated and known to all rekey agents including the agents’ (individual) keys AKs. In
this approach, a group member maintains an extra set o f A-LKH keys starting from his
agent individual key to GK. A group member maintains his individual key and in the
average log^^(n/m ) subgroup LKH keys and log^ ("^) A-LKH keys, where n is the
2

group size, m is the rekey agents’ group size, d l is the subgroup LKH degree, and d2 is
the A-LKH degree. This approach allows any rekey agent to distribute a new GK to all
group members but reduces the replicated LKH size at a rekey agent and the number o f
keys maintained at a group member when compared to the naive solution.
When n = 32 and m = 4, Fig. 64 shows the A-LKH (of height 2) and the subgroup
LKH (o f height 3) maintained at agent Ai, where d l = d2 = 2. A group member maintains
6 keys: his individual key, 2 subgroup-LKH KEKs, an agent key AKi, 1 A-LKH KEK,
and GK.
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Fig. 63. A group LKH o f degree 2 for 32 members.

GK

A-LKH

AK,

— -y

A gent key

Fig. 64. An A-LKH and subgroup LKH maintained at rekey agent Ai for 32 members.

6.1.4

Agents’ LKH (A-LKH) Maintenance

The agents’ LKH (A-LKH) is fully replicated at all rekey agents. There are two
approaches for A-LBCH maintenance: dynamic or static. In the dynamic approach, the A-
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LKH is dynamically built up as the rekey agents join the agents group. In the static
approach, the A-LKH is initiated to be o f fixed static size that could accommodate the
maximum number o f rekey agents as they join. A newly joined agent contacts the LA to
get the latest version o f A-LKH. The A-LKH replica should be consistently updated at all
agents through the agents’ group communication channel. In the following sections, the
two A-LKH maintenance approaches will be presented in detail, in addition to how an ALKH key can be generated.
6.1.4.1

Dynamic A-LKH

In the dynamic A-LKH maintenance approach, the first rekey agent to start creates
GK and its subgroup LKH. The A-LKH contains only GK, and it is considered the first
agent individual key. The A-LKH dynamically grows as other rekey agents join the
agents’ group. There is no need to regenerate an existing A-LKH key (including GK) as
agents join (the whole A-LKH is known to all agents). When an agent joins the agents’
group, A-LKH keys are created to accommodate the new agent individual key (leaf ALKH node). The LA notifies other rekey agents to update their replicated A-LKH. The
new agent creates and maintains its subgroup LKH rooted at its newly created agent key.
In the dynamic A-LKH approach, creating a new A-LKH key requires updating
(some) group members. As previously mentioned, evicting an agent is not valid (section
6.1.1). When an agent leaves, its individual key is deleted from A-LKH (that might lead
to the deletion o f other A-LKH keys). Similarly, when a rekey agent leaves, there is no
need to regenerate an existing A-LKH key. The deletion o f an A-LKH key requires
updating (some) group members. This model has the drawback o f sometimes affecting
some group members as A-LKH keys are created or deleted.
Fig. 65 is an example that demonstrates the sequence of
rekey agents, where

A - L K H

degree is 2 . In Fig. 65(a), the first agent

that contains GK. In Fig. 65(b), the second agent
this case,

A K ]

key creation for 4

A - L K H

A 2

joins,

A K ]

and

A i

A K 2

creates

A - L K H

are created. In

should be sent to the subgroup members managed by A] (assuming no

members have joined

A 2

yet). In Fig. 65(c), the third agent

A 3

joins, and K],

K 2 ,

and

A K 3

are created. In this case, K] should be sent to the subgroup members managed by A] and
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A . In Fig. 65(d), the fourth agent A joins, and AK is created. In this case, none o f the
2

4

4

group members is updated for such join.

GK

GK

AK2

AK

(b)

(a)

GK

AK,

GK

AK3

AK;

(c)

AK

AKj

(d)

Fig. 65. Sequence o f a dynamic A-LKH, key creation for 4 rekey agents.

6.1.4.2

Static A-LKH

The static A-LKH maintenance approach provides a transparent rekey agent join and
leave for all group members, i.e., no members are updated for an agent join or leave. The
first agent to start creates an empty (no keys) A-LKH that can accommodate a specified
maximum number o f agents (leaf nodes). It generates its own agent key AK (in a A-LKH
leaf node), GK (A-LKH root node), and all the keys in the path between its AK and GK.
When other agent joins, a newly generated AK is inserted into an empty A-LKH leaf
node, and other A-LKH keys are generated as needed. When an agent leaves, only its AK
is deleted (A-LKH leaf node is marked empty) allowing other agent keys to be inserted.
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There is no need to regenerate an existing A-LKH keys as agents join or leave. The static
A-LKH maintenance approach has a drawback that the maximum number o f rekey agents
has to be known before starting a session.
Fig. 66 is an example that shows the sequence o f A-LKH key generation for 4 agents,
where A-LKH degree is 2 and the maximum number o f rekey agents is 4. In Fig. 66(a),
the first agent to join generates AKi, Ki, and GK. In Fig. 66(b), the second agent joins
and

A K 2

is generated. In Fig. 66(c), the third agent joins, and

In Fig. 66(d), the fourth agent joins and

A K 4

A K 3

and

K 2

are generated.

is generated.

GK

GK

AKz

AK,

(b)

(a)

GK
GK

AK,
AK,

AK;

AK

AK3

2

AK3

(d)
(C)

Fig. 66. Sequence o f a static A-LKH key generation for 4 rekey agents.
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6.1.4.3

A-LKH Key Generation

An A-LKH key to be used the first time by an agent is created by one o f the following
methods;
1) Creation hy the leader agent (LA)
2) Creation by the new agent (NA) itself
3) Creation by both the LA and the NA through KAP
4) Creation hy all agents through KAP

The following are the protocols for the four aforementioned cases.

Creation by the LA
The LA sends the NA the updated A-LKH after creating/generating the required keys.
At the same time, the LA sends an update A-LKH message to all other agents.

LA ^ NA: A-LKH;

LA ^ Ai: Update A-LKH

Creation by the NA
The LA sends the NA the A-LKH before the creation o f any new key. The NA
updates A-LKH and sends the update to all agents including the LA. This protocol
requires two messages to be sent in sequence.

LA ^ NA: A-LKH
NA ^ A i: Update A-LKH
Creation by both the LA and the NA
The LA sends the NA the A-LKH along with its share in the newly generated keys.
Then, the NA sends back its share in the newly generated keys to the LA. Both the LA
and the NA update A-LKH with the new keys. Then, the LA sends an update A-LKH to
all other agents. This protocol requires three messages to be sent in sequence.

LA

NA: A-LKH, new-keys-share

NA

LA : new-keys-share

LA -> A i: Update A-LKH
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C reation by all agents
The LA sends the NA the A-LKH, and sends to all other agents a StartRekey message
for the required A-LKH keys (at least one). All agents (including the LA and the NA)
exchange messages for the new keys generation. After the KAP proceeds all agents will
be able to establish the same updates to A-LKH.

LA

NA; A-LKH;

LA ^ A: StartRekey

Ai ^ Aj: KAP messages

We can observe that the first protocol is the simplest (fastest) since updating an ALKH requires the LA to send two messages at the same time, one to the NA and one to
the other rekey agents. However, choosing a protocol for A-LKH key creation/generation
can be a group policy decided by the application.

6.2

Group Key Manager Recovery
In this section, the recovery o f a group key manager and a rekey manager after short

failure time is discussed. It is assumed that, the rekey manager is a software entity
maintained by the group key manager, i.e., the rekey manager fails and recovers as a
component o f the group key manager. Such recovery process is concerned with the
recovery o f the last state o f the rekey policy, the rekey scheduler, and the LKH. One
approach to recover the state a failed group key manager is to have an independent full
replica(s) o f its state that assumes responsibility upon its failure. The drawback o f this
approach is the extra overhead needed to keep all replicas consistent all the time. Instead,
we assume that the group key manager state is not replicated. We are concerned with the
state recovery o f a central group key manager that maintains group LKH as well as a
group key agent that maintains a subgroup LKH and possibly an agents’ LKH (A-LKH)
after a short failure time, e.g., due to a server restart. Although the recovery o f a LKH
could be performed using the state stored at group members, we introduce the use o f a
log file that facilitates such recovery in case o f members’ failure or inconsistencies. The
proposed logging and recovery mechanism is secure and easy to implement. The logging
system avoids writing any key or revealing random number generator information. Group
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members participate in the recovery o f their key manager/agent by sending at least one
encrypted recovery message. The recovery message sent by a group member contains his
maintained list o f keys. We introduce a key selection technique for a group member to
reduce the number o f keys sent in the recovery message while allowing the group key
manager to retrieve all LKH keys. To the best o f our knowledge, this topic has not been
previously investigated in the research community.
The rest o f this section is organized as follows. Section 6.2.1 is an overview o f the
proposed recovery system. Section 6.2.2 illustrates the proposed group key manager
logging system. Section 6.2.3 introduces the recovery key used by the group members in
the recovery o f their manager. Section 6.2.4 details the group key manager recovery
procedure. Section 6.2.5 demonstrates the group member recovery message and
introduces a key selection technique that reduces the overhead in constmcting the
recovery message.
6.2.1

Recovery Overview

The authentication manager that maintains the group policy is assumed to be
implementing an independent fault tolerance mechanism. In addition, the authentication
manager is assumed to store the group requests (add, remove, and refresh) sent to the
group key manager until a rekeying is successfully ended (i.e., committed). Moreover,
the authentication manger either keeps the group requests or denies all or some types of
those requests during the group key manager failure.
The recovery o f a group member after failure could be treated as him leaving the
group and joining at a later time. If the group member failure is for a very short time and
the leave request is not processed (waiting in a batch o f requests), when the join request
is received, the group member state is refreshed instead. As previously mentioned in
chapter IV, refreshing a group member state assumes the member lost his maintained set
of keys, and requires sending him the same keys as if he newly joined. However, the
rekey manager doesn’t change LKH keys for refreshing a group member. Such refreshing
optimizes the rekeying process by reducing the number of the newly generated LKH
keys. The mobile computing paradigm is an example where frequent short disconnection
times may occur, due to frequent handoffs.
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In distributed group rekeying, if the distributed agents’ cooperation protocol allows
any agent to distribute a new GK to all group members, the failed agent subgroup
members will be notified by the changes o f GK during their agent failure period. On the
other hand, if the distributed agents’ eooperation protocol allows every agent to distribute
a new GK to its subgroup members only, the failed agent subgroup members could store
the un-interpreted group messages (due to lack o f GK updates) during their agent failure
and proceed interactively after its recovery. In this case, if the agent failure is for a very
short time, its subgroup members might be able restore communication appropriately.
Otherwise, a failed agent subgroup members might loose interactivity with the session.
As previously mentioned in chapter III, the group rekey channel provides a reliable
group communication (multicast) protocol that assures a group member has received the
rekey message (RM). A RM send method call (through the rekey channel) is assumed to
return successfully even if RM didn’t reach some (or all) group members due to their
failures. The new GK is guaranteed to reach the group member by the rekey channel.
The rekey scheduler and the leader selection mechanism guarantee that there are no
nested rekeyings (i.e., no start-rekey is issued before the previous rekeying is committed).
6.2.2

Group Key Manager Logging

The group key manager is configured through the rekey policy to schedule the group
rekeying events while reeeiving requests (from the authentication manager) to add,
remove, and refresh group members. When group rekeying deems necessary, the rekey
manager is notified to issue a rekey message (RM) and send it to the group members. The
proposed recovery mechanism assumes the group key manager is maintaining a log file.
The log file is written to permanent storage (disk) periodically and forcefully at certain
checkpoints, so that any type o f failure does not affect it. Note that, we are not
considering disk or catastrophie failures.
Writing a LKH key to the log file is crucial and requires encryption that is time (and
processing) consuming. In addition, the keys are subject to change in a rekeying process,
and the most recent version o f a key is the only needed version after the recovery. The
recovery meehanism avoids writing keys to the log file. Moreover, the randomly
generated numbers (such as keys, IDs, or byte patterns (BPs); see chapter IV) could be
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regenerated if the used pseudo random number generator and its initialization are
revealed to an intruder. It is crucial to store the initial pseudo random generator state
(e.g., its seed) that would allow the generation o f the exact sequence o f random numbers.
The recovery mechanism avoids storing such random number generators state
information.
In summary, a group key manager/agent writes a time stamped entry to the log file in
the following cases;
•

Initialization entry that is used to restore the employed protocols, implementations,
and policies,

•

Receiving a message to add, remove, or refresh a group member,

•

Before initiating a rekeying process (i.e., the leader agent (LA) in a distributed group
rekeying model) a Start-Rekey entry is written,

•

After committing an initiated (by itself) rekeying process, a Commit-Rekey entry is
written,

•

When committing a rekying process (i.e., not the LA in a distributed group rekeying
model), a Rekey entry is written,

•

Change o f rekey policy, and

•

A LKH signature at specified checkpoints.

The log file is forcefully written to the permanent storage in the following cases:
•

Initialization,

•

Committing an initiated rekeying process, and

•

A LKH signature written at specified checkpoints.

A checkpoint is introduced to facilitate the recovery process. The checkpoint could be
scheduled periodically or after certain number o f committed rekeyings. At a checkpoint,
the rekey manager (governed by the group key manager) writes the LKH signature to the
log file, and forcefully writes the log file to the permanent storage. The LKH should be
checked to have updates since the previous checkpoint. In a distributed group rekeying,
the agents’ LKH (A-LKH) is not written to the log file since it is fully replicated at all
agents and could be easily recovered. In the group key manager recovery, the LKH
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signature determines the shape o f the LKH, the number o f entries at each node, and the
guiding IDs. The following is the LKH signature o f the LKH illustrated in Fig. 67. The
LKH is parsed in pre-order and the IDs are written in order with the symbol “(“ used to
group a single node’s entries.

T: LKH-Signature [((120, 205), 400, (900)), 900, ((1120, 1205))]

K,,
K.,;

K,.2

K

2 .1

K,,

K i .1.2

(a) The S-LKH key view.

900

400

7
120

205

900

(b)

1120

1205

The S-LKH search view.

Fig. 67. A group LKH at a checkpoint time.
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6.2.3

Recovery Key

A group member participates in the group key manager/agent recovery by sending
some of his maintained keys as will be explained in section 6.2.5. For privacy purpose, a
group member sends to the group key manager the recovery messages encrypted by a
recovery key. The group key manager should be able to decrypt such messages, while no
other group member should possess such capability. Using the group key, GK, as a
recovery key, is not suitable, since the group members are aware o f it. Instead, a group
member either uses his individual key or a group key manager public key.
If the authentication manager stores the group members’ individual keys, the group
key manager contacts it at the beginning o f a recovery process to obtain such keys
(among other information). The group key manager recovers the group members’
individual keys before receiving any recovery message from them. In this case, every
group member uses his individual keys as a recovery key (to encrypt the recovery
messages).
On the other hand, if the authentication manager doesn’t store the group members’
individual keys, a recovery key is needed. The recovery key has to be in the form o f
private key and public key pair. The recovery key could be a long-term key or a session
recovery key. The private key is kept securely at the authentication manager or at the
group key manager system. The public key is handed to every group member right after
he joins the group to use as a recovery key.
6.2.4

Group Key M anager Recovery

The recovery o f a group key manager/agent implies the restoration o f the latest
group/subgroup LKH, policy, scheduler state, and agents’ LKH (if applicable). It is
assumed that contact information to the authentication manager and other group key
agents are recoverable (one could be through the other). The group key manager recovery
process proceeds as follows:
1. Inspect the following log file entries: Initialization entry to reinitialize itself and the
rekey manager; last Rekey-Policy entry to restore the rekey policy and adjust the
scheduler; last LKH-Signarure entry to reestablish the group LKH structure.
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2. Apply all committed rekeyings’ changes to the LKH, i.e., insert and delete LKH
nodes that took effect after last signature. Note that, without writing LKH-Signature
the LKH could be restored by redoing all insertions and deletions form the beginning
of the log file.
3. Contact the authentication manager for changes in the rekey policy (if allowed). In
addition, the group key manager retrieves the stored requests at the authentication
manager. If the last Start-Rekey entry in the log file is not followed by a CommitRekey, it is implied that the group key manager crashed during a rekeying. Although
the exact scheduler state can’t be recovered, the group key manager schedules a
rekeying as soon as possible after LKH full recovery.
4. Contact the agents’ group for latest agents’ LKH (A-LKH), and the committed
rekeyings during the failure period to adjust the sequential number SEQ. I f all agents
are not available during this recovery (e.g., all failed) and some rekeyings have been
performed, the recovering agent subgroup members will provide partial construction
of A-LKH and that will allow the recovering agent to proceed normally.
5. Send a recovery request to group members to send back their maintained list o f keys
to fully restore LKH keys (see section 6.2.5).
6.2.5

Group Member Recovery Message

A group member sends to his group key manager/agent one recovery message upon
receiving a recovery request. The recovery message contains his individual LKH leaf
entry position, his individual ID, last SEQ, and the maintained list o f keys. In addition,
the recovery message is encrypted using the recovery key as explained in section 6.2.3.
As previously illustrated for LKH keys, an individual key is maintained by one group
member, GK is maintained by all group member, a KEK is maintained by a subset o f the
group members. I f every group member sends all his maintained list o f keys in the
recovery message to the group key manager, GK and KEKs will be sent several times
(e.g., GK will be sent by all group member). Instead, we propose an enhancement to the
above protocol that allows group members to send a partial list o f their maintained keys.
Allowing only one group member only to send a recovered key is crucial if that member
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fails. On the other hand, if all the members that maintain a key have failed, the group key
manager will not be able to recover such key but will be able to proceed without it.
The proposed LKH keys recovery protocol provides a fair group member key
selection that allows a group member to choose a partial list o f his maintained keys to
send to a recovering group key manager. In addition, it allows the group key manager to
retrieve all keys in one round if no member fails. If some members fail during their group
key manger recovery, LKiH keys recovery might take two rounds as follows:
round
•

The group key manager sends a recovery request to all group members.

•

A group member sends an encrypted recovery message that contains his individual
key (if not recovered from the authentication manager), his individual ID, and his
LKH leaf entry position. Note that, if a group member didn’t send a recovery message
in the first recovery round, he is detected as failed by the group key manager.

•

If the group member’s individual entry falls on the path o f the first child o f a key
node (determined from his LKH leaf entry position that equals to I), send that key in
the first round recovery message. The maximum number o f keys a group member can
send in a recovery message is half the LKH height, starting from the key on the 2"*^
LKH level (i.e., without his individual key).

2“'' round
• If the group key manager didn’t recover a LKH key (KEK) at the first round due to
members’ failure, a recovery request message is sent specifying the missing set o f
keys and the next existing neighbors (to the failed members) to send it.
• The specified group members send the specified keys.

We suggest that the above key selection algorithm is fair since an individual entry
LKH position is determined from his randomly assigned individual ID. The probability o f
a group member sending a certain key is independent from any other key, and is equal to
the probability o f holding a key that exists in a first entry of a node that is equal to ltd,
where d is the LKH degree.
For example, in the group key manager recovery process o f the LKH o f height 3
illustrated in Fig. 67, a group member will send a first round recovery message that
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includes his ID, LKH leaf entry position, and at most 3 keys (assuming half 3 is 2)
including his individual key. The five recovery messages sent by the five group members
to the group key manager in the format (ID, LKH position, keys) are as follows: (120,
1.1.1, K i .m , K u , K i ), (205, 1.1.2, Ki. . , Ki, GK), (900, 1.2.1, Ki. . , K . , GK), (1120,
1 2

2

1

1 2

2.1.1, K . . , K . , K ), and (900, 2.1.2, K . . , K ).
2

6.3

1 1

2

1

2

2

1 2

2

Conclusion
Distributed group rekeying between a set o f peer rekey agents provides a more

scalable and reliable secure group key management compared to the central rekey
manager approach. In this chapter, four group rekeying cooperation protocols between a
distributed set o f rekey agents, in terms o f group key generation and distribution
mechanism, are proposed. It is demonstrated that, the minimal overhead rekey protocol is
when one rekey agent at a time generates and distributes a new group key to all agents
and group members. In addition, the LKH maintained at a rekey agent in the two cases of
new group key distribution are discussed. The first case is that each agent distributes the
new group key to its subgroup members. The second case is that one rekey agent at a
time distributes a new group key to all group members. The naiVe solution in the latter
case is that every rekey agent fully replicates the group LKH. Altematively, we proposed
the construction and replication o f smaller size agents’ LKH (A-LKH). The proposed
approach reduces the replicated LKH size at each rekey agent and the number o f keys
maintained by a group member. Furthermore, we identified two approaches o f such
agents’ LKH maintenance namely dynamic A-LKH and static A-LKH. The dynamic ALKH approach has the drawback o f affecting group members (by inserting or deleting
keys) as agents join or leave the agents’ group. The static A-LKH approach guarantees a
transparent rekey agent join and leave but requires the specification o f the maximum
number o f rekey agents before starting a session.
Moreover, a logging mechanism for the recovery o f a group key manager/agent state
after short failure time is presented. The logging includes all events that change the group
key manager state but avoid writing any security revealing information such as keys.
Group members participate in the recovery o f their manager by sending an encrypted
recovery message that includes a sub-list o f their maintained keys. A fair group member
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key selection technique is proposed to reduce the number o f sent keys in a recovery
message.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE EXTENSIONS
In this chapter, we conclude the dissertation by summarizing our motivation,
objectives, contributions, and the performance o f our proposed framework for secure
group key management. Furthermore, we discuss a list o f possible future extensions to
our work in the context o f secure group communication, and secure group key
management.

7.1

Conclusion
Secure group communication is quickly becoming the adopted standard in many

applications spanning diverse areas. Throughout the dissertation, we focused on secure
group key management, which deals with group key {GK) issues such as establishing,
distributing, and maintaining that key over the period o f the group existence. To provide
perfect secrecy, group rekeying (change o f GK) has to be performed for every group
member joining or leaving the group. Group rekeying is a challenging problem especially
for large group sizes or highly dynamic groups.
The simplest group rekeying protocol is performed with the help o f a trusted and
secure group key manager. The group key manager maintains GK, and performs a group
rekeying when it deems necessary according to a defined rekey policy. In a group
rekeying process, a new GK is generated and distributed to group members such that a
joining

(leaving)

member

is

not

allowed

access

to

previous

(future)

group

communication. A very fast rekeying is crucial to the performance o f an application that
has large group size, experiences frequent joins and leaves, or the group key management
is hosted by a group member because o f the required computation effort. Traditionally,
newly generated keys are encrypted for secure distribution to group members. Such
technique is denoted encryption-based key distribution technique (KDT). There are two
approaches for group key management, the star key management and the logical key
hierarchy (LKH) approach. In the star key management, the group key manager performs
2 keys encryptions for join rekeying and n keys encryptions for leave rekeying, where n
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is the group size. This approach is not scalable since leave rekeying scales linearly with
the group size. In the LKH approach, if the LKH degree is d, the group key manager
performs on the average 2 x lo g ^ n keys encryptions for join rekeying, and d xlog^ n
keys encryptions for leave rekeying. The LKH provids a scalable group rekeying, and is
becoming the standard approach for group key management. However, when encryptionbased KDT is used with LKH, there are two un-symmetric rekey protocols for join and
leave rekeying. Such unsymmetric property makes increasing the LKH degree result in a
deerease o f the join rekey cost and an increase o f the leave rekey cost. In this case, the
optimal LKH degree is estimated to be 4.
Traditionally, group rekeying is performed periodically for the accumulated join and
leave requests (i.e., batch o f updates) during an inter-rekey period. In the star key
management approach, the group key manager is required to regenerate one key and to
perform 0{n) key encryptions for a rekeying, where n is the group size. If the group key
manager maintains a LKH o f degree d and height h, such that n < d ’’, and the bateh size
is R requests, a rekeying requires the group key manager to regenerate O ( R x h ) keys and
to perform 0 ( d x R x h ) keys encryptions. The encryption-based LKH approach provided
a rekeying cost that scales to the logarithm o f the group size, however, the number o f
encryptions performed by a GKM increases with increased LKH degree, LKH height, or
the batch size, and can be more than the star approach’s number o f eneryptions.
The objective o f our work is to provide a framework for secure group key
management that outperforms the original encryption-based LKH for all application
scenarios. The framework has to be secure, efficient, scalable, reliable, and independent
o f the application. The group key management framework addresses the following issues:
secure group communication software model, key distribution technique, rekey protocols,
batch rekeying, distributed group rekeying, and recovery. We briefly present our
approach to resolve the aforementioned issues highlighting our contributions.
Secure group communication software model. We presented a generic software
model for providing secure group communication. The model identifies five main
components as follows: authentication manager, group key manager, rekey manager and
the corresponding rekey client, rekey channel, and cryptographic utility manager. The
model is designed to isolate the group key management components and illustrate the

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

164

functionalities and interactions o f other components. We have extended Java‘^“ security
with an application-programming interface (API) that can be used to provide group key
manager, rekey manager, and rekey client functionalities as designed in our model.
Key distribution technique. We focused on the rekey manager that uses a LKH for
scalable rekeying. We proposed a novel XOR-based KDT, namely XORBF. The
proposed approach performs an XOR operation between keys to reduce the computation
effort, and uses a random byte patterns (BP) to distribute the key material in a fixed size
rekey packet (for every new key). The use o f LKH and XOKBP KDT provides
symmetric rekey protocols in both cases o f join and leave rekeyings.
We derived analytical cost estimates o f XORBP and performed empirical
experiments to compare its performance with the encryption-based KDT for the same
degree LKH. The use o f XORBP doubles the required LKH storage, the required member
storage, and the number of randomly generated bits per a rekeying. The XORBP rekey
message size is comparable to the eneryption-based leave rekeying message size. On the
other hand, the use o f XORBP substantially reduces the rekey message construction time.
Our experiments have shown that XORBP achieves up to 90% reduction in the rekey
message construction time. In addition, contrary to the encryption-based KDT, increasing
the LKH degree, when XORBP is used, reduces both join and leave rekeying cost. Such
property allows the use o f a larger degree LKH, which reduces the LKH storage, the
member storage, and the rekey message size when compared to a smaller LKH degree.
The anal34ical cost estimates assume that the LKH is balaneed, while the experiments are
performed using an un-balanced LKH. Such experiments show that there is a slight
increase in the measured member storage and the rekey message size over the analytical
values, but the measured LKH storage has a 60% increase over the analytical value.
Rekey Protocols. As group members join or leave the group, LKH nodes (keys) will
be inserted or deleted. While, many researchers assume a balanced LKH when estimating
the group rekeying cost, the literature lacks practical LKH protocols that maintain a
balanced LKH o f any degree all the time. We proposed two novel protocols for
establishing and maintaining a LKH o f any degree. One protocol adopts an unbalanced
LKH while the other adopts a balaneed LKH. The protocols assume that the rekey
manager assigns a unique individual identification (ID) to every group member. For both
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protocols, we detailed the LKH structure, the rekey message format, and the rekey
processing at a rekey manager and at a rekey client for different scenarios o f LKH keys
insertion and deletions.
The first protocol, denoted S-LKH, maintains LKH as a search tree using the
individual IDs. The second protocol, denoted B'^-LKH, maintains LKH as a balanced
search tree that has the same structure as S-LKH. B^ search tree insertion and deletion
algorithms guarantee that the LKH is balanced after each node (key) insertion or deletion.
In addition, B"^ search trees have an extra constraint that all allocated nodes have to be at
least half full to reduce the allocated LKH storage (memory). On the other hand, B”^-LKH
maintenance introduces complexity and extra overhead to the rekey process.
We have performed empirical experiments to compare the performance o f S-LKH
and B^-LKH rekey protocols. The experiments show that, for both protocols, the
frequency o f the simple insertion and deletion scenarios increases with LKH degree
increase. In addition, for B^-LKH the frequency o f the most expensive operation is less
than 1% for any LKH degree. For individual rekeying (i.e., a rekeying after one group
member joins or leaves), the use o f B^-LKH results in an increase in the average number
o f rekey packets (i.e., newly generated keys) and the average number o f encrypted keys
(measured when encryption-based KDT is used) when compared to S-LKH. On the other
hand, a B^-LKH has a smaller height and introduces a decrease in the expected maximum
rekey time. The expected maximum rekey time identifies a minimum time period that has
to be elapsed between two consecutive rekeyings. Furthermore, a B'^-LKH requires much
less allocated nodes. The reduction o f the number o f allocated nodes using B^-LKH
reaches 50% o f the same degree S-LKH for a highly dynamic group.
Batch Rekeying. Individual rekeying for a single join or leave request is not a
practical solution. Instead, researchers suggested periodic rekeying to be performed for a
batch o f requests accumulated during an elapsed period. We have extended S-LKH and
B'^-LKH protocols to support batch rekeying.
We introduced a generalized rekey policy definition that has three main parameters:
minimum inter-rekey period, maximum request delay, and batch size. The defined policy
can be used to provide simple periodic rekeying as well as other complex rekeying
conditions as configured by the application. A simplified design o f the software objects
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used to provide secure group key management is presented. For batch rekeying, the
newly generated keys compose a sub-tree o f the original LBCH. We illustrated how the
rekey manager constructs the rekey sub-tree in both rekeying protocols and how the
rekey tree is used in constructing the rekey message sent to group members for such keys
updates.
We performed experiments to compare the batch rekeying performance o f S-LKH
and B^-LKH protocols. Our experiments show that, the batch rekeying performance o f a
rekey protocol that uses LKH o f degree 4 and encryption-based KDT is better than star
key management only for small batch sizes (less than 20% n). In addition, our
experiments show that using B^-LKH for large batch sizes or highly dynamic groups
substantially reduces the rekey cost when compared to S-LKH. In addition, B^-LKH
performance is shown to be stable (bounded) for highly dynamic groups while S-LKH
performance deteriorates as the group dynamics increase.
Distributed group rekeying. To extend the scalability and the reliability o f our
model, we introduced four cooperation group rekeying protocols between a group o f peer
rekey agents. We illustrated that the protocol with the minimal overhead is that one rekey
agent, at a time, generates and distributes a new group key to all group members.
Detailed LKH maintenance in the different cooperation protocols are presented. In
addition, the use o f an agents’ LKH (denoted A-LKH) is introduced to facilitate a new
GK distribution by a rekey agent to all group members. The use o f A-LKH minimizes the
replicated LKH size at every rekey agent as well as the number o f maintained keys at a
group member. Finally, two approaches for A-LKH establishment are presented. The first
is the dynamic A-LKH approach that is flexible but (some) group members might be
updated for a rekey agent joining or leaving the agents’ group. The second is the static ALKH approach that requires the specification o f the maximum number o f rekey agents
before starting a group session but provides transparent agents join and leave for group
members.
Recovery. Finally, we proposed a logging and recovery mechanism for the group key
manager/agent and the rekey manager/agent. The logging system is secure and easy to
implement. Group members participate in the recovery o f their manager by sending an
encrypted recovery message when requested. The group member recovery message
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contains his individual material and his maintained set o f keys. We proposed a key
selection technique to reduce the number o f keys sent in the recovery message. In
addition, we discussed the recovery o f a group member after a short failure time.

In conclusion, the designed software model provides group key management
components that are independent o f the application, the security mechanism, and the
communication protocol. The proposed XORBP KDT if used with the LKH approach
achieves further reduction to the group rekeying computation cost and provides a more
efficient and scalable solution than the encryption-based KDT. The proposed unbalanced
LKH rekey protocol (S-LKH) can be used for any LKH degree. While, the proposed
balanced LKH rekey protocol (B^-LKH) is practical for a LKH o f degree greater than 3.
A B"^-LKH requires much less storage than S-LKH. In addition, the use o f a B^-LKH
when compared to a S-LKH substantially reduces the batch rekeying cost for large batch
sizes or highly dynamic groups and exhibits a bounded performance with increased group
dynamics. Moreover, the proposed rekey policy offers versatile triggering conditions for
the batch rekeying process including simple periodic batch rekeying. Furthermore,
distributed group rekeying enhanees the scalability o f the group key management
framework. Finally, the group key manager and the group member’s recovery mechanism
add reliability to the framework.

7.2

Future Extensions
The secure group key management framework can be extended as follows:

1) Adapting the proposed LKH rekey protocols to constrained LKH key generation
mechanisms such as the use o f a hash function. In our work, it is always assumed
LKH keys are freshly randomly generated. Such constrained key regeneration
techniques are used to reduce the group rekeying cost (i.e., number o f randomly
generated bits, rekey message size, etc...). Unfortunately, constrained key generation
could be less secure.
2) Providing a dynamic rekey policy. Such dynamic rekey policy would require
investigating the possibility o f having conflicting policy decisions applied to the
(short) time, interval between two consecutive rekey policies.
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3) Investigating distributed group rekeying where more than one rekey agent is
experiencing a change in its subgroup membership. In this case, performing a group
rekeying is similar to performing a distributed nested transaction that requires
distributed concurrency control.
4) Experimenting with batch group rekeying for real application scenarios and different
group sizes. The experiments would compare the batch group rekeying performance
o f S-LKH and B^-LKH rekey protocols. Group applications have two benchmark
scenarios. First, one sender and large group o f receivers such as video broadcasting.
Second, small group o f peer group members such as a conferencing application where
any member can be a sender.
5) Experimenting with the distributed group rekeying protocols for real application
scenarios. The experiments would compare the different protocols overhead, and
compare the proposed distributed architecture with other distributed secure group
management architectures such as lolus [49].
6) Implementing the proposed group key manager recovery technique and performing
experiments to study its charaeteristics. The experiments will compare the time and
overhead required for a group key manager recovery using the proposed selective
logging technique and a full logging technique. A full logging technique would allow
logging the LKH keys.
7) Experimenting with group member recovery in applications exhibiting short failure
time such as mobile clients.
8) Perform an analytical study o f the proposed key selection technique used by a group
member in the construction o f his group key manager recovery message.
9) Refining the implementation o f the group key manager/agent, the rekey manager, and
the rekey client as designed in the proposed framework. The finished product is a set
o f packages that extend Java'^'^ security and can be used by secure group
communication applications. The packages design will revolve around two Java''''^
security design principles: implementation independence and interoperability, and
independenee and extensibility.
10) Integrating the proposed XORBP key distribution technique and the S-LKH and B”^LKH rekey protocols with the work o f the IETF secure multicast group.
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11) Investigating other secure group communication issues such as a group policy
definition and implementation for the authentication manager, and a reliable group
rekeying transport protocol for implementing the rekey channel.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLES OF S-LKH AND B^-LKH REKEY PROTOCOLS

This appendix contains two examples for S-LKH and B^-LKH rekey protocols. The
examples illustrate the rekey message sent in different group member addition and
removal scenarios. The initial key message (initMsg) format is {ID, position, height,
degree}. The rekey message (rekeyMsg) format for S-LKH rekey protocol is {SEQ, type,
position, level, ID, RekeyPacketi, RekeyPacket , ...}. The rekey message format
2

(rekeyMsg) for B'^-LKH rekey protocol is {SEQ, type, position, level, (IDi, ID , ...),
2

(isRighti, isRight , ...), RekeyPacketi, RekeyPacket , ...} where isRight values are T for
2

2

true and F for false. Note that maintaining SEQ is not shown in the algorithms (trivial).
Note also that, the rekey message level filed is not assigned in all cases.
A LKH key is identified by its LKH position and that position is changing due to
insertion/deletion o f node entries. An addRekey packet is identified by a key and the
directly/indirectly inserted entry number in the associated child node. If encryption-based
KJDT is used, such addRekey packet contains the new version o f the key encrypted by its
previous version and by that specified child node key entry. For example addRekey(K.2 .u
2) packet is [{-Kj J K j [ ,{ ^

2 1

)^

2 1 2

]• A rmvRekey packet is identified by a key. If

encryption-based KDT is used, such rmvRekey packet contains the new key encrypted by
every key in the associated child nod. For example rmvRekey(K 2 .\) packet is
[ {K\ }K,, K. e node(P 2 )], where node(P 2 ) is the node pointed to by the pointer P , .
1

1

1

2

1

S-LKH Examples
Fig. 68(a) illustrates the initial nodes o f a S-LKH o f degree 4 that is used to
demonstrate the three member addition and the two member removal scenarios. The SLKH is constructed using S-LKH AddMember (Fig. 24) and RemoveMember (Fig. 25)
algorithms. The S-LKH height h > 3 (part o f the tree is not expanded). For all other
figures the S-LKH search view is used to illustrate the changes to the initial S-LKH.
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Fig. 68(b) is the S-LKH search view after AddMember(240,

) is performed. The

returned initMsg is {240, 2.1.2, h, 4} and the returned rekeyMsg is {SEQ, ADD, 2.1.2, 2,
240, addRekey(K 2 A, 2), addRekey(K.2 , 1), addRekey(GK, 2)}.
Fig. 68(c) is the S-LKH search view after AddMember(420, K y ) is performed. The
returned initMsg is {420, 2.2.4, h, 4} and the returned rekeyMsg is {SEQ, SPLIT, 2.2.4,
2, 420, rmvRekey{K 2 .2), rmvRekey(K 2 .z), addRekey(K 2 , 3), addRekey{GK, 2)}.
Fig. 68(d) is the S-LKH search view after AddMember(609, K ^ ) is performed. The
returned iniMsg is {609, 3.3, h, 4} and the returned rekeyMsg is {SEQ, INCREASE, 3.3,
1, 609, rmvRekey{K-i.\), rmvRekeyiK^ i), addRekeyQL^, 1), addRekey{GK, 3)}.
Fig. 68(e) is the S-LKH search view after RemoveMember(666) is performed. The
returned rekeyMsg is {SEQ, REMOVE, 3.2.1, 2, 666, rmvRekey{)L-i.2), rmvRekeyiK^),
rmvRekey{GK)}.
Fig. 68(f) The following figure is the S-LKH after RemoveMember(790) is
performed. The returned rekeyMsg is {SEQ, DECREASE, 3.2.1, 1, 666, rmvRekey(JL{),
rmvRekey(GK)}.

GK
ro o t

(Ki, P,), 170, (Kj, P2), 490, (K3, P3), 900, (K4, P4) I
N,

N3

N2
( K 2 ,,P 2 , ) ,2 5 5 , ( K 2 . 2 ,P 2 .2 )

N

2

(K2.1.,, 230), (K2.,.2, 255)

1

(K3,„ 575), (K.3.2, 589), (K.3.3, 666), (K,3,4, 790)

N

2

(K2.2.,, 290), (K,2.2.2, 300)), (K2.2.3, 388), (K.2,2.4, 490)

(a) The S-LKH initial nodes.

Fig. 68. A S-LKH member addition and removal examples.
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(b) The S-LKH search view after AddMember(240,

170

490

300

) is performed.

900

255

290

790

388

388

420

490

(c) The S-LKH search view after AddMember(420, Ky ) is performed.

170

490

900

609

575

589

666

609

790

(d) The S-LKH search view after AddMember(609,

170

490

) is performed.

900

609

575

(e)

589

609

790

The S-LKH search view after RemoveMember(666) is performed.

Fig. 68. (Continued)
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170

490

575

(f)

900

589

609

The S-LKH search view after RemoveMember(790) is performed.

Fig. 68. (Continued)

B^-LKH Example
Fig. 69(a) illustrates a B'^-LKH o f degree d = A and height A = 3 constructed using the
B’^-LKH AddMember (Fig. 29) and RemoveMember (Fig. 34) algorithms. Note that,
parts o f the tree are not expanded but the maintenance algorithms guarantees that all
nodes are at the same level, so the height h o f that B^-LKH is 3. The B^-LICH is used in
demonstrating the different B'^-LKH member addition and removal scenarios.
Fig. 69(b) is the B^-LKH search view after performing AddMember(600,

)

followed by AddMembr (790, Ky) . The first returned initMsg is {600, 3.1.2, 3, 4} and
the first retumed rekeyMsg is (SEQ, ADD, 3.1.2, -, (600), -, addRekey{K 3 ,i, 2),
addRekey(K-i, 1), addRekey{GK, 3)}. Then the second retumed initMsg is (790, 3.2.3, 3,
4} and the second retumed rekeyMsg is (SEQ, ADD, 3.2.3, -, (790), -, addRekey(K 3 2 , 3),
addRekey(KT„ 2), addRekey{GK, 3)}.
Fig. 69(c) is the B'^-LKH search view after AddMember(770, K ^ ) is performed. The
retumed intiMsg is {770, 3.2.2, 3, 4} and the retumed rekeyMsg is {SEQ, SPLIT, 3.2.2,
1, (770, 786), -, rmvRekey(K 3 2 ), rmvRekeyQLz^), addRekey(K.3 , 2), addRekey{GK, 3)}.
Fig. 69(d) is the B"^-LKH search view after AddMember(590,

) is performed. The

retumed initMsg is {590, 3.1.2, 3, 4} and the retumed rekeyMsg is {SEQ, INCREASE,
3.1.2, -, (590, 600, 786, 786), -, rmvRekey{K\2 ,\), rmvRekeyOLi^.i), rmvRekey{K\3 ),
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rmvRekeyQL.2 .\), rmvRekeyQLx), rmvRekeyQL.7), addRekey{GK, 1)}. The B"^-LKH height h
becomes 4.
Fig. 69(e) is the B'^-LKH search view after RemoveMember(990) is performed (an
expansion o f extra part o f the tree is shown). The retumed rekeyMsg is {SEQ, REMOVE,
2.1.2.3,

rmvRekey{]L2 .\.2 ), rmvRekey{K 2 .\), rmvRekeyiJLj), rmvRekey{GK)}.

(990),

Fig. 69(f) is the B^-LKH search view after RemoveMember(817) is performed. The
retumed rekeyMsg is

(SEQ, SHIFT, 2.1.2.1, 0, (817, 810, 990), (F, T, F),

mrgRekey(lL 2 2 .\, F), mrgRekey(K 2 .2 , T), rmvRekey{K.2 ), rmvRekey(K\), rmvRekey{GK}}.
Fig. 69(g) illustrates an expansion o f Pi sub-tree. Fig. 69(h) is the B^-LKH search
view after RemoveMember(380) is performed. The retumed rekeyMsg is {SEQ,
MERGE, 1.2.3.1, 2, (380, 230), (F), mrgRekey(]L\2 .2 , F), rmvekey{K\ 2 ), rmvRekey(Ki),
rmvRekey{GK)}.
Fig. 69(i) is is the B'^-LKH search view after RemoveMember(lOO) is called. The
retumed rekeyMsg is {SEQ, DECREASE, 1.1.1.2, -, (100, 100, 170, 490), (T, T, T),
mrgRekey(}L\,\, T), mrgRekeyQLu T), mrgRekey(GK, T)}.

GK
root
\

N,

(K,, P,), 170, (K2, P2), 490, (K3, P3), 990, (K4, P4)

N2

■ ■

N3

N4

I (K3,,, P3,,), 675, (K3.2, P3.2), 810, (K3.3, P3.3)

N s.i

■

N 3 .2

(Kj.,,, 530), (K3.,.2, 655), (Kj.z.,., 675)

(K 3.2.2, 749), (K.3.2.3,786), (K.3.2.4, 810)

(a) The B^-LKH initial nodes.

Fig. 69. A B'^-LKH member addition and removal examples.
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) and (790, K y ) are performed.

(b) The B"^-LKH search view after AddMember(600,
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(c) The B’^-LKH search view after AddMember(770, K ^ ) is performed.
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(d) The B"^-LKH search view after AddMember(590,

) is performed.

Fig. 69. (Continued)
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(e) The B'*'-LKH search view after RemoveMember(990) is performed.
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(f) The B^-LKH search view after RemoveMember(817) is performed.
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(g) The B’^-LKH expansion o f P] sub-tree.

Fig. 69. (Continued)
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(h) The B'''-LKH search view after RemoveMember(380) is performed.
D2
490

210

170

166

(i)

170

786

198

210

270

330

490

The B”^-LKH search view after RemoveMember(lOO) is performed.

Fig. 69. (Continued)
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APPENDIX B
B^-LKH REKEY CLIENT PROCESSING

Method Rekey(rekeyMsg)
Globals: h, d, Min d, ID, position, keyList, KDT,
rekeyPos, level, match, isRight, isRNghbr, isLNghbr, S;
{ rekeyPos = rekeyMsg.position; level = rekeyMsg.level; match = -1;
for (I = 0 to (b-1)) if (position[I] equals rekeyPos[I]) then match = I; else breakFor;
match = h - match; if (match equals 1) then match = 2;
X = h + 1-match; isRght = rekeyMsg.isRght[match-3];
isRNghbr = isRght and (position[X] equals (rekeyPos[X]+l));
isLNgbr = (not isRght) and (position[X] equals (rekeyPos [X]-l));
if (match < (h-level+2)) then S = h-level; else S = match-1;
IF (rekeyMsg.type)
{ equals ADD or REMOVE: Simple();
equals SPLIT: Split();equals INCREASE: Increase();
equals MERGE: MergeQ; equals SHIFT: Shift(); equals DECREASE: Decrease();}
Method Loopl(startI, endl, adjust)
{ for (I = starti to endl) keyList.update(I + adjust, rekeyMsg.packet[I]);
^j'k-k'kj

Method Loop2(startI, endl, adjust)
{ for (I = starti to endl)
{ if (ID > rekeyMsg.ID[I]) then increment position[h-l-I];
packetNo = 2* I;
if (position[h-l-I] > Min_d)
then { increment position[h-l-I] by (Min_d+1); packetNo = packetN o+l; }
keyList.update(I + adjust, rekeyM sg.packet[packetNo]);}
Method Loop3 (starti, endl, adjust)
{ for (I = starti to endl)
{ if (ID > rekeyMsg.ID[I]) then decrement position[h-l-I];
if (KDT equals XORBP)
then keyList.updateBP(I, rekeyMsg.xoredBP[I, position[h -l-I]]);
if (not rekeyMsg.isRght[I]) then increment position[h-l-I] by Min_d;
keyList.update(I -f- adjust, rekeyM sg.packet[I]);}

}
Fig. 70. The B^-LKH rekey client Rekey(), Loopl(), Loop2(), and Loop3() methods.
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Method SimpleQ
{ if ((match equals 2) and (ID > rekeyMsg.ID[0]))
then if (rekeyMsg.type equals ADD) then increment position[h-l];
else decrement position[h-l];
Loop 1(match-2, h-1, 1);
j/***/
Method Split()
{ Y = h-leveI-2;
Loop2(match-2, Y, 1);
if (((match-2) < (h-level)) and (ID >rekeyM sg.ID[Y+l]))
then increment position[level];
LoopI(Y+S, Y+h, -Y);
J/***/
Method IncreaseO
{ increment h; Loop2(match-2, h-1, 1);
y-k-k-kj

Method Decrease()
{ if ( match > 3)
then { if (isRNghbr) then increment position[X+l] by (Min_d -1);
if (isRNgbr or isLNghbr) then Loop 1(match-3, match-3, 1);}
Loop3(match-2, h-2, 1);
decrement h ; free position[0]; keyList.free(h+l);
}

Fig. 71. The B’^-LKN rekey client Simple(), Split(), Increase(), and Decrease() methods.
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Method MergeQ
{ if ( 3 < match < (h-level+2))
then { if (isRNghbr ) then increment position[X+l] by (Min_d-1);
if (isRNghbr or isLNghbr ) then Loop 1(match-3, match-3, 1);}
Loop3(match-2, h-L-2, 1);
if (((match-2) < (h-level)) and (ID >rekeyM sg.ID[h-level-l]))
then decrement position[level];
L o o p l(S -l, h-1, 1);
Method ShiftQ
{ if ( 3 < match < (h-level+1))
then { if (isRNghbr) then increment position[X+l] by (Min_d-1);
if (isRNghbr or isLNghbr) then Loop 1(match-3, match-3, 1);}
if (match equals (h-level+1))
then if ( isRNghbr or isLNghbr)
then { if (isRght and (position[level] equals (rekeyPos [Ievel]+1)))
then decrement position[level+l];
if ((isRght and (position[level+l]<l)) or
(not isRght and (ID > rekepMsg.ID[match-2])))
then { if (isRght)
then { decrement position[level];
increment position[level+l] by Min_d; }
else { increment position[level]; position[level+l]==l;}
if (KDT equals XORBP)
then keyList.updateBP(match-3, rekeyMsg.xoredBP(match-3, 1));
Loop 1(match-3, match-3, 1);
} else Loop 1(match-2, match-2, 0);

}
Loop3(match-2, h-level-3, 1);
if (match < (h-level-1))
then { if (rekeyMsg.isRght[h-level-2] and (ID > rekeyMsg.ID[h-level-2]))
then decrement position[level+1];
Loopl(h-level-2, h-level-2, 1);}
LoopI(S, h, 0)
}

Fig. 72. The B"^-LKH rekey client MergeQ, and ShiftQ methods.
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Exam ple
This example illustrates B"^-LKH rekey client processing for the retumed rekeyMsg
{SEQ, DECREASE, 1.1.1.2, -, (100, 100, 170, 490), (T, T, T), mrgRekey{K^A, T),
mrgRekey{K\, T), mrgRekey(GK, T)} in the last step in the B'*^-LKH example in appendix
A. Initially, all rekey clients maintains h = 4, and when rekeyMsg is received they will
execute the Decrease() method. All rekey clients will adjust h to be equal to 3 and keyList
size will be 4 after the method is executed.
Note that keyList.update{key_number, rekeyMsg.packet[packet_number]) will be
shortened to KLU{key_number, packe_ number). We will trace the rekey client position
and the updated keys for four members with match = 2, 3, 4, and 5.
The group member whose ID = 50 has match = 2 and position = l . I . l . l . The rekey
client executes Loop3(0, 2, 1) {(KLU(1, 0); KLU(2, 1), KLU(3, 2)} and position
becomes 1.1.1.
The group member whose ID = 166 has match = 3 and position = 1.1.2.1. The rekey
client executes the condition with X = 2 and isRight = T {position =1.1.2.2, KLU(1, 0)}
and then executes Loop3(l, 2, \){position =1.1.1.2, KLU(2, 1); KLU(3, 2)} and position
becomes 1.1.2.
The group member whose ID = 198 has match = 4 and position =1.2.1.1. The rekey
client executes the condition w ith X = 1 and isRight =T {position =1.2.2.1, KLU(2, 1)},
then executes Loop3(2, 2, 1) {position =1.1.2.1, KUL(3, 1)}, finally position becomes
1. 2 . 1.
The group member whose ID = 530 has match = 5 and position = 2.1.1.1. The rekey
client executes the condition with X = 0 and isRght =T {position = 2.2.1.1, KLU(3, 2)}
and position becomes 2.1.1.
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APPENDIX C
B^-LKH REKEY SUB TREE LABELED INSERTION

This appendix details the B^-LKH rekey sub-tree (rekeyTree) labeled insertion o f key
nodes. A key node is inserted into rekeyTree in one of four ways namely, insert,
insertSplit, insertMerge, and insertShift. The simple insertion insert(H, RC, type) inserts
the key node N labeled according to the policy determined rekey condition RC and the
rekey message type that is either ADD or REMOVE as shown in TABLE IX. Another
form o f simple insertion is insertQsi, label) that inserts the key node N with the specified
label, and InsertQtT) that inserts the key node N with no label.

TABLE IX
LABEL OF KEY NODE N FOR SIMPLE RM TYPES: ADD & REMOVE
RC\type

ADD

REMOVE

NONE

“A ”

-

PBS

“G A ”

-

PFS

“A ”

“GR”

PBaFS

“G A ”

“GR”

The insertSplit(H, RC) o f a key node N inserts two key nodes N1 and N2 to the
rekeyTree for two nodes that result o f node N spliting. Every internal key, GK or KEK,
has an LKH internal entry that contains a pointer to its child node, where the child node
for GK is root node. A split key node N means the child node pointed to by that key
internal entry is split. Let N be the node specified to be split to two nodes N1 and N2,
where N1 is chosen from the two nodes such that it contains the newly inserted entry and
N2 is its neighbor that share entries previously inserted in N. Initially, the key for both
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nodes N1 and N2 entries will contain the key that was in N and at least N1 key will be
regenerated. The label o f the two key nodes when inserted in the rekeyTree is specified
according to RC as shown in TABLE X. Note that if N exists in the rekeyTree, N1 and
N2 both will start with N label that could be upgraded. Also note that if RC is NONE, N1
will be labeled “GA” to guarantee the generation (creation) o f that key (which initially
contained the same key as N2) although “A” would be suitable otherwise.

TABLE X
LABELS OF KEY NODES N1 AND N2 FOR A SPLIT KEY NODE
RC

Nl

N2

NONE

“G A ”

-

PBS

“G A ”

-

PFS

“GR”

“GR”

PBaFS

“GR”

“GR”

The insertMerge(N, isRight, RC) of key node N inserts the key node N1 in the
rekeyTree that is merged with N. The key node N1 is determined from isRight value
(right or left neighbor). If N already exists in the rekeyTree, it is deleted first then N1 is
inserted. Inserting N I implies inserting all merged children entries with no label or with
their label if any existed in the rekeyTree. The key node N l will be labeled according to
RC as shown in TABLE XI.
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TABLE XI
LABEL OF MERGED KEY NODE N TO N l
RC

Nl

NONE

“A ”

PBS

“G A ”

PFS

“A ”

PBaFS

“G A ”

The insertShiftQ^, isRight, RC) o f key node N inserts two key nodes N and N l in the
rekeyTree. The node N l is the N neighbor determined from isRight value where an entry
is shifted from N l to N. Both N and N l nodes are labeled according to RC as shown in
TABLE XII.

TABLE XII
LABEL OF SHIFTED KEY NODES FROM N l TO N
RC

N

Nl

NONE

-

-

PBS

“G A ”

-

PFS

“GR”

“GR”

PbaFS

“GR”

“GR”

A leaf entry position in a B^-LKH is represented by an array o f size LKH height h,
where each array entry specifies a child position in the path that leads to the leaf entry.
There are (h + I) keys specified from the position PiP 2 ---Ph
GK, {h-l) KEKsK^_,

..., andX^_^^

follows; the group key

^, and a leaf (individual) key

Assuming the keys specified by certain position are the keys o f key array o f size {h + 1).
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The rekeyTree insertion o f such key array depends on the parameters RC, type, level, and
isRight array. Fig. 73 illustrates the insertion o f the key array to rekeyTree, for all possible
rekey message types and policy-determined rekey condition (RC).

if ((type equals ADD) or (type equals REMOVE))
then { for (I = 1 to h) rekeyTree.insert(key [I], RC, type);
if (type equals ADD) then rekeyTree.insert(key[h+l]); }
if (type equals SPLIT)
then { for (I = 1 to (level +1)) rekeyTree.insert(key[I], RC, ADD);
for (I = (level+2) to h) rekeyTree.insertSplit(key[I], RC);
rekeyTree.insert(key[h+l ]);}
if (type equals INCREASE)
then { rekeyTree.insert(key[l], RC, ADD);
rekeyTree.insert(K], “GR”);
rekeyTree.insert(K , “GR”);
for (I =2 to h) rekeyTree.insertSplit(key[I], RC);
rekeyTree.insert(key[h+l]);}
2

if (type equals MERGE)
then { for (I = 1 to (level+1)) rekeyTree.insert(key[I], RC, REMOVE);
for (I = (level+2) to h)
rekeyTree.insertMerge(key[I], isRight[h+l-I], R C );}
if (type equals SHIFT)
then { for (I = 1 to (level+1)) rekeyTree.insert(key[I], RC, REMOVE);
rekeyTree.insertShift(key[level+2], isRight[h-level-l], RC);
for (I = (level+3) to h)
rekeyTree.insertMerge(key[I], isRight[h+l-I], R C );}
if (type equals DECREASE)
then { rekeyTree.delete(GK);
for (I = 1 to (h -1 )) rekeyTree.insertMerge(key[I], isRight[h-I], RC); }

Fig. 73. Labeled insertion o f key array to a B^-LKH rekey sub-tree.
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Exam ple
For the B''^-LKH key view shown in Fig. 74, where degree <i = 4, height h = 3, and
group size n = 29. I f RC is PBaFS, and a rekeying has been initiated for batch o f requests
that contains 4 Add requests, 2 Remove requests, and 2 Refresh requests as shown in the
figure. The 2 removed entries’ positions are marked “Rplc” for replacement by 2 added
entries, the other 2 added entries’ positions are marked “Add”, and the 2 refreshed
entries’ positions are marked “Rfrsh”.

GK

•2.2

- 1.2

Rfrsh

Rfrsh

-2.3

-3.2

Rplc

Rplc

Add

Add

Fig. 74. A B'^-LKH key view and a batch o f requests.

A LKH leaf entry position is determined by a path that starts from the root node and
specifies the child node number in all nodes in the path that leads to that leaf node. The
positions o f the two refreshed individuals’ entries are 1.2.3, and 2.2.1 (Rfrsh marked
nodes). The two removed individuals’ leaf entries will be replaced by two new
individuals’ leaf entries (i.e., a new member will be assigned the same ID o f a removed
member). The two replaced entries are at positions 2.3.3 and 4.2.2 (Rplc marked nodes).
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The other two new individuals’ leaf entries are assigned two newly generated IDs and
inserted into the original LKH. From a new individual ID the position o f his individual
leaf entry is determined (Add marked positions). The rekeyTree, shown in Fig. 75, is
constructed for the replaced, refreshed, and added entries as follows:
1.

Replacing the leaf entry at position 2.3.3 leads to rekeyTree insertion o f the key
nodes GK,

2.

K 2 ,

and

K 2 .3

labeled “GR”, and the leaf key

K 2 .3 .3

with no label.

Replacing the leaf entry at position 4.2.2 leads to rekeyTree insertion o f the key
nodes GK,

K 4 ,

and

K 4 .2

labeled “GR”, and the leaf key node

K 4 ,2 ,2

with no label. Note

that GK is inserted before with the same label.
3.

Refreshing the entry at position 1.2.3 leads to rekeyTree insertion o f the key nodes
GK, Ki, and Ki labeled “A”, and the leaf key node Ki.
,2

2.3

with no label. Note that GK

is inserted before with higher ranked label.
4.

Refreshing the entry at position 2.2.1 leads to rekeyTree insertion o f the key nodes
GK, K , and K
2

2.2

labeled “A”, and the leaf key node K , .i with no label. Note that
2 2

GK, and K are inserted before with higher ranked labels.
2

5.

The randomly generated IDa for the first added individual positions his entry at
1.1.2, where RM type for such insertion is ADD. Inserting that leaf entry leads to
rekeyTree insertion o f the key nodes GK, Ki, and Kj i labeled “GA” and the leaf key
node K i

,].2

with no label. Note that GK is already inserted before with higher ranked

label and Ki is already inserted before with “A” label that is upgraded to “GA”.
6.

The randomly generated IDb for the second added individual positions his entry at
3.2.2, where RM type o f such insertion is SPLIT and level is 1. Inserting that leaf
node leads to rekeyTree insertion o f the key nodes GK, and K labeled “GA”. For the
3

split node

K 3 .2

where N l (that has the new entry) is

K 3 .2

N2 will be inserted labeled “GR”. The leaf key node C .

1 3 2 .2

and N is Ksj^ both N l and
2

is inserted with no label.
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i K2
I “G R ”

1

I

i “G A

f

K i.i

1 “G A ”

K,.,.2

1 K1.2

1i

“A ”

1I

i

K i .2.3

K2.2
“A ”

1 I

Ii

K 2 .2 .I

1

K3
1 “G A ”
!

!

i

K3.2
i “GR”

K2.3
“G R ”

K 2 .3.3

1

1 K4

1

i

i “G R ”

i

1 K4.2
I “G R ”

i

i 1 K3.3
i i “G R ”

K 4 .2.2

K 3 .2.2

Fig. 75.The B^-LKH rekey sub-tree constructed for batch o f 8 requests.

The batch RM for such batch o f requests contains:
o

Two replaced positions 2.2.3, and 4.2.2

o

Two refreshed positions 1.2.3, and 2.2.1

o

Two individual RM headers {type = ADD, position = 1.1.2, IDa}and (type = SPLIT,
position = 3.2.2, level = 1, (IDb, IDc)}

o

The rekey packets constructed for all labeled keys in the rekeyTree each according to
its label. The rekeyTree is parsed in post-order generating the rekey packets for the
keys in the following order: K u ,

K 1 .2 ,

K],

K 2 .2 , K 2 .3 , K 2 , K 3 .2 , K 3 .3 , K 3 , K 4 ,2 , K 4 ,

GK.

If encryption-based KDT is used, the rekey packets are as follows:
o

For the two “A” labeled keys are: [{Ki. }Ki. . ] and [{K . }K . .i]

o

For the three “GA” labeled keys are: [{K ,', }Ki.i, {Kj j }Ki.i, ], [{K,' }Ki, {K[ }Ki.j,

2

2 3

2 2

2 2

2

(K;}K,.2Land[{K;}K3, {K',}K,.2, {K',}K,.,]
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o

For the “GR” labeled key K

2 .3

is [{ ^<^ }K- . ,i, {-^
2 ,3

2 3

2 .3

} ^ . , , {-^^ } ^ . . ]- All other
2 3 2

2.3

2

3 3

“GR” labeled key (K , K . , K jj, K . , K , GK) are constructed the same way: a new
2

3 2

4

2

4

key version is generated and encrypted with all its children keys (at the original
LKH).
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APPENDIX D
ACRONYMS

BP

Byte Pattern

DBS

Data Encryption Standard

GK

Group Key

GKM

Group Key Manager

KAP

Key Agreement Protocol

KDT

Key Distribution Technique

KEK

Key Encrypting Key

LKH

Logical Key Hierarchy

PBS

Perfect Backward Secrecy

PFS

Perfect Forward Secrecy

PBaFS

Perfect Backward and Forward Secrecy

RM

Rekey Message
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